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“Is all Greek, grief to me”: Ancient Greek sophistry and the poetics of Charles 
Bernstein 
 
Abstract: This thesis reads the poetry and poetics of Charles Bernstein in relation to 
his interest in sophistry and sophistics. Taking his 1987 volume The Sophist as a 
central text, the influence of a sense of sophistics is developed across his wider range 
of published works. This involves identifying some of the many different 
interpretations of the sophists throughout the history of philosophy, from the early 
dismissals by Plato and Aristotle to the more recent reappraisals of their works. A 
secondary aspect of the thesis is in examining the renewal of interest in the Ancient 
Greek sophists and suggesting some of the affinities between contemporary literary 
theory and poetics and the fragments of the works of the major sophists (primarily 
Protagoras and Gorgias). Finally, I suggest that The Sophist itself is a valuable and 
contemporaneous re-examination of sophistic ideas, that in fact goes further than 
those by academics from within philosophy and rhetoric by virtue of employing the 
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0. I. Introduction – The Critical Situation  
Over the course of the last forty years, Charles Bernstein has emerged as one of the 
most talked about and talkative of language poets. His work both critical and creative 
has become central to the reception of language poetry and his wide and varied 
activities as a facilitator, organizer and editor have ensured the proliferation of 
language poetry and other experimental strands in contemporary poetry culture. While 
there is no critical monograph focusing on his work alone, discussions of his work 
have featured prominently in almost all the major academic publications dealing with 
the language poets. The field of scholarship surrounding his work has steadily grown, 
and includes responses by major critics such as Charles Altieri, Marjorie Perloff, 
Jerome McGann and Gerald Bruns.  In addition, his work has generated significant 
attention from writers both creative and critical, including work by: Jeffrey Nealon, 
Nerys Williams, Maria Damon, Vernon Shetley, Hank Lazer, Linda Reinfeld, 
Benjamin Friedlander, Robert Sheppard, Edwin Morgan, Paul Auster, John Shoptaw, 
Bob Perelman, Pierre Joris, Chris Goode, Timothy Yu, Peter Middleton, Romana Huk 
and Joel Bettridge. Naturally, each of these critics has framed Bernstein’s work 
differently, a necessary condition of critical appraisal but also an indication of the 
variety and multiplicity built into Bernstein’s output.  
In Marjorie Perloff’s groundbreaking 1985 study Dance of the Intellect, she 
presented a Bernstein who willfully flirted with “unintelligibility” or what she had 
previously called “the poetics of indeterminacy” (1981): 
Charles Bernstein takes this sort of wordplay a step further, almost to the point 
of unintelligibility. In “The Sheds of Our Webs”, neologisms abound: “a 
lacrity”, “sumpter”, (“marshy” or “low-lying” on the model of “sump”?), 
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“plentitude”. More important; grammatical position is frequently ambiguous: 
is “sheds” a noun or a gerund (“sheddings”)? “Abandon skirts” a noun 
followed by its direct object or a subject-verb clause? “Tender” a verb or 
adjective of noun? There is no way to be sure, especially since so many of the 
words in ambiguous syntactic positions are homonyms. (1985, 217).  
This syntactic and semantic ambiguity results, in Perloff’s memorable phrase, in a 
poetry that looks as if: “Swinburne or Crane have been put through the Cuisinart: 
what finds its way into the bowl looks at first sight like so many chopped and hence 
unrecognizable vegetables” (218). Perloff’s accounting of Bernstein’s poetry pays 
particular attention to what Linda Reinfeld has called “the very specific sensual 
qualities of the language within which it takes place’ (6). The phrase of Perloff’s title, 
“dance of the intellect”, draws particular attention to this sense of an intellectual 
game, discourse or tryst in which a saturation of textuality results in an open form of 
poetry that is accommodating of difference and impurity. Furthermore, the 
organizational structuring of Perloff’s book locates her chapter dealing with language 
poetry ‘L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poetry in the Eighties’ within (and as the most recent 
iteration of) a continuation of American poetics that follows on from the Modernist 
projects of Pound, Joyce, Beckett and Stevens, through Cage, Oppen and Williams in 
negotiating what she calls “the impasse of the lyric” (180).     
Another early inroad into language poetry criticism was conducted by the 
renowned critic Jerome McGann, whose work on language poetry is particularly 
notable for its ability to synthesize the relevance of contemporary experimental 
poetics with that of writers from the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. In Social 
Values and Poetic Acts (1987), McGann discusses Bernstein’s poetics as 
fundamentally “a practice of discourse rather than a scene of representations” (34). 
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That is to say that rather than attempting to accurately and clearly represent a lyric 
experience or feeling in as concise a fashion as possible, language poetry “carries out 
its discourse” (34) because it “imagines and executes its work in a space that is self-
consciously social and political” (34). Language poetry situates itself therefore within 
the contested arena of how language can be employed in such a way that resists or 
critiques dominant political and social structures. Bernstein’s poems enact a 
performance in which, for McGann, “relationships and forms of order can be had only 
if they are actively made by the reader” and where “these relationships and forms of 
order are multiple and that they shift from reader to reader and from reading to 
reading” (211). In this way, Bernstein’s poetry can be considered to enact a form of 
textual participation for the reader that acknowledges and embraces multiplicity and 
indeterminacy while avoiding a tyrannous subjectivity or finality. As such, Reinfeld 
has noted, McGann’s writing extended Perloff’s attention to the charged, language-
centered, textual thickness of language poetry into “a sense of poetry as ideological 
critique” (6).      
In Reinfeld’s own volume, published in 1992 at a time when language 
poetry’s status within both popular and critical circles was considerably more secure, 
she stresses language poetry as a form of “writing as rescue” (1) in myriad forms. She 
sees language poetry originating in part as “an impulse to save American poetry from 
its own insularity – and the potentially overwhelming theoretical discourse of 
Continental theory as well” (150). Bernstein- one of three poets who are studied in 
depth in Reinfeld’s volume, the other two being Susan Howe and Michael Palmer- is 
central to this project as a writer within whose work continental and American 
influences are set into “issues of conflict and resistance directly” (9). She “reads 
Bernstein against Derrida” (9), riffing on Bernstein’s professional life as a “freelance 
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editor for technical journals for doctors and pharmacists” (50) (prior to gaining an 
academic appointment) and Derrida’s ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’. Her essay functions as a 
way of bringing into focus the ways in which “it appears to be a matter of principle 
for Bernstein not to follow Derrida” (51). Specifically, she writes that “Bernstein is 
personally committed to maintaining the possibility of a reasonable, politically 
enlightened discourse, a project he considers better served by Stanley Cavell’s The 
Claim of Reason than Derridean disclaimers and dissemination” (57). Nevertheless, 
Reinfeld suggests, the writings of Derrida are relevant as an unspoken counterpoint to 
many of Bernstein’s texts and “there is no disputing that Derrida’s text can serve to 
illuminate the unique space occupied by the activity… that certainly invites an 
approach that is not innocent of Derridean theory or deconstructive modes of 
reading… Like Derrida, he never hesitates to play with poison” (58). Indeed, drawing 
attention to the ways in which language deconstructs itself and can be deconstructed 
in the process of reading does, as Reinfeld suggests, have potency to both disorient 
and re-address attitudes to language and the literary in a way that can encourage a 
positive, politically and socially aware culture: “in a complacent society, such writerly 
activity has medicinal value” (59).  
If, then, “poison” is the Derridean flipside of “remedy”, both contained within 
the word “pharmakon”, then a language-oriented flipside of Reinfeld’s ‘rescue’ might 
be the near homophonic ‘askew’. As she writes: “it makes sense to read Bernstein the 
way he writes, with eccentricity, taking literally his invitation to make the most of 
accidental gaps and contradictions” (59). Reinfeld’s book is an important influence 
upon this thesis, because although she doesn’t explicitly address Bernstein as a writer 
for whom sophistry or sophistics is a mode of writing and reading to be taken 
seriously (short of a nod towards the title of his 1987 collection The Sophist –“figures 
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who anticipate Derrida’s anti-platonic bias” (80) -, nevertheless, her location of 
Bernstein’s work within the context of Derrida’s essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ does 
indirectly establish the link and posit the issues at stake. In addition, she does 
characterize those qualities that make Bernstein sophistic, namely a “philosophical 
disposition- also a disposition toward equivocation and verbal indirection” (80). For it 
is in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ that Derrida addresses some of the most potent qualities of 
the sophist for a contemporary poetics. For example, Derrida draws attention to the 
non-totalizing and anti-universalizing power of the sophists’ relativity and relates this 
specifically to the dynamics of writing as act: “the author of the written speech is 
already entrenched in the posture of the sophist: the man of non-presence and non-
truth. The incompatibility between the written and the true is clearly announced” (73). 
Bernstein’s poetry could equally be considered to announce this “incompatibility” and 
find its energy and its interest in multiplicities of meanings rather than singularity of 
truth. Similarly, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ also introduces the questions of semblance, 
imitation and mimesis, which will also become central to a sophistic reading of 
Bernstein’s work:  
He who writes with the alphabet no longer even imitates. No doubt because he 
also imitates perfectly. He has a better chance of reproducing the voice 
because phonetic writing decomposes it better and transforms it into abstract 
spatial elements. This de-composition of the voice is here what both best 
conserves it and what best corrupts it (Derrida, 139).  
This “de-composition of the voice” is a central tenet of language poetry, as is writing 
in a way that acknowledges the artifice of all writing in a way that rejects 
straightforward imitative writing as a possibility. Language poetry is therefore 
“writing with the alphabet”, an activity that has been visually and conceptually borne 
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out perhaps most performatively by the Canadian poet Steve McCaffery, who “is 
reported to have covered himself in glue and then rolled about on a floor covered with 
Alpha-Bits so as to create, literally, a writing of the body” (Reinfeld, 52). 
More recently, in a study of language poetry published in 2007, the critic 
Nerys Williams has emphasized not the rejection of the lyric (as some earlier critics 
had described) but rather a “conceptual mapping of error as a means of opening up the 
social sphere of the lyric” (27). She suggests that Bernstein’s work employs 
“typographical mistakes and solecisms” to “suggest that the deformation of 
“prescribed rules of grammar & spelling”, opens the text to language as a shared 
commonality. Indeed, Bernstein proposes polemically that “bad grammar” can speak 
more truthfully than correct grammar” (27). By situating “error” as fundamental to his 
poetry and poetics, Williams writes that “for Bernstein, error is strongly linked to a 
political gesture, providing the refutation of an authoritarian rhetoric through humour” 
(29). Williams’ writings on error become particularly relevant to this thesis during 
Chapter 5, which focuses on the role of humour and comic performance in 
Bernstein’s poetry. The political efficacy of such a gesture is generated by the 
problematisation of a lyric subject position to the extent that it draws attention to the 
ways in which our subjecthoods are interdependent and shared through the social and 
cultural links that communities share. Rather than stressing the individualized insight 
of a poet distanced from society, Bernstein’s poetry engages the reader in the 
formation of multiple and indeterminate poetic selves, voices and networks:  
Bernstein’s ideolectical or erring approach to the lyric is premised on an 
attempt to reconfigure an understanding of subjectivity as a complex of social 
relationships. He asserts that the process of reading his poetry activates a 
mutually dependent engagement: “I hope the reader does feel implicated 
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because I want to show that I as a social construction, a product of language 
and not a pre-existing entity outside it; that I is first a we. We’re implicated in 
each other from the first (Williams, 69). 
    
The social dimension of language was also at the heart of the critic George 
Hartley’s 1989 volume Textual Politics and the Language Poets in which he traces 
the contextual contests surrounding the value of experimental writing as ideology 
critique. He summarizes Bernstein’s project as follows:  
Bernstein writes that there is “no natural writing style”. What looks natural 
about a given poem is actually the result of a number of procedures which the 
author may be more or less conscious of when composing. Those procedures 
and assumptions are in fact social constructions which have become 
conventions. Thus most language poets attempt to remind us of the socially 
contrived basis of any writing (xiii).  
Hartley’s interpretation of the socially based textual experiments of the language 
poets puts the emphasis on both the strategies they employ to dispel the illusion of 
“natural” speech or writing patterns and instead increase an awareness that no 
utterance is ever other than “socially contrived” through an exploration of non-
normative writing strategies. While framed in this way, the project seems antagonistic 
and negative, there is a positive side to this project in the sense that if a complacent 
approach to language and assumptions about “natural speech” foster a politically 
disengaged and conservative populous, then conversely, increasing awareness of 
shared social explorations in non-normative and experimental modes will foster a 
more open, enfranchised and dynamic engagement with politics and language. 
Hartley’s text is particularly useful for understanding why language poetry was such a 
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polarizing force when it first emerged, an aspect of its potency that is easy to forget 
now that its place within literary history seems secure. Hartley describes and 
discusses in detail the objections to language poetry expressed by the influential 
Marxist critic Fredric Jameson to give a sense of the contested ground that language 
poetry occupied. Jameson’s primary concern, as summarized by Hartley, is that “such 
poetry, in that it resembles a schizophrenic language as Lacan has described it, 
contributes to – rather than challenges – the reification of late capitalist society” (xiv). 
To quote from Jameson’s text itself, he remarks that “when the links of the signifying 
chain snap, then we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and 
unrelated signifiers” (Jameson, 26).  
The issue at stake is of crucial importance to the poetry of language poets and 
to Bernstein’s work in particular. Bernstein, of all the language poets, is perhaps the 
one who has made most room in his work for excursions away from disjunctive 
modes (modes where the “signifying chain” could be perceived to have “snapped”) 
into, I would argue, no less experimental but certainly less able to be characterized as 
“schizophrenic” or fragmentary modes. Bernstein’s objection to a characterization 
such as Jameson’s would certainly be that his perception of a “snap; or severance in 
‘the signifying chain’ is in fact its re-energizing. As he writes in the essay 
‘Semblance’: ‘not “death” of the referent – but a recharged use of the multivalent 
referential vectors that any word has” (1984, 115). One issue with Jameson’s remarks 
is that they fail to see a difference between employing disjunction, disruption or 
fragmentation at the level of a poem’s structure or organization, and speaking in such 
a state as a result of extreme trauma in the brain. As Hartley remarks, Jameson can be 
accused of confusing “poetic language with schizophrenic speech” (42). Poetic 
language that frequently employs fragmentation and disjunction does so to 
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problematize the sense of a natural and normative language in order to suggest 
alternative societal structures and to encourage the reader’s participation in realizing 
and discovering those structures at the level of the text. As Perelman himself remarks, 
whose poem ‘China’ bore the brunt of Jameson’s critical analysis, his own experience 
of reading language poems is not that of schizophrenia or fragmentation. Rather, 
taking the work of Ron Silliman as an example, he remarks that, “far from being 
fragments, his sentences derive from a coherent, wide-ranging political analysis. 
Contrary to Jameson’s description of the New Sentence, this writing seems to me self-
critical, ambitiously contextualized, and narrative in a number of ways” (67). This 
issue becomes central to chapter 4 where I examine some of the language techniques 
and devices employed in Bernstein’s The Sophist. In particular, his sense of 
‘Dysraphism’ as a mode of writing becomes important, putting as it does the 
emphasis not on disjunction or fragmentation but on the combination and seaming of 
elements together to form what he terms an “overall weave” (2001, 391). By focusing 
on the ways language poems are or can be stitched together or stitched up, Bernstein 
negates Jameson’s sense of fragmented schizophrenia and replaces it with a poetics of 
seams, of the bridges, fastenings and seams between language units.  
The field of scholarly and critical writing surrounding Bernstein’s work has 
recently been added to by the publication of The Salt Companion to Charles 
Bernstein, published in 2013, which provides a range of critical perspectives on 
Bernstein’s poetic output up to the date of publication. As such, The Salt Companion 
to Charles Bernstein is the most recent and significant development in Bernstein 
criticism, the book including invaluable essays focusing on a very wide range of his 
poetic output. As with many similar publications from Salt, the book includes 
appraisals, tributes, essays and poems from fellow poets as well as academics, which 
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is useful in considering in what ways Bernstein’s work is considered influential or 
esteemed by fellow practitioners engaged in their own poetic investigations and 
experiments. The selection of included authors is international and features 
contributions both poetic and critical from younger writers such as Lars Palm, Kirsten 
Gallagher and Tim Peterson alongside British poets such as Allen Fisher and Maggie 
O’Sullivan and critics within and also outside the parameters of what might be 
considered the field of experimental poetry scholarship such as Steven Salmoni, 
Thomas Fink and Kimberley Lamm. The critical directions in which the book 
stretches Bernstein’s poetry are therefore genuinely expansive. Of particular 
relevance to my research are two essays published in this collection: ‘Taking on the 
Official Voice: Charles Bernstein’s Poetic Sophistry and Post-Process Writing 
Pedagogy’ by Megan Swihart Jewell and ‘Beyond the Valley of the Sophist: Charles 
Bernstein, Irony and Solidarity’ by Paul Stephens. As their titles suggest, these essays 
take their cue from the title of Bernstein’s 1987 collection The Sophist and consider 
his work in relation to the figure of ‘the sophist’. Specifically, Jewell discusses 
Bernstein’s pedagogical style in relation to sophistry and claims that Bernstein 
“actively engaged issues of co-option through a characteristic sophistic ventriloquism, 
or direct rhetorical enactment” (115). The thrust of Jewell’s argument is that 
Bernstein’s work is sophistical in its approach to and investment in rhetoric. While 
they assert the link between Bernstein’s poetry and sophistry and thus initiate the 
discourse surrounding this aspect of Bernstein’s work, neither of these essays actually 
considers Bernstein’s writings in relation to the writings of specific thinkers 
associated with the group of sophists of the 5th Century BC, the most well known of 
which include Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus and Antiphon. ‘The sophist’, then, is 
merely a figure set up (as it was by Plato) in which the particulars of sophists are 
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made irrelevant in favour of a version of them that (however positively it may be read 
in light of postmodernity) remains essentially the same as the conception that has seen 
the category ‘sophist’ maligned for centuries. Nor does either essay in any detail 
consider the relation of Bernstein’s text to that of the same title, Plato’s dialogue The 
Sophist or the wealth of critical and philosophical work that the dialogue has 
engendered from philosophers such as Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze and Lyotard 
among others. Finally, neither of these essays (nor any other that I am aware of) 
consider Bernstein’s book The Sophist in itself (and in conjunction with his critical 
writings) as a contribution to the growing movement within certain fields of academia 
(the discipline of Rhetoric Studies is where this is most visible) to re-evaluate and 
reassess the contributions of the sophists and of sophistics as a valid theoretical and 
critical mode. These three aims are central to this thesis: to consider Bernstein’s 
poetics in relation to the surviving fragments of the sophists; to discuss Bernstein’s 
text as a response to Plato’s The Sophist (and its surrounding field); and finally to 
establish Bernstein’s The Sophist as a contribution to the emergent field of 
contemporary re-evaluations of the sophists.    
However, many of the other contributions to The Salt Companion to Charles 
Bernstein also raise issues that are of interest to a sophistic reading of Bernstein’s 
poetics. Poet Caroline Bergvall stresses Bernstein’s work as constitutive of a 
“connection between written and spoken performance so tenuous as to be nearly 
reversed. Or rather where the performance of speaking assists the writing and where 
the politics of engagement take place at the point of the delivery” (9). This aspect of 
Bernstein’s poetics raises itself at a number of points in this thesis: in most depth in 
Chapter 5 where Bernstein’s performance strategies are considered in relation to those 
of the sophist Gorgias, though also in Chapter 2 in which Bernstein’s work is 
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considered as ‘talkative’ in relation both to the oral performances of ancient sophists 
and the conversational philosophizing of Rogers Albritton. The critic Jason Lagapa 
advances a sense of Bernstein’s “grammar of pragmatism: a pragmatic politics and 
poetics in whose foundation is an ever more keen attention to the operations and 
workings of language and grammar… Bernstein’s grammar of pragmatism has its 
roots in the American pragmatist philosophical tradition of William James and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson” (179). This thesis posits roots for just such a relativist and language-
centered approach to truth that stretch further back than pragmatists or 
transcendentalists to the sophists of Ancient Greece. Kirsten Gallagher’s fantastically 
indulgent account of being taught by Bernstein in the poetics program at SUNY 
Buffalo is also instructive in giving a sense of Bernstein as pedagogue, an aspect of 
Bernstein’s multiple roles that is decidedly sophistic in nature. The sophists were, 
after all, “the first professional teachers” (Schiappa, 4).  Thomas Fink, meanwhile, 
narrows his focus onto a recurrent form within Bernstein’s oeuvre, that of the 
catalogue or list poem. Fink writes that this form allows Bernstein to explore “the 
complex interactions of differing ideologies so that expedient simplifications do not 
induce readers to ignore the complexities of political issues” (278). Bernstein’s lists 
are complex and often seem to resist their own sense of cohesion as a list. They also 
frequently engage gender and racial stereotypes in a way that complicates a sense of 
the cultural and social significance of their referential politics (that enacts the violence 
and offence inherent in certain utterances and interrogates the significance of this): “A 
black man waiting at a bus stop/ A white woman sitting on a stool/ A Fillipino eating 
a potato/ A Mexican boy putting on shoes/ A Hindu hiding in igloo” (2008, 3). The 
repetitive rhetorical structuring of these lines from ‘In Particular’ is fundamental to 
their success as an investigation into power relations within language. This kind of 
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poetic activity, drawing attention to the political and social assumptions that are at the 
heart of our language use, our uses of rhetoric, is, this thesis suggests, a sophistic 
project in which understanding the uses and abuses of rhetoric is of paramount 
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0. II.  Poet-Critic and Sophist 
 
Bernstein has expanded his activities far beyond those usually associated with a poet, 
taking on myriad roles as a public intellectual: teacher, critic, curator, conference and 
lecture series co-ordinator, frequent collaborator, actor, radio show host, film-maker, 
librettist, professor, editor, publisher and many more. Bernstein’s career has so 
embraced variety and resisted singular characterization that it seems no surprise that 
in addition to his over forty volumes of poetry and prose, he has appeared in 
advertisements for The Yellow Pages, the Hollywood film Finding Forrester, a 
collaboration with the artist Richard Tuttle, while also lecturing on Louis Zukofsky in 
Seoul, contemporary Italian poetry in New York and directing experimental theatre 
productions of Peter Weiss’s Marat/Sade, among other plays. In translated form, 
Bernstein’s poetry has been published in magazines and/or full length publications 
around the world, in Germany, Italy, China, France, Iceland, Poland, Finland and 
Brazil, to name only a few. Across all these activities, one thing constantly remains, 
even amid his explorations of multiple perspectives, personalities and ways of seeing: 
his commitment to and exploration of “poetic thinking as an activated potential for all 
people” (1992, 225). When a figure so embraces diversity and multiplicity in his 
approach, the question naturally arises as to what to call this figure. One answer might 
be to expand the word ‘poet’ in our culture, to create a public role for poets and to 
reconfigure the way poets are perceived. Bernstein’s poetry continually challenges 
conventional assumptions about what role a poet takes in society and he has 
repeatedly suggested ways in which the poet has potential to be taken seriously as 
having an impactful relationship to public and social constitutions. This isn’t to 
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suggest an ‘official’ role for the poet such as ‘Poet Laureate’. After all, Bernstein has 
frequently railed against what he calls “Official Verse Culture” (2011, 38) and he has 
also remarked that “the role of the poet in society is to/ roll, i.e. /not get stuck, /don’t 
worry about the bumps” (2010, 189). The poet’s function, then, is not to be 
officialised into a pseudo-political position. Rather, it is to posit a role for the poet as 
unofficial, as the underside and inverse of the ‘statesperson’, who can nevertheless 
impact upon the culture in which they find themselves through “exercising the right to 
reconvene” (1992, 225) and interrogating the structures and systems (both political 
and linguistic) under and through which we live. This is the “poet-critic” from 
Bernstein’s influential essay ‘Revenge of the Poet-Critic’, a figure who remarks:  
Do beware the role of public intellectual, my friend, for when The New York 
Times starts talking about either the death or the rebirth of the public 
intellectual, it can only remind us that intellectuality as a form of linguistically 
investigative activity has been banned for a long time from its pages and that 
public intellectuals unwilling to clip their tongues the better to induce in 
readers thinking-deficit disorder have not gone away, they have been barred 
from this and other standard bearers of the culture (2010, 6). 
 
One model for this expanded sense of poet-critic has been suggested by the 
title of Bernstein’s seminal collection The Sophist. Above all, the version of the 
sophist this thesis is concerned with aligning Bernstein alongside is a thinker engaged 
in and standing for “intellectuality as a form of linguistically investigative activity” 
who “has been barred from… standard bearers of the culture” ever since the dismissal 
and eradication of their contribution to philosophy by Plato, Aristotle and most of the 
subsequent history of Western philosophy. However, in suggesting “the sophists” as a 
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useful model for thinking about Bernstein’s poetics (and more widely about language-
oriented, critical and politically engaged writing), there is an intended awareness that 
the idea of “the sophists” that is being made use of is, as Edward Schiappa has 
written, a “mirage” (1991, 5). While it is possible to engage with the ideas of the 
sophists from fragments of their extant writings (in particular Gorgias and 
Protagoras), the fragmented nature of this evidence also leads to extensive use of third 
party materials, a practice that makes “the sophists”, as Victor Vitanza has remarked 
“three times removed” (1997, 29). The sophists are themselves an illusion and a 
construction created in part by detractors as far back as Plato and Aristotle who 
attempted to define their own activities as philosophers against the, as they saw it, 
chimerical, dangerous and inauthentic teachings of the sophists. Nevertheless, it is in 
part for this reason that aligning Bernstein with the sophists appears both productive 
and appropriate. Bernstein is one in a long line of language-oriented thinkers whose 
works have embodied ideas of “the sophists” in challenging standard academic 
practice and in linking poetry, politics and philosophy in genre-exceeding works. As 
Bernstein has himself remarked:  
If, as a culture, as a society, we find no consensus on a single tradition that 
marks our heritage and discloses our alignments and mis-alignments, then it is 
up to each of us- bricoleurs- to make our own; not, however, in our own name, 
but in the name of whatever socious for which we wish to stand (2001, 169).  
The sophists form a critical part of this bricolaged “socious” that constitutes one 
version of the contextual traditions in which Bernstein’s poetry can be understood. 
Reading Bernstein as a contemporary “sophist” reads his work as part of a 
multitudinous tradition of language-oriented “poet-critics” who have challenged, 
parodied and transgressed uni-vocal and universal logic as the only modes for 
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thinking. In summary, then, the argument advanced in this thesis is two-fold: firstly, 
that the sophists of Ancient Greece, particularly figures such as Protagoras, Gorgias 
and Antiphon, offer useful windows through which to read Bernstein’s poetry and 
poetics in line with the radically democratic and skeptical approach that they adopted 
in the 5th Century BC; secondly, that Bernstein’s writings (both poetic and critical) 
amount to a significant contribution to the recent development in academia towards 
renewed interest in (and respect for) the fragmentary, paradoxical and at times brash 
and baffling work of the sophists.     
The first section of Chapter 1 offers a critical commentary on these 
developments in academic discussions of the sophists, highlighting their renaissance 
as thinkers to be taken seriously, offering a significant critical ‘other’ to the standard 
Western philosophy canon. Taking a broadly chronological approach, this chapter is 
designed to give the theoretical backdrop to the major contributions to one of the most 
startling turnarounds in the humanities, the re-assessment and rehabilitation of the 
sophists. Where relevant, this chapter pinpoints specific areas of interest to 
contemporary poetics and to Bernstein’s poetry in particular. However, in the main, 
the focus of the chapter is on painting a sense on how ‘the sophists’ have been and 
continue to be seen by a wide range of critics from various disciplines. By no means 
is this chapter intended to give a complete account, or particularly to synthesise the 
different approaches taken in the different and divergent considerations given to 
sophistry and sophistics. Rather, this divergence within the sense of who and what the 
sophists are is itself part of the potency of reading Bernstein’s work in a contested 
field where critical questions regarding language, community and identity are up for 
grabs. The sophist is contest, is disagreement, agon and ambiguity. This section is 
intended to give a flavor of that rather than diminish it through neatly synthesizing a 
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singular version of sophistry. The second half of this chapter draws on the first to 
identify three areas of sophistic thought that are of particular relevance to a study of 
Bernstein’s poetry. These are: pedagogy, professionalism and semblance. Three 
touchstones that powerfully link Bernstein’s poetics to that of the sophists, these 
concepts are unpacked in relation to Bernstein’s work and illustrated with reference to 
his pedagogical approaches (including significant analysis of his syllabi at both 
Buffalo and the University of Penn), poems and critical writings.  
Chapter 2 takes a fourth feature of sophistics, an investment in the act of 
talking, and suggests a poetics of conversation that is relevant to both the works of 
Bernstein and David Antin, with whom Bernstein has collaborated. As well as briefly 
considering the influence of Stanley Cavell on Bernstein’s poetics, which has been 
fairly widely attended to by critics, this chapter also focuses on the influence of 
another of Bernstein’s professors at Harvard, the philosopher Rogers Albritton whose 
work has received little attention in relation to Bernstein’s writing practice precisely 
because Albritton was invested in talking rather than writing as a philosophical modus 
operandi. Given the centrality to sophistry of the act of public speaking and the 
agonistic conversations and debates of the agora, a poetics of ‘talking’ is sophistic in 
nature and practice.  
Following on from these discussions, Chapter 3 looks at one specific example 
of how Bernstein’s activities as a poet and editor have emphasized and engendered a 
poetics of conversation and discourse of the sort familiar within the sophistic context 
of the agora. L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, the magazine edited by Bernstein and 
Andrews between 1978 and 1981 is examined in this chapter as an exemplar of a 
discourse-oriented and conversational multi-authored text in which individual 
contributions are placed into conversation with each other by the editors.   The focus 
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on this chapter is not just the magazine as an instance of productive discourse and an 
opportunity for the proliferation of ongoing conversation about each others poems and 
poetics; rather, it also considers L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E as a performance of the 
ways in which the writers associated with divergent geographical locations of 
language poetry came to define themselves both locally and across states and nations 
as a community and otherwise. Key to this is process is the conviction on both 
Bernstein and Andrews parts to avoid a sense of ‘groupism’ and the narrowness of 
aligning themselves as a narrow poetic movement or faction. Therefore, 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E consistently expanded and left open the sense of its 
community-orientation and was purposively engaged in an act of enlarging a notion 
of relevance and audience for poets associated with the journal. Section 2 of this 
chapter contextualizes the theoretical underpinnings of social and communal poetic 
practices through Bernstein’s essays ‘Thought’s Measure’ and ‘Artifice of 
Absorption’, in which he considers the ways in which linguistic structurings can 
reflect and create social and political structures. The word “measure” itself becomes 
important within these considerations because if it is read sophistically the word 
“measure” cannot but resonate with Protagoras’s famous “man measure” fragment in 
which he states “man is the measure of all things”. Within this chapter, then, is an in 
depth discussion of this fragment  and the various interpretations to which it has been 
subjected and their relevancies to Bernstein’s essay ‘Thought’s Measure’ and his 
wider poetic concerns.  
Chapter 4 examines in detail and through a number of close readings of poems 
within the book, Bernstein’s seminal 1987 volume The Sophist.  Given the nature of 
this study, this text is of particular relevance to understanding Bernstein’s relation to 
sophists and sophistry. The intention within this portion of the study is to situate 
	   24	  
Bernstein’s text in relation to those other reassessments of sophistry that were written 
around the 1980s and 1990s, a field to which I suggest Bernstein’s The Sophist also 
belongs. The focus of this section is on the rhetorical devices that Bernstein employs 
and how these create a poetics of sophistic alertness to the ways in which political and 
social systems are constructed and maintained through language and rhetoric.  
Chapter 5 looks in more detail at two of Bernstein’s more recent publications, 
With Strings and Girly Man. These texts continue Bernstein’s engagement with 
sophistic ideas and poetic postures and refine and further explore sophistics, 
particularly in relation to humour. A number of critics have noted of these later 
publications that they represent a shift in Bernstein’s mode from his early radical 
textual and linguistic experiments to his later slapstick and parodic incursions into 
poems and performances that at times read more like stand-up comedy than they do 
innovative poetics. This chapter puts forward an argument that there is a sophistic 
continuation between both the earlier works and these later works. I also mean to 
suggest that issues relating to sophistry and rhetoric have become more central to 
Bernstein’s writing in recent years, particularly in publications such as My Way: 
Speeches and Poems (1999), Girly Man (2006), Attack of the Difficult Poems: Essays 
and Inventions (2011) and Recalculating (2013). In the introduction to The Salt 
Companion to Charles Bernstein, William Allegrezza noted that Bernstein’s work has 
come to rely more on “humour and accessibility” (2) than his previous work. An aim 
of this study is to demonstrate that this shift relates to an increasing importance of 
different rhetorical registers within his work, including but not limited to an 
“accessibility” that in fact reveals itself to be anything but ‘simple’. Furthermore, 
reading these books sophistically also provides a context through which to combine 
an examination of both comedy and performance which have increasingly seemed 
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central to Bernstein’s poetic practices. The figure of Gorgias becomes central to this 
consideration, for it is Gorgias of all the sophists who most embodies a sense of a 
parodic and comic poet and artist as well as a quixotic linguist experimentalist.   
In focusing on the work of Charles Bernstein in contexts of previously little-
explored territories such as the philosophical projects of the sophists and Rogers 
Albritton, this thesis is intended to explore theoretical contexts for Bernstein’s work, 
outside of those traditionally associated with language poetry. This isn’t to deny the 
importance of the collective projects of language poetry, nor to deny the power of 
language poetry’s breach with the various incarnations of what Bernstein calls 
“Official Verse Culture”. Rather, it is to acknowledge Reinfeld’s remark that 
“language poetry has no future. That is to say, although contemporary experimental 
writing continues to engage an increasingly diverse community of readers and writers, 
it cannot be tracked down as a form apart from time; it inhabits its tenses actively, 
politically, and without respect for definition, property rights, or borderline 
disputes…Their poetics cannot be understood as derived from a shared theoretical 
base” (148). Language poetry, she suggests, is a concept that was useful at one time 
for critics to identify writers associated with certain characteristics that emerged in 
American poetry in the 1970s and 1980s. However, even in the early Nineties when 
Reinfeld was writing she felt the category losing some of its value because “it has 
become a commonplace to say all poets are language poets” (149). Indeed, Reinfeld is 
not the only writer to have taken issue with the continuation of using a single term to 
characterize the procedures of a diverse group of writers and in particular there has 
been discord over what specific term to use, with “Language poetry”, “language 
writing”, “langpo”, “L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E writing”, “language-centered writing” 
and “language oriented writing” all possibilities alongside many more variations 
	   26	  
besides. As Bob Perelman has written, “while language writing has, by the mid 
nineties become a recognized literary historical term, there was never any self-
consciously organized group known as the language writers or poets- not even a fixed 
name” (1996, 12). By moving away from the sole or predominant context of the 
writings of other writers who have generally been considered a part of the groupings 
of language poets, this study aims to pay heed to the fact that while there hasn’t been 
such a thing as a magazine exclusively of “language poetry” for twenty five years or 
so, many of the writers associated with the movement have continued to write and 
publish and that their work has in some senses drifted away from the initial shared 
interests that united them. At the very least, these shared interests have developed in 
different ways for many of the writers associated with the tendency and so it has 
become more relevant to look at these specifics and differences than at characterizing 
the moment of language poetry as it played out in the 70s and 80s. This strategy is 
also in part intended to avoid the all-too-often made claim that the theoretical writings 
of language poets are more important than their poems themselves. In the case of the 
language poets, this is an illogical viewpoint that doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, either in 
relation to the theoretical texts or to poetic texts by the language writers. The 
viewpoint that the poems in some way do not ‘measure up’ to the interest of the 
theoretical writings, results in an attempt to normalize and diminish the strangenesses 
of the poems, to remove them from view and focus instead on the theoretical writings, 
which have in at least some cases taken an expository and familiar model of delivery. 
By doing so, it has been easy to neglect the poems themselves.   However, as this 
study aims to demonstrate, this dichotomy between theoretical writing on the one 
hand and poetic writing on the other is dissolved and problematized, particularly in 
the work of Bernstein, where the theoretical work is part of the creative project and 
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indistinguishable from it. As Bernstein has written: “claims for poetry, even of the 
most theoretical or untenable or theatrical kinds, have the same status as any other 
type of poetic utterance. Claims have a kind of beauty and certainly kind in tropicality, 
whether they are modest or exaggerated or overly enthusiastic or erroneous. I hear 
claims as engaging, moving sometimes, disturbing. To separate claims from poetry, 
even claims made “outside” the poem, to say, “well that to me seems peripheral” is 
foreign to my conception of poetry” (1992, 156). For Bernstein, the theoretical claims 
made for a poem’s efficacy are essential and integral to a poem’s effect and should 
not be marginalized or set aside as irrelevant. This thesis therefore frequently engages 
with Bernstein’s own “claims” for poetry and relates these claims to the sorts of 
claims that were made by and have subsequently been made about the sophists.  
However, while in some senses this thesis is intended to move away from the 
immediate context of fellow language poets or the initial characterisations of their 
early theoretical concerns and instead broaden out into an appraisal of Bernstein’s 
work that takes more of the depth of his own individual theorizing into account, there 
is one sense in which the context of language poetry’s emergence and reception is 
relevant to the affinity between Bernstein’s poetry and the activities of the sophists in 
Ancient Greece. I want to suggest that at a time when language poetry was 
experiencing a hostile reception by mainstream academia (in a way that is decidedly 
not the case today), the sophists – themselves vilified in academic history - offered 
Bernstein an attractive and compelling analogy for his felt (and perhaps consciously 
devised) marginalization. To use Brian McComiskey’s phrase referring to some of the 
contemporary interest in sophists, they offered “a friend in the fray” (5) as linguistic 
experimentalists whose work was ignored or maligned precisely for this reason. There 
is an irony to this study, however. The analogy is not entirely comfortable and the 
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objections to language poets from critics as diverse as Charles Altieri and Fredric 
Jameson do not map conveniently on to the objections Plato raises of the sophists. 
Nevertheless, it would be possible to reduce in both cases the objection down to a 
single simplification: the use of non-normative language practices coupled with a 
resistance to dominant societal modes of expression. In terms of date of publication, 
Bernstein’s The Sophist (1987) is one of the earliest texts to interrogate and challenge 
traditional readings of the sophists by casting them within the context of his own 
cutting edge experiments with language. However, in spite of this, The Sophist has 
been entirely ignored as a contribution to these debates by those writers who have 
reassessed the sophists’ contribution from fields such as philosophy and rhetoric, 
demonstrating that while contemporary assessments of the sophists may have become 
a burgeoning academic field of enquiry, the radical language interventions and the 
alignment of philosophy with poetry for which they stood, remain outside the 
conventional academic field of vision. However, I have been wary not to assert that 
either Bernstein’s poetry or his essays – be they literary criticism, philosophy, 
educational, or in almost every case, a hybrid of these and other forms – constitute an 
attempt to reposition the Sophists in a philosophical lineage other than a highly 
personalized and conceptual one. This would be a misrepresentation both of the 
substance and the effect of his writings. However, I do hope to demonstrate that 
debates surrounding the Greek Sophists inform Bernstein’s poetry and that the 
sophists open up something of what Bernstein’s poetry offers in terms of ideology 








1. I. The Charge of Sophistry 
 
The great accomplishment of the Sophists was to adopt an experimental 
method toward language that allowed them to channel the logical power of 
abstract thought through novel poetic forms and to generate the possibility for 
political action capable of bringing forth reward and fulfillment in the shared 
life of the polis. (Crick, 41) 
 
Nathan Crick’s radical reading of the sophists in his essay ‘The Sophistical Attitude 
and the Invention of Rhetoric’ positions them as language users on the cutting edge of 
linguistic innovation, using language in new and experimental ways to expand 
thought and to increase participation and political awareness in the growing 
democracy of Greece in the fifth century B.C. He makes the explicit connection 
between what he sees as their linguistic experimentation and the potential they open 
up for “political action”. His reading suggests that the “novel poetic forms” and 
capacity for “abstract thought” employed by the sophists were allied with their 
influence on the novel political form of Greece’s burgeoning democracy in the period. 
This reading of the sophists is attractive and seductive, reckoning them as 
aesthetically adventurous and politically radical experimentalists. Similarly, the 
literary critic Scott Pound has framed the sophists as purveyors of radical wordplay, 
contrasting their reckless and exciting prosodic style with the clarity of the scholar: 
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Unlike the sophist who traffics in ludic utterances that mobilize the inherent 
play of language to bend the meaning of words and turn them against 
themselves and their users, the scholar is a straight shooter, brandishing only 
lucid prose in disinterested analyses cleansed of the play that riddles 
discourse. (Pound, 180) 
 
Both Pound and Crick paint an image of the sophist as a dynamic and 
subversive force (note Pound’s use of the word “mobilize”, Crick’s word “action”), 
whose potency lies in their innovative language use. This is the “charge of sophistry”, 
its power and attraction. However, there is another side of the coin, “the charge of 
sophistry” as accusation and condemnation. These recent assessments and re-framings 
of the achievements of the group of fifth century B.C. thinkers known as “the 
sophists” are at odds with the traditional position they have occupied throughout the 
history of philosophy. These re-evaluations have been made possible due to one of the 
most radical turnarounds of reputation in the history of scholarship, a rejuvenation of 
interest that began in the nineteenth century but which has gathered pace significantly 
in the last few decades.  Prior to this process, no group of thinkers was more in need 
of resuscitation and re-evaluation, more maligned and ignored, than the sophists. As 
Susan Jarratt writes in her book Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured: 
“the first sophists had been buried under two millennia of neglect, an outcome of the 
passionate condemnation they provoked from two of their contemporaries who have 
fared better in the histories, Plato and Aristotle” (1). The question therefore arises in 
any study that posits the sophists as a useful paradigm on contemporary artistic or 
philosophical practices: which version of “the sophists” are you dealing with? Is it the 
radical and innovative language user who offers an alternative approach to the 
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philosophical approaches of Plato, Aristotle and the dominant trend of academics ever 
since? Or is it the shady non-philosophers who took advantage of wealthy individuals 
in pedaling their imitative practices without real wisdom (as characterized by Plato in 
The Sophist)? The inherent difficulty of the act of defining the sophist has 
characterized it from Plato onwards throughout histories of sophistry and sophistics. 
In detailing some of the different versions of the sophists, this chapter introduces what 
is at stake in any contemporary appropriation of their works within critical writing, 
where, ultimately, the category ‘sophist’ remains indefinable, degraded and dangerous 
and where the subversive capacity of the sophist as an alternative to the philosopher is 
not diminished or watered down. As Pound puts it even more strongly, discussions of 
the sophist draw on a centuries-old binary opposition of scholar and sophist that has 
only recently imploded: 
In the relatively tame mythology of the scholarly world the only real villain, 
besides our archenemy the plagiarist, is the sophist. It is the sophist, the myth 
tells us, who muddies the clear waters of thought with dissembling arguments 
and specious wordplay, who engages in eristic argumentation (argument for 
the sake of argument), and who sets out to hide a lack of substance with an 
excess of style. (179) 
Pound identifies the “specious wordplay” and “eristic argumentation” of the 
sophists as the key factors in their alienation from the traditions of philosophy. His 
suggestion is clearly that the sophists have been ignored and maligned in part because 
of the mode or style in which they practiced philosophy. Steven Mailloux, in the 
introduction to his edited volume Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism (1995), describes a 
similar situation. However, he takes these factors and adds the related charge of 
“relativism”, i.e. the belief that there is no externally verifiable truth and that the best 
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that can be achieved is an opinion or point of view. In addition, he notes one of the 
charges that has dogged ‘the sophists’ for centuries, that they were “unscrupulous 
traders” and “merceneries” who became very wealthy indeed through fraudulent 
teachings: 
Since Plato, the Older Sophists have often been condemned as relativists and 
subjectivists, unscrupulous traders in opinion rather than knowledge, 
rhetorical mercenaries who taught their clients to disregard objective truth in 
making the weaker case appear to be the stronger (Mailloux, 1). 
This view of the sophist as the unethical and destructive inverse of the philosopher 
has been the dominant position in writings about the sophists since Plato. They have 
usually been seen as disingenuous teachers of technique rather than advancers of 
serious philosophical ideas or methods, and the word “sophist” retains this pejorative 
sense in its most frequent uses today. However, as John Dillon and Tania Gergel note 
in their introduction to their volume of translations The Greek Sophists, the word 
itself was not initially used in a derogatory sense: 
The word ‘sophists’, which seems first to gain currency early in the fifth 
century, means originally, with a favourable or at least neutral connotation, 
something like ‘expert’ or ‘pundit’, one who is ‘wise’ (sophos) in a particular 
art or craft (x). 
According to many contemporary assessments of Plato’s Sophist, the derogation of 
the term ‘sophist’ is at least in part attributable to Plato’s account in his dialogues. In 
Plato’s dialogue Sophist (and in other related dialogues such as Gorgias, Meno and 
Protagoras), the sophist is portrayed as an unethical, fraudulent and destructive 
teacher who takes advantage of the ambitions of wealthy young men for his own 
financial gain. The fullest picture of these objections to the sophists is located in the 
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Sophist. The dialogue follows the Socratic method of ‘collection and division’ 
whereby the interlocutors take a concept and narrow its meaning down until they are 
satisfied that they have pinned down a water tight definition. In this dialogue, the 
specimen before Thaetetus and the character of ‘the visitor’ is ‘the sophist’ and they 
attempt to contrast and distinguish the sophist in relation to two other categories of 
citizen: statesman and philosopher. The following excerpts detail what emerges from 
their attempts to define the sophist:   
It’s the hunting of rich, prominent young men. And according to the way our 
account has worked out, it’s what should be called the expertise of the sophist. 
(243) 
The Sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which he’s had 
practice dealing with, and he is hard to see because the place is so dark. (276) 
The sophist isn’t one of the people who know but the people who imitate 
(292) 
We can’t call him wise, since we took him not to know anything. But since he 
imitates the wise man, he’ll have a name derived from the wise man’s name. 
And now at last I see that we have to call him the person who is really and 
truly a sophist. (Plato, 292) 
There is perhaps a central irony to Plato’s text in that ‘the visitor’ and ‘Thaetetus’ are 
overwhelmingly demonstrated to be ‘hunting’ the sophist while criticizing him for 
doing the same. Their project is to pin down exactly what the sophist is and thereby 
define the “philosopher” in opposition to it. The language used in the dialogue is 
oriented towards hunting and there is also a kind of ecstatic glee on the part of 
Thaetetus when he reaches a definition that ‘the visitor’ is satisfied with (in spite of 
the resistance that the sophist puts up to being so defined): “So, you see how true it is 
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that the beast is complex and can’t be caught with one hand, as they say” (246). In 
addition, the dialogue becomes increasingly complex when the two speakers attempt 
to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher, something that they have significant 
difficulty doing. The reason given for this is that the sophist resembles or imitates the 
philosopher but that this is merely a semblance and that the sophist is in fact 
counterfeit goods, as it were, using some of the methods of wisdom (such as argument 
and debate) while leading their pupils away from true knowledge. Both of these 
features of the dialogue suggest that the sophist and the philosopher were in fact very 
closely aligned in Ancient Greece and that the clear division between them is at least 
in part a product of Plato’s dialogues, rather than a widely accepted distinction that is 
merely reflected through Plato’s fiction. In Heidegger’s lengthy analysis of Plato’s 
Sophist, he remarks:  
Initially this accomplishes nothing else than what the natural public 
conception already has at its disposal: the sophists, the philosophers and the 
statesmen are all muddled together, and no-one is capable of distinguishing 
them. Now this appearance is made still more explicit and sharper, such that 
when the sophist and the philosopher are brought so close to each other, 
whatever might be there to distinguish them will distinguish them in a 
fundamental way (263).  
According to this reading, Plato acknowledges the closeness of philosopher and 
sophist in his public’s imagination, deliberately brings the two categories closer 
together initially before positing the key differences that divide them. Similarly, 
Edward Schiappa has commented that Plato engaged in a process of “dissociation”, 
quoting Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca: “Dissociation is a rhetorical 
strategy by which an advocate attempts to break up a previously unified idea into two 
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concepts: one which will be positively valued by the target audience and one which 
will be negatively valued” (6).  
The features that mark out the sophist according to Plato’s dialogue are: the 
sophist is unscrupulous about ethical right and wrong, exploitative for financial gain, 
feigns knowledge when in fact he has none and uses words to produce imitative 
copies of knowledge. He is expert in contests of words, and in arguing for the sake of 
arguing (eristike). He is less worthy than “the philosopher”, who is associated with 
true knowledge and wisdom rather than fraudulent imitation.  The main criticisms of 
the sophist in Plato’s dialogue will be considered in more detail in the next section, in 
conjunction with how these same issues play out in the context of Charles Bernstein’s 
poetry. These are: 1) commerce, 2) teaching and 3) artifice and semblance. However, 
for the remainder of this section, I continue to consider the reception history of 
sophistry and some recent attempts to reformulate the sophists within contemporary 
concerns. By defining the sophist negatively in these ways, Plato helped to change the 
meaning of the term ‘sophist’ from a neutral expression that could be used both 
positively and negatively to an almost exclusively negative term, as Bruce 
McComiskey has noted in his important study Gorgias and the New Sophistic 
Rhetoric by drawing on the writings of the seventh century B.C. rhetorician Aristides 
to demonstrate an extremely wide usage of the term ‘sophist’ in texts prior to Plato: 
Before Plato, it was good to be called a sophist, but after Plato it was a source 
of shame… We must understand that Plato’s descriptions of the sophists are 
deceptively specific, limiting the usage of the term to those traveling teachers 
with whom he would quarrel, and also inaccurately ascribing to each sophist 
character certain qualities and doctrines that the extant texts do not support. 
(3) 
	   36	  
Plato’s assessment of the sophists was repeated by Aristotle. As Scott Schreiber has 
written in his book Aristotle and False Reasoning: Language and the World in the 
Sophistical Refutations, for Aristotle  “the sophist trades on people’s inability to 
distinguish the true from the false, the real from the merely apparent” (3). He 
therefore attempts to offer a way for individuals to address and recognize false 
reasoning when they encounter it from sophists. However, there is another element of 
Aristotle’s project which suggests that sophists and philosophers were closely related 
categories from his perspective too.  Schreiber remarks that Aristotle was attempting 
to answer the question: “How then does one learn to recognize these false 
appearances whether they are intended by another or accidentally arise in one’s own 
study” (2). This suggests that sophistry was something that philosophers were 
cautious to guard against in their own thinking processes and that there were therefore 
significant resemblances between the two categories. The assessments of Plato and 
Aristotle of the sophists must, therefore, be treated for what they are, a deliberate 
attempt to position their own ideas and methods as superior to those of rival thinkers. 
Plato and Aristotle’s opinion of the sophists remained widespread and 
definitive until the nineteenth century, when, in his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy (1805-06), Hegel drew attention to their place within the philosophical 
canon. He began by reclaiming the word itself from its negative connotations: 
Sophistry is a term of ill repute. By these expressions we understand that some 
definition or other is arbitrarily refuted or undermined on grounds that are 
false or else that something that is not in itself right is made plausible or 
proved upon false grounds. We have to set this bad sense of the term aside and 
put it out of our minds; we must treat the position of the sophists in Greece 
more precisely than that. (111) 
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Hegel even went so far as to situate the sophists as intellectual forbears to modern 
discourse, claiming in particular that their awareness of both sides of an argument 
situates them as more alike modern philosophers than Socrates and Plato: “the 
standpoint of the sophists is our standpoint too, and their mode of cognition or 
thinking is what we call argumentation – the advancing of reasons for and against 
something” (119). Hegel’s re-insertion of the sophists into the philosophical narrative, 
however, has subsequently been criticised for reinforcing the mis-apprehensions of 
their thinking that had begun with Plato.  For example, John Poulakos has contested 
that Hegel “sought to confer upon them the high status traditionally enjoyed by 
philosophers but, at the same time, brought their rhetoric under the control of 
philosophy, thus rendering it impotent and ineffective” (Poulakos, 2008, 161). His 
main contention is that Hegel emphasizes the philosophical qualities of the sophists’ 
thought in spite of their rhetorical achievements and thereby misses what he 
conceives of as the really valuable aspect of their writing. Poulakos quotes a number 
of examples where he believes that Hegel misconstrues the sophists into speculative 
philosophers rather than experimental rhetoricians, including this example, 
concerning the sophist Protagoras: "Protagoras was not, like other Sophists, merely a 
teacher of culture, but likewise a deep and solid thinker, a philosopher who reflected 
on fundamental determinations of an altogether universal kind" (Poulakos, 2008, 
163). Rather than a philosopher of “an altogether universal kind”, Poulakos sees the 
sophists as radically opposed to universalizing and committed to argumentation and 
linguistic virtuosity as a method of thinking and reasoning. He sees Hegel’s 
rehabilitation as potentially even more suffocating to the sophists’ thought than 
Plato’s criticism of them: 
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[T]heir rhetoric loses its capacity to commit symbolic violence by engaging in 
paradox, indulging in excesses, or turning any argument on its head. 
Moreover, the Sophists are taken out of the public life of the culture that 
invited, encouraged and criticized them and are put in seclusion, where they 
can contemplate and advance the cause of philosophical speculation. In short, 
Hegel's sophists have been rehabilitated at philosophy's reformatory and have 
joined the philosopher in pursuing the knowledge of "the truth." But if they 
had their way, they would counter Hegel's attempt to "normalize" them by 
showing with abundant ease that "the truth" does not exist; or that even if it 
does, it is unknowable; or that even if it is knowable, it is incommunicable 
(Poulakos, 168). 
In spite of the reservations about Hegel’s rehabilitation of the sophists, there can be 
no doubting that his lectures sparked a significant revival of interest in the sophists 
that was facilitated by George Grote’s favourable reassessment in A History of Greece 
from the Earliest Period to the Close of the Generation Contemporary with Alexander 
the Great (1846-56). In turn, the radical expansion of interest in the sophists in major 
works such as W. K. C. Guthrie’s The Sophists (1973) and G. B. Kerford’s The 
Sophistic Movement (1981) can be attributed to the landmark reinterpretation by 
Grote, as has been asserted in texts such as Arnaldo Momigliano’s George Grote and 
the Study of Greek History (1952). The result of these positive reassessments is that 
the sophists have in the last few decades been the subject of many essays and studies 
across multiple disciplines that have re-claimed the sophists. As Karen Whedbee has 
remarked, the sophists have been “transformed from the villains to the heroes of the 
ancient world” (Whedbee, 604). 
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Of particular interest in relation to the poetry of Charles Bernstein and 
Language poetry in general is an essay by Michael Gagarin that was published in the 
pages of the journal Rhetorica in 2001. In ‘Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?’, 
Gagarin studies extant texts by Gorgias in particular to challenge the prevailing notion 
that the primary aim of sophists was to teach the art of persuasion. In both traditional 
and revisionist histories of the sophists, this preconception about their work has 
remained tenacious and has been central to the understanding of their contribution to 
philosophy. As Gagarin notes, “explicitly or implicitly most scholars agree that for 
the Sophists, to speak well meant to speak persuasively and to teach rhetoric was to 
teach the art of persuasion” (277). However, Gagarin offers a radically different 
perspective, a perspective that focuses much more on sophists as experimental 
linguists, whose chief goal was to raise questions about language use and its link to 
critical reasoning through virtuoso language performances:  
My argument is not that persuasion was never a goal of a sophistic logos, but 
that in most cases persuasion is in the background and is less important than 
several other objectives, such as the serious exploration of issues and forms of 
argument, the display of ingenuity in thought, argument and style of 
expression, and the desire to dazzle, shock and please. (Gagarin, 289) 
He achieves this conclusion through a reading of Gorgias’s poem Encomium to Helen, 
which is one of the central texts (alongside accounts in Plato and Aristotle) used to 
justify the weight put on persuasion as a central teaching of the sophists. While the 
neutrality of both Plato and Aristotle towards the sophists has been radically called 
into question, both revisionists and traditionalists alike tend to take Gorgias’s own 
words about logos in this text as evidence of the importance of the art of persuasion in 
his teachings and in his thought. Interpreting this text in particular is crucial to 
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Gagarin’s study because it is “the only sophistic discussion of logos that survives” 
(276).  Indeed, within the Encomium to Helen, Gorgias forcefully asserts the power of 
logos to persuade, for example in the following two passages:  
12) What is there to prevent the assertion that Helen, too, when still young, 
was carried off by a speech just as if constrained by force? Her mind was 
swept away by persuasion and persuasion has the same power as necessity, 
although it may bring shame; for speech, by persuading the soul that it 
persuaded, constrained her both to obey what was said and approve what was 
done. The persuader, as user of force, did wrong; the persuaded, forced by 
speech, is unreasonably blamed. (Gorgias, in Murphy, 265) 
 
14) The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as 
the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel 
different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease while others 
end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some 
instill courage, some bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (Gorgias, 
in Murphy, 265) 
Gagarin’s argument, though, is that Gorgias shouldn’t be taken at face value in these 
utterances, because his poem is above all an intellectual exercise whereby he is 
attempting the seemingly insurmountable challenge of using his own virtuoso 
reasoning to absolve Helen of all guilt for the Trojan War. It suits his present 
purposes in the poem/speech to claim that logos can be used like witchcraft or a drug 
to persuade someone to behave both against their will and in suspension of their better 
judgment. Furthermore, Gagarin argues that this virtuosity, this exercise in open and 
experimental thinking is more central to Gorgias’s concerns in the poem than the art 
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of persuasion itself. He writes: “not only are audiences not persuaded by Gorgias’s 
logos, but far from trying to persuade, he seems to go out of his way not to make his 
logos persuasive.” (281) By “going out of his way” to make the challenge of 
defending Helen’s honour more difficult than it need have been (by largely ignoring 
traditional defences such as the Gods compelling her, Helen being forced by the 
Trojans or even that she didn’t travel to Troy at all), Gorgias is providing himself with 
the almighty challenge of “making the weaker case appear to be the stronger”. He 
isn’t concerned with persuading his audience but with enthralling them in his exercise 
in reason and language. By putting the focus on the power of logos to persuade Helen, 
Gorgias in fact draws attention to the power of all language to condition and construct 
modes of thinking. An audience of Encomium to Helen would more likely leave with 
a greater appreciation and awareness of language’s constitutive qualities than they 
would having been persuaded to adopt any altered perception about Helen’s guilt or 
otherwise.   
The conviction that the sophists were not essentially teaching the ‘art of 
persuasion’ is a cornerstone, too, of Michelle Ballif’s study Seduction, Sophistry and 
the Woman with the Rhetorical Figure in which she reclaims and feminizes a lineage 
from Gorgias through Nietszche to Baudrillard. In this text, she contrasts “sophistic 
rhetoric” with “philosophic rhetoric” and claims that the critical difference between 
the two positions is the sophist’s lack of interest in logical argument and skepticism 
about the notion of ‘truth’: 
Thus, philosophic rhetoric frames rhetoric as a logical appeal; people are 
persuaded (or should be persuaded) to believe that which is logically 
demonstrated to be true or probably true. Sophistic rhetoric, contrariwise, 
presumes that there is something about rhetoric that is seductive, even 
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deceptive, and that language resists logic, that it desires to trope – to turn and 
to turn and to turn – until it gets dizzy and, in the words of Paul de Man, 
“radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential 
aberration” (Allegories of Reading, 10) (5).    
Like Gagarin, Pound and Poulakos, Ballif specifically stresses a form of radical and 
experimental wordplay as their strength as thinkers. The suggestion is that while the 
sophists may have demonstrated the ability to ‘argue persuasively’ on any side of an 
argument, the real lesson of their teachings isn’t ‘how to argue persuasively’ but ‘how 
to recognize that language constitutes and conditions our responses’. Within a newly 
burgeoning democracy where citizens are able to participate in the political processes 
for the first time, this is an extremely important lesson to be taught. To use Mailloux’s 
phrase, they reveal “the social situatedness of the truth-establishing process” 
(Mailloux, 11) by demonstrating that “truth” verifiable by the gods is out of our reach. 
By freeing the lessons of the sophists from the conviction of an over-arching concern 
with teaching the “art of persuasion”, i.e. teaching citizens to succeed in politics by 
convincing through debates and speeches, their subversive power as critical thinkers 
and linguistic performers is opened up. However, exactly what this power is and how 
it opens up political possibilities requires further unpacking. The relation of the 
sophists to democratic ideals is historically based in the emergence of increasingly 
democratic political processes in fifth century B.C. Athens. 
In the chapter ‘The sophists as a social phenomenon’ of his The Sophistic 
Movement, G.B. Kerford situates the teachings of the sophists within the wider 
political situation of Athens during the fifth century B.C. He writes that Athens was in 
the early stages of having transitioned to a state ruled by democratic principles: 
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These two principles are: (1) that power should be with the people as a whole 
and not with a small section of the citizen body, and (2) that high offices 
carrying the right to advise and act for the people should be entrusted to those 
best fitted and most able to carry out these functions (16).     
These principles (fundamental principles likewise of democratic theory today) were 
innovative and were pioneered in the Athens of the 5th century BC. As Cynthia Farrar 
has written, “democracy was cobbled together, thousands of years ago, by the 
Athenians” (1). One of the keys to understanding what makes Athenian democracy of 
this period unique, Farrar contests, is the interconnectivity between ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’, or what may be termed ‘logos’ and ‘praxis’. Appreciating this link between 
words or theory and their practical implications is essential to understand the potency 
of experimental sophist performance. However, it is a potency that can offer citizens 
of contemporary democracies opportunities to engage with in a far more participatory 
and critical mode. As she writes:  
From where we stand, in a modern, western, liberal, capitalist culture, it is 
difficult to apprehend the possibility of uniting reflective social understanding 
and rootedness in concrete social practices in a political life. We understand 
both democracy and political theory in abstract terms, and both are remote 
from the lives we lead (3). 
However, this was resolutely not the case for the sophists, where their language uses 
were intricately tied together with the burgeoning democratic system of their state.  In 
his study Pragmatism, Democracy and the Necessity of Rhetoric (2007), Robert 
Danisch situates both pragmatism and rhetoric within democratic politics, both in the 
context of the United States of America and Ancient Greece. He asserts that the 
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sophists contributed to an emergent democracy where citizens were aware of how 
language use constructs society: 
In the light of Protagoras’s and Gorgias’s positions, it is clear that the 
democratic city state was supported by assumptions about language. 
Specifically, the sophists consistently pointed to the power of language to 
influence political and legal decisions - thus indicating that all people are 
capable of and subject to persuasive speech acts (9).  
 
The key positions of Protagoras and Gorgias that Danisch refers to are 
Protagoras’s famous “man measure doctrine”, i.e. that “man is the measure of all 
things” and Gorgias’s interpretation of language as a medium through which 
communities create the ‘truths’ that are most acceptable to them by a process of 
rhetorical contests and language games. Language is, therefore, conceived of as the 
fundamental glue through which communities govern themselves. It is through 
language that communities are able to conceive of notions such as justice and ethics, 
rather than through a received morality from the gods. Danisch quotes Scott 
Consigny’s remark that “Gorgias construes language as an array of maneuvers or 
tropes that people use in various socially sanctioned agons or games.”  Rather than 
simply paid instructors in how to succeed in politics as they have traditionally been 
seen, this interpretation of the sophists’ teachings transforms them into philosophers 
of language, pointing to the role language plays in our political structures, and 
particularly the human susceptibility to persuasion and ‘smooth-talking’. For 
example, in The Sophists, Guthrie attributes to Gorgias the viewpoint that “persuasion 
allied to words can mould men’s minds as it wishes” (51). While the double meaning 
of “mould” is due to the translation rather than an intentional paranomasia from 
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Gorgias, it is pertinent because language use not only has the power to persuade or 
incite, it also has the power to dull, disease and cover over; to make complacent. The 
sophists made citizens aware of this dual power of language to construct (and 
maintain) our realities; to influence and effect politics.  As Cynthia Farrar has written, 
understood in terms of sophistic language experiments with a dynamic social and 
political agenda, Protagoras was “the first democratic political theorist in the history 
of the world” (77).  
Given that the sophists were associated with relativist views and also have 
been portrayed as in favour of a philosophy being conducted in the agon through 
debate about real issues facing citizens of the day, it is perhaps no surprise that the 
school of thought for whom the sophists held most appeal in the recent historical past 
were those philosophers associated with pragmatism. Mailloux quotes pragmatist 
philosopher James H. Tufts’ entry in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 
(1902) where under pre-Socratic Philosophy, the sophists are represented in a positive 
light: 
[The Sophists] represent a shifting of the centre of interest and study from the 
cosmos to man, and an emergence of science from closed schools or societies 
into public discussion. The growing democracy made knowledge claims 
valuable to the citizen as well as to the scholar. Teachers of every subject, and 
especially teachers of rhetoric, found eager hearers. The study of the art of 
persuasion, especially upon political themes, led naturally to the study of 
politics. (Mailloux, 6)   
On this subject, the French philosopher Barbara Cassin has been particularly 
influential. While much of her work remains untranslated into English, her essay 
‘Who’s Afraid of the Sophists? Against Ethical Correctness’ was published in the 
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journal Hypatia in 2000. In this essay, Cassin borrows a definition of ‘sophistic’ from 
Andre Lalande, which she calls “as magisterial as it is mysterious… ‘a philosophy of 
verbal reasoning, lacking any solidity or seriousness’” (Cassin, 105). She goes further 
to claim that this “possible modality of non-philosophy” (105) offers a “new 
delimitation of the entity called “philosophy” in relation to the other entities it 
constructs (sophistics as rhetoric, and then as literature)” (104). By the phrase “a new 
delimitation of the entity called “philosophy””, Cassin appears to mean a widening of 
the field of philosophy to include non-traditional modes of enquiry and exposition, 
including in the fields of literary criticism, literature and rhetoric. The crucial aspect 
of Cassin’s argument here is that she agrees with Poulakos’s contention that a more 
radical and powerful interpretation of the sophists lies not in rehabilitating them 
within the received canon of philosophy and restoring them to a respectable position 
within philosophical discourse but by revealing and prioritizing the radicalism of their 
practice and the challenges it has presented to Plato and to philosophy ever since. 
Cassin’s interpretation of the sophists therefore offers an interesting counterpoint to 
Charles Bernstein’s mode of speaking, writing, poeticizing and philosophizing. 
Bernstein’s work poses a similar challenge today as the sophists have posed for 
millennia and while the sophists may now be enjoying significant respectability 
within the discipline of philosophy in spite of their non-philosophical linguistic 
experimentation, the same is not true of Bernstein’s arguably equivalent experiments 
today, which continue to be seen as primarily literary rather than philosophical works.  
Cassin’s argument centres around Gorgias’s treatise ‘On Not-Being, or On 
Nature’, where Gorgias claims that “nothing exists, then if anything does exist, it is 
unknowable, and finally, if it is knowable, it cannot be revealed to others.” (Dillon, 
Gergel, 69). The first thing to note about this text is that it has widely been considered 
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either a parody of Parmenides or a “jeu d’esprit” (Blondell, 176). However, in-spite or 
because of the irreverence of his rhetoric, Gorgias is able to advance his provocative 
argument, in which ‘being’ is revealed as an effect of speech rather than a verifiable 
condition. Cassin takes up Gorgias’s argument and moves it even further to attribute a 
conception of existence to the sophists that is not only an effect of speech but actually 
constructed through the language we use: 
That being is a speech effect now takes on a twofold meaning: we are not 
simply faced with a critique of ontology-your purported being is nothing but 
an effect of the way you speak-but with a claim which is characteristic of 
“logology,” to use a term of Novalis (1997, 56) and also of Dubuffet (1970, 
115). What matters from now on is not a being which would supposedly be 
already there, but the being produced by the discourse. One must assess the 
magnitude of the shift in landscape, from the primal scene onwards. The safest 
identity principle is no longer formulated as “Being is” or “The entity is” but, 
to quote from Aristotle’s “On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias”: “he who 
speaks, speaks” (1984c, 980b 4). The presence of Being, the immediacy of 
Nature and the evidence of a speech which aims to express them adequately 
all vanish at the same time; the physics discovered by speech makes way for 
the politics created by discourse. Indeed, it is here, thanks to the sophists, that 
we reach the dimension of the political as agora for an agon: the city as the 
continuous creation of language. (Cassin, 108)  
  In this passage, Cassin posits a link between sophistic awareness of the speech-
constructed self and the place of the individual within community politics, with 
language as the agora (assembly) or locus of political advancement and thought 
through agon (debate). However, she styles her agora as a realm of boundary-pushing 
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linguistic and rhetorical experiments rather than simply a chamber of debate with 
reason as its governing principle, where viewpoints will either win or lose based on 
majority rule. The element of ‘performance’ is critical within Cassin’s and other 
commentators conception of the sophists. Susan Jarratt has commented that, “the first 
linguistic theorists, the sophists were performers as well, following in the traditions of 
oral poetry” (Jarratt, xx).  
Similarly, Cassin describes the locus of sophistic politics in terms of a 
performance: 
The entire rhetoric of the sophists is thus a vast performance which, time after 
time, by means of praise and counsel, produces the consensus required for the 
social bond. This consensus is minimal, even minimalist, because far from 
requiring a uniform unity, the sophistical consensus does not even require that 
everyone think the same thing (homonoia), but only that everyone speaks 
(homologia) and lends their ear (homophonia) (109). 
The situation Cassin sketches is of a linguistically-aware, talkative culture in which 
politics is reached and defined not through agreement as much as through 
disagreement, through a multitude of different language-performances and 
perspectives. She enacts the specifics of such an approach within the rhetoric of her 
text itself, through the subtle language game of comparing “homonoia”, “homologia” 
and “homophonia”. The significance of these three concepts is vital to her 
advancement of sophistics in that the interlinked activities of “talking” and “listening” 
are contrasted to the combined activity “thinking”, which exceeds but is constituted 
by the primary activities of language use (talking and listening), activities which are 
never passive in form but always active. Rather than the sense of “talking” being the 
method through which “thinking” is communicated, talking and listening as language 
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games are the process of thought, indistinguishable from thought. As such, thought is 
constantly in flux and being modified and multiplied. This itself manifests a politics 
of flux, possibility and multiplicity. Cassin contrasts this political language-centric 
form of philosophizing (which she coins “philosophisticizing”, incorporating 
“sophistics”) with the traditional narrative of philosophy, commenting: “in the 
philosophizing Greece of aletheia, the invention of the city is non-political, because 
the political qua political is in no way political; rather, it is always subordinate to 
Being, the True, and the Good. But in a philosophisticizing Greek, where the 
ontological immediately reverts to, backtracks towards the logological, the logos 
enables us to grasp the very immanence of the political, in its condition of possibility” 
(109).  
Cassin’s term “immanence” clearly references the writings of Gilles Deleuze, 
and in particular the sense of the immanent as something that is grounded, inhabitable 
and inescapable. The political therefore is the constant condition of existence through 
which all language use is constantly based, as a performance of the political. Writing 
in response to (and not in agreement with) Cassin, Alain Badiou has equally stressed 
the importance within her conception of sophistics of performance as constitutive of 
the political: “Barbara Cassin links sophistics to a consensual multiplicity of 
discursive games, which creates worlds” (317). For Cassin, language performance 
encompasses the activities of both reading/listening and talking as critical to how the 
world is interpreted and negotiated politically. One thing is clear. The sophists were 
language users and performers of whose work it was at all times necessary to 
interpret. They used language and logic in such a way as to encourage the art of 
interpretation and their main activity could be considered the fostering of the 
interpretative art. By doing so, they encouraged skepticism over prevailing cultural 
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dominance and radical re-thinking of language uses. Frank Lentricchia has written (in 
an essay on the pragmatist philosopher Josiah Royce) that “interpretation, a 
community-making act, the essential activity of human association is repeatedly 
repressed in the history of the philosophy” (41). This is a process that begins with the 
writing out of the sophists from philosophical history, figures who stood for using 
language in a way that demanded it be interpreted and wasn’t taken at face value. It is 
this interpretation of the sophists that displays affinities with the projects of Language 
poets and it is this radicalized version of sophism that is of interest to a reading of 
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1. II. Pedagogy, Public Policy and Semblance 
 
This section looks at three recurrent themes in writings about the sophists and 
considers their individual inflections and importance within Bernstein’s own practice. 
The aim is not only to establish a link between Bernstein’s concerns and that of the 
sophists but to suggest that these aspects of their thought are integral to a “sophistic” 




Not all academics (and certainly not all poets), take pedagogy seriously. However, 
throughout his writings on academia and above all in his teaching procedures and 
courses themselves, Bernstein has demonstrated a commitment and exploration of 
teaching methods and of education more broadly conceived. Bernstein’s syllabi at 
SUNY Buffalo and UPenn demonstrate both his sense of what teaching is and his 
understanding of what contemporary poetry and poetics can teach. For example, his 
course on ‘Prose and its Malcontents’, delivered in 1999 at SUNY Buffalo, takes a 
characteristically slanted view of prose theory, claiming that “Prose: it is more than 
just another word for poetry”. This statement says at least one crucial thing about 
Bernstein’s pedagogical approach. It prioritizes poetry and poetics as a way of 
looking at language use in everyday life. Subverting normative assumptions about the 
primacy or normalcy of prose in everyday communication, this statement suggests 
that all prose can or ought to be viewed poetically, with the same distancing 
procedures one adopts when analyzing a poem.  Bernstein’s pedagogical claims for 
poetry stretch far beyond merely creating legions of vaguely homogenous but 
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technically proficient poets and creative writers (which the boom in creative writing 
degrees might be considered to have done). Bernstein instead believes in the 
pedagogical importance of “poetic thinking as an activated potential for all people” 
(1992, 225), which comes from looking at all language use poetically, analyzing its 
syntax, grammar and semantics meaningfully for what they say about the specific 
iteration in question and the assumptions that underlie its composition. The syllabus 
therefore traverses a wide range of contemporary prose, both critical and creative that 
has, in one way or another, poeticized prose. Central to the course, therefore, are the 
writings of many of the language poets. However, equally important within the course 
are authors who had a significant influence on language poets, such as Victor 
Shklovsky, Gertrude Stein, Robert Creeley and Robert Duncan among many others. 
The essay by Creeley studied, ‘Was that a Real Poem or Did You Just Make it up 
Yourself?’ is particularly relevant to the significance Bernstein attaches to the study 
of poetry within pedagogy. The essay is written in a colloquial style, and recalls the 
writings of David Antin in its seemingly tangential organization and structure. 
Creeley, like Antin, makes use of anecdotes as an energizing force within his essay 
and by doing so the essay covers a wide range of topics, circling around a topic that 
can’t quite be grasped. For example, towards the end of the essay, Creeley writes of: 
The phenomenon of another friend and student at Black Mountain in 
the middle fifties, who in truth could perceive no demonstrable difference 
between a cluster of words called poem and a cluster of words called prose . 
She felt the typographical form of the poem was all that apparently defined 
it—and that of course was a very arbitrary gimmick, to her mind. I tried 
everything, "Mary had a little lamb," tum te tum, clapped my hands with the 
beat, pulled out the vowels à la Yeats, probably even sang. Still it stayed flat 
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and arbitrary. She felt the beat and texture of the sound was imposed by will 
of the reader and was not initial in the words themselves. All the usual critical 
terms were of course useless, far too abstract. Finally I truly despaired of 
gaining more than her sympathy and patience. Then one day, we were reading 
Edward Marshall's "Leave the Word Alone," and for some immaculate and 
utterly unanticipated "reason" she got it, she heard all the play of rhythms and 
sounds bringing that extraordinary statement of primary humanness into such 
a density of feeling and song… 
…As a poet, at this moment—half listening as I am to the House 
Judiciary Committee's deliberations—I am angered, contemptuous, impatient, 
and possibly even cynical concerning the situation of our lives in this 'national' 
place. Language has, publicly, become such an instrument of coercion, 
persuasion, and deceit. The power thus collected is ugly beyond description—
it is truly evil . And it will not go away (577). 
The anecdote of the student encapsulates successful pedagogy at work: patience, anti-
didacticism, good humour and experiment. Creeley allows the student to (eventually) 
hear the rhythms of poetry for herself rather than just stating that they are there and 
moving on. This anecdote also relates to the one that gives the essay its title, in which 
after a poetry reading a student asked of a visiting poet “was that a real poem or did 
you just make it up yourself?” This question reveals a sense that a poem is a mark of 
validation rather than anything intrinsic within it. Unlike the student who won’t 
accept something as a poem as opposed to prose until she hears it herself, this student 
believes something is a poem if it is widely held to be a poem, not because of any 
intrinsic formal attribute that would allow one to recognize it as such. These two 
views are presented together by Creeley without any particular comment or remark on 
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them. However, both of them are possible approaches to poetry and they 
fundamentally question in their own ways what it is that distinguishes something as 
poetry from prose. Particularly in the widened field of poetic production today, this 
can be a distinction that is extremely hard to define and may in fact be considered 
redundant. However, the sense in Creeley’s essay is that by their questioning, by their 
engagement with the parameters of how to define a poem (however naïve their 
questions might seem when presented anecdotally) these students have reached upon 
a crux of the study of poetry: why isn’t it prose? Their questioning of the issue is 
equally if not more valid than the definition, quoted (with “horror”) earlier in the 
essay by Creeley, from The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1935): 
“elevated expression of elevated thought or feeling, esp. in metrical form” (575). The 
unconvinced suspicion of the students is infinitely more helpful than the narrowness 
of this 30’s definition, which is all the more remarkable placed within the context of 
the developments in Modernist poetry that immediately preceded it.  
Also important is the tangential link that Creeley builds between this episode 
and the conclusion of the essay, in which he shares his own suspicion and despair 
about the uses of language in everyday political life. The coming-to experienced by 
the student over the rhythms of poetry is juxtaposed to a similar though more sinister 
coming-to experienced by Creeley over the prose usages of the “House Judiciary 
Committee’s deliberations”, which in 1974 when this essay was composed refers to 
the Watergate scandal. By questioning what poetry is, the students in Creeley’s 
anecdotes are also questioning what prose is and may be becoming more aware of the 
ways in which language is used to manipulate and control our everyday political 
selves, in the sorts of ways that Creeley describes: “an instrument of coercion, 
persuasion and deceit”. While not overtly stated as such, poetry in Creeley’s essay 
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becomes indefinable except as a way of looking at the world with both skepticism and 
wonder in the ways that both the students in his anecdotes do. As such, poetry as 
pedagogy in Creeley’s essay becomes akin to the sophistic project of drawing 
awareness to the ways in which language is used to persuade, as discussed in detail in 
relation to the work of Gorgias in Chapter 5.   
Bernstein’s syllabus situates this essay by Creeley alongside a wide range of 
works by other authors, such as Oscar Wilde’s Critic as Artist and Gertrude Stein’s 
Composition as Explanation. The context of reframing the essay within his own 
course means that Creeley’s own prosodic strategies (like those of Stein and Wilde) 
are opened up to analysis, observation and critique. The radically divergent 
approaches to “prose” employed by each writer crystallises the sense that prose as a 
concept is as artificial and indefinable as ‘poetry’. The following is from the course 
introduction to ‘Close Encounters of the Poetic Kind’, a course that Bernstein taught 
in 1991:  
Course requirements are flexible and interactive, aiming to catalyze the 
readings and discussions in the context of a "workshop", ie working, relation 
to the reading. By "reading workshop" I mean I want to explore the ways in 
which poems may or can be read, interpreted, performed, engaged with: the 
seminar is directed toward sampling (or inventorying) a variety of poetic 
textures and investigating ways of locating or recognizing these textures 
(atmospheres, shapes, valences, forms, structures, prosodies . . .). For each 
seminar, please write a short response to that week's assignments in the form 
of imitations, parodies, excursus, recitations, performances, appropriations, as 
well as critical, textural or theoretical comments. The "Reading Through" list 
that begins the "Experiments" provide some alternative modes of poetic 
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"response". You're encouraged to experiment with a variety of poetic forms 
suggested by the readings and discussions. 
What is most evident from this excerpt is the emphasis that Bernstein as pedagogue 
puts on the two tenets of responsiveness and experiment. His students are constantly 
encouraged, above all, to create works in response to other works “in the form of 
imitations, parodies, excursus, recitations, performances, appropriations, as well as 
critical, textural or theoretical comments”. The act of engaging creatively with texts is 
therefore prioritized above (or at least emphasized ahead of as a counter to the 
prevailing teaching methods of most university courses) the straightforwardly critical 
and theoretical demonstration of discursive comprehension. Students are encouraged 
to produce their own works that join in the conversation alongside the works of the 
writers being studied rather than just reflecting on them. Learning (and even more 
fundamentally) reading are seen as creative acts. Even the name of the reading list 
suggests this: “Reading Through list” rather than simply “Reading list”. Bernstein has 
theorized this method of teaching in the essay ‘Creative Wreading and Aesthetic 
Judgment’, which was first published in the volume of essays Poetry and Pedagogy: 
The Challenge of the Contemporary, edited by the poets Joan Retallack and Juliana 
Spahr, suggesting the growing interest in the pedagogy of poetry and poetry as a form 
or method of pedagogy. The essay begins: 
I am a professor of poetry. I take that term quite literally. I profess poetry in a 
society, and often in a classroom, where poetry is often at best a half-forgotten 
thing, something confined to the peripheries of cultural imagination, a once 
grand enterprise perhaps, but today eclipsed by more compelling media 
(2011).  
Bernstein’s understanding of teaching, then, is related to a ‘literal’ interpretation of 
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the phrase “professor” of poetry, drawing on the connotations of the verb ‘profess’, 
which include that of publicly declaring something with a view to acting on it. 
Bernstein is committed to actively promoting and professing poetry as not only an art 
form or genre but as a way of experiencing and looking at the world. As such, his 
understanding of poetry is akin to that of the sophists, whose teachings were holistic 
and pragmatically oriented, designed to equip one for a way of thinking about society 
and the world. The specific tool, if it were to be packaged as a roll-out educational 
programme, is “creative wreading”. “Creative wreading”, as Bernstein writes, is his 
version of the more familiar ‘creative writing’ courses. In Bernstein’s version, rather 
than workshop students’ own poetry to refine them, Bernstein encourages innovation, 
exploration and experimentation coupled with the exposure to as wide a range of 
historical and contemporary writing as possible. The students then perform 
‘experiments’ based on their readings of these texts: “a set of deformations, 
transformations and imitations that involve doing things with poems rather than 
analyzing them… These experiments are designed to provide interactive engagement 
with the assigned reading. I also ask that for each experiment, the student provide a 
short commentary on the process, the results, the relation to the original and an 
assessment of the value of the experiment” (55). As such, the emphasis of his course 
is on empowering the students to engage with the forms of the poems presented as 
part of the course. Rather than elevating them as artifacts beyond the student’s reach, 
Bernstein encourages the students to see the course materials as forms to be re-drawn 
and experimented with. It is possible to see the political implications of such a 
practice, if poetic structures are taken to be a metaphor for societal and cultural 
structures. Students, by engaging with poetic structures and being encouraged to 
experiment formally (while constantly developing reflective, responsive and 
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evaluative skills). One critical aspect of this process is the acceptance of 
“nonunderstanding” (47) and the different responses, interpretations and reaction of 
students. In order to foster just such differences of opinion, Bernstein’s teaching 
strategies involve the generation of a culture of “disagreement”:     
In the Wreading Workshop, disagreement is encouraged as a way of 
generating exchange rather than as an obstacle that needs to be overcome. 
Disagreement is not a means to a consensus (or the imposed consensus of the 
professor’s judgment): dissensus is the goal of the Wreading Workshop. I 
always try to give extended attention to the negative reactions that students 
have to a poem or set of poems. (46) 
The acceptance of “dissensus” when it comes to poetry might seem a far-cry from the 
acceptance of “dissensus” as a wider cultural principle. However, one significance of 
advocating these sets of educational procedures for a wider sense of political and 
aesthetic judgments is that, just as Bernstein writes that “new poems often challenge 
prior definitions or understandings of poetry” (2011, 43), so too can this be extended 
into a wider understanding of social and political “definitions and understandings”. 
The poem, by Bernstein’s reckoning, becomes a site of constant revision and 
“reintroduction” (43), encouraging a way of looking at the world that prioritizes a 
lack of complacency and closure in favour of change and multiplicity. This extends 
beyond the definition of a poem. The critic Megan Swihart Jewell has stressed that 
Bernstein regards “the value of teaching modern and contemporary poetics for its 
particular ability to empower readers to negotiate within cultural discourses” (117). In 
this regard, the extension of Bernstein’s pedagogical professing of poetry into a wider 
sense of negotiating social interaction (rather than instilling any one sense of society) 
owes something to his own Deweyan education (it was John Dewey after all who 
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criticized many views of education where “the underlying philosophy is that it is the 
function of education to transmit and reproduce existing institutions – only making 
them more efficient. This philosophy we deny” (79).) Indeed, Dewey’s sense of 
philosophy, democracy and education as fundamentally linked activities can be 
identified within Bernstein’s own sense of poetry as a mode of thinking. As John 
Stuhr has compellingly argued, for Dewey “all genuine philosophy is philosophy of 
education” (10). This remark suggests that fundamentally education (conceived 
broadly as the development of humans - at all stages of development and learning) 
must be essential to the activity of philosophy, which would be conceived of as an 
activity devoted to conceiving of new ideas that are useful to the development and 
greater freedom of individuals within societies and societies as a whole.   However, 
even more than this, Bernstein’s attitude to education can be seen to be in line with a 
sophistical attitude to the world. As Susan Jarratt has written, the sophists provided 
“the very first education for empowerment” (98), equipping their students with 
empowering skills that enabled them to more effectively negotiate social structures. 
This marked a significant shift and its most important aspect is in the way it positions 
the individual in relation to society as a fundamental component and player in the life 
of the society, “raising people’s consciousness of their attributes as social creatures” 
(Jarratt, 99). Because of this, Jarratt believes an understanding of sophistic education 
is relevant to orienting contemporary educational practices more towards the political 
and social empowerment of the individual: “Despite differences between fifth century 
Greek democracy and our own, understanding the political orientation of sophistic 
education is instructive for those seeking an education more responsive to 
contemporary political possibilities” (Jarratt, 99). The sophistic method of teaching 
took as its basis language and rhetoric, but also, through that, the process of engaging 
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with society publicly through public speaking and logical argumentation. However, 
poetry had its place in a sophistic education. Indeed, William M.A. Grimaldi has 
written that the sophist Protagoras’s own study of poetry both led him personally and 
constituted the avenue through which he lead his students to consider “the structure 
and structuring character of language” (32). The next section leads on from 
Bernstein’s pedagogical strategies into how the values promoted and developed by 
poetry and poetics (dissensus, difference, unknowability) lead onto forging a link 
between “poetry and public policy”, as he subtitled an edited collection published in 
1999. 
 
b. Poetry and Public Policy 
 
Throughout his critical writings, Bernstein makes claims for poetry as a space where 
the limits of language can be tested and transgressed. His descriptions of the space he 
claims for poetry bear a striking resemblance to the descriptions of the experimental 
language zone occupied by the sophists from their contemporary champions, 
discussed in Chapter 1. The crucial affinity is in the relation of linguistic 
experimentation, what Scott Pound called “mobiliz[ing] the inherent play of 
language” to manifesting political potential, which is a central tenet of the claims 
language poets and Charles Bernstein in particular have made of their writings. One 
of the most clearly-stated essays on this subject that Bernstein has written is his 
‘Comedy and the Poetics of Political Form’. In this essay, he contends:   
When a poem enters the world it enters into a political, in the sense of 
ideological and historical, space. By refusing the criteria of efficacy for 
determining the political value of the poem, we confer political value on the 
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odd, eccentric, different, opaque, maladjusted – the nonconforming. We also 
insist that politics demands complex thinking and that poetry is an arena for 
such thinking: a place to explore the constitution of meaning, of groups, of 
nations, - of value. The politics of poetry of which I speak is open ended, the 
results of its interrogations are not assumed but discovered in the process and 
open to reformulations (1999, 4). 
This conception of a poem entering into a “political space” suggests that every poem, 
however ‘non-political’ its subject matter or content, operates politically through its 
formal dynamics. This sense of the political dimension of a poem owes much to a 
reading of Frankfurt School aesthetics. In particular, the influence of Herbert 
Marcuse’s influential remark that art “opens the established reality to another 
dimension, that of possible liberation” (1972, 87) and Theodor Adorno’s contention 
that “art has turned against the status quo and what merely exists” (2004, 3) suggests 
the ways in which art can open up alternative ways of conceiving of society. 
Bernstein writes that his conception of “political value” is in the “nonconforming” 
aspects of poetic form. The suggestion being made is that by exploring and realizing 
unconventional forms, poetry is able to suggest alternative political structures. The 
significance of Adorno’s writings on aesthetics for this argument are critical, as it was 
Adorno who inscribed the primacy of formal consideration into a sense of how a work 
of art can not merely reflect the social conditions of its creation but transcend them 
and critique them. As Jennifer McMahon has written, Adorno “located the source of 
art’s critical function in its aesthetic form” (161). When Bernstein writes that he is 
“refusing the criteria of efficacy when considering the political value of a poem”, he 
is following Adorno’s lead in stating that an artwork’s form can communicate 
politically in ways that go beyond a direct or sustained argument communicated by 
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the work’s content itself, “even though discursive judgment is unable to define it” 
(2004, 174). Indeed, Bernstein quotes Adorno within the essay, the remark that “truth 
is the antithesis of existing society” (226), which Bernstein interprets as suggesting 
“the authority of our conventions is bogus, that only by negating the positive values 
that legitimate existing societies we can find truth” (226). Bernstein’s interpretation of 
Adorno’s remark here allows him to suggest that the “negating” aspect of language 
poetry’s non-acceptance of conventional grammar is precisely what allows it to 
explore grammatical (and by extension societal) systems with greater ‘truth’. In this 
interpretation, he is drawing on the sense in which a work of art can resist 
assimilation into the dominant values of a culture and instead, through its form, posit 
alternative organizational principles or possibilities. As Bernstein writes: “the 
political power of poetry is not measured in numbers; it instructs us to count 
differently” (226). For Adorno, as David Held has written, “social criticism flows 
from a work’s form – not its content… Adorno’s emphasis on form should not be 
mistaken for a simple insistence on the primary of style or technique. Rather, form 
refers to the whole ‘internal’ organization of art – to the capacity for art to restructure 
conventional patterns of meaning” (1980, 83). This point leads on to the second part 
of Bernstein’s argument for the politics of poetic form, that “politics demands 
complex thinking” and that poetry and poetics can provide “an arena” for the sorts of 
thinking (notably about “the constitution of meaning”) that it requires. Bernstein’s 
progression from “constitution of meaning” to “of groups, of nations - of value” 
(incidentally employing the overt sophistic rhetorical device of a progressive 
tetracolon) mimics exactly the suggestion that is being made about aesthetic form, 
that it does indeed extend to a consideration of formal properties of political and 
social constitution. Exactly how this progression occurs, however, might be 
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considered to be rather remote in a society where the actual gap between artistic use 
of language and the practice of politics are so diligently kept apart. As Bernstein 
himself acknowledges, “I know it is almost a joke to speak of poetry and national 
affairs” (225). However, in Ancient Greece, the distance between artistic use of 
language and the political life of the state was not so clearly delimited as it is today: 
both of these seemingly disparate elements can be seen to converge in the artistic 
language practices of the sophists.  
Adorno’s understanding of how art “embod[ies] the contradictions, pure and 
uncompromised, in its innermost structure” (Held, 1980, 84) in itself is a sophistic 
position vis-à-vis the critical function of experimental language use. John Poulakos 
has written of sophistic rhetorical performances that “the only message that can be 
said to have overshadowed all others… was the message that language could not be 
delivered from its fundamental ambiguity. Thus, to engage in rhetoric, too, was to 
admit, if only implicitly, an otherness to one’s own discourse” (43). Sophistic rhetoric 
can therefore be seen as a sort of language-art that ‘embodies contradictions in its 
innermost structure’, by emphasizing above all “ambiguity” in language. By denying 
a sense of natural or plain speech and instead emphasizing technique, style and 
artifice, sophists brought about a sense of formal possibility and manifested an 
implicit sense of “otherness”. This is because the language forms they used pointed 
outwards away from a mere expression of their views and instead towards the very 
materiality of language and its resultant ambiguity and paradox. Furthermore, this 
same impulse can be detected in Bernstein’s claims that language poetry “confer[s] 
political value on the odd, eccentric, different, opaque, maladjusted – the 
nonconforming”. This is an insight that can be traced to a sophistic lineage. In his 
assessment of the significance of Prodicus the Sophist, Robert Mayhew asserts that 
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“the gulf between reason and reality (or language and reality) represents or is an 
expression of the inability of the human mind to fully grasp and articulate the facts of 
reality” (xxv). However, the writings of Prodicus, Gorgias and other sophists in fact 
demonstrate an awareness not only that there is a “gulf between language and reality” 
but that language is also constitutive of “reality”, an essential part of how “reality” is 
experienced. Prodicus’s writings are very different to those of Gorgias. Rather than 
the parodic, energetic language performances of Gorgian irony (discussed in chapter 
5), Prodicus’s texts reveal him to be almost comically serious and pedantic. With a 
passion for etymology, he attempted to reform language use so that every word had 
only one meaning and one clearly defined connotation. He took this strategy to its 
limits, as Mayhew details: 
The basic meaning of δεινος is ‘terrible’ though it can also mean ‘clever.’ In 
Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates reports that, concerning “terrible”, Prodicus 
chastises him for Protagoras as a “terribly wise man”, asking whether I am not 
ashamed to call good things terrible. Prodicus complains that a word should 
not contain two contradictory connotations (xvi).  
Prodicus’s objections to this and other usages point towards an attitudinal awareness 
of the complexities of language, which is performed through his militant linguistic 
analysis. Prodicus’s work, while seeming to point towards a desire to fix and secure 
language in fact dramatizes an incredibly active, fluid and shifting language that is 
anything but fixed. For example, as Mayhew writes, he had a highly personalized 
approach to using words, the most famous example concerns the word ‘phlegm’, 
which Prodicus interpreted entirely differently to “everyone” (xvi) else, advocating 
the replacement of the conventional notion of “phlegm” with mucus. Prodicus’s 
incursions into linguistic analysis were part of his wider philosophical approach. He 
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was “an atheist” (xvii), and his interest in linguistic analysis undoubtedly reflects his 
belief that language is a man-made construct that is continually reconstructed based 
on the convenience and attitudes of the societies that use it, rather than a gift from the 
gods that must be preserved. Prodicus’s atheism also manifested itself in writings 
about “the origin of beliefs in the gods” (xvii). As such, Prodicus demonstrated a keen 
awareness of the ways in which societies adopt systems of belief and structures of 
governance based them. Taken together, the fragments on these subjects suggest a 
radical philosophical approach that took into account language’s structuring capacity 
and the ways in which language is used to create belief systems and to justify 
governmental structures. 
The crucial difference between this sophistic attitude and Bernstein’s similar 
one today is perhaps in the way that society viewed sophistic performances as 
relevant to the political life of society, in a way that our contemporary society by no 
means does always consider art, and in particular poetry. As Poulokos writes, “insofar 
as the sophists turned rhetoric into a spectacular enterprise, they can be said to have 
relied on- indeed, imitated- aspects of the dramatic tradition they had encountered. 
But insofar as they expanded the spectacular from the theater to the courtroom, the 
Assembly or other places of public gathering, they can be said to have theatricalized 
rhetorical discourse, giving it a new face. Thus, by combining two heterogenous 
elements, spectacles and discourse, the sophists in effect created a new amalgam” 
(43). It is in this “amalgam” of “assembly” and “theater” and “spectacles and 
discourse” that the sophists’ experimentations with language achieve their specifically 
political content. Within their works, the distinction between aesthetics, philosophy 
and politics is fundamentally more blurred, a fact that is illustrated by Plato’s pre-
occupation in The Sophist and elsewhere of distinguishing and categorising the 
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statesman from the sophist and the philosopher. It is this same confluence of and 
“amalgam” of artifice and politics that Bernstein appears to be envisioning when he 
writes of the progression from questions concerning complex thinking of “the 
constitution of meaning, of groups, of nations – of value”. This impulse to 
amalgamate the exploration of aesthetic forms with the exploration of social and 
political forms can also be located within Bernstein’s position of  “insisting that 
stylistic innovations be recognized not only as aesthetic conventions but also as 
alternative social formations” (227). 
If the link between “poetry and public policy” is self confessedly “almost a 
joke”, the task of suggesting what the “alternative social formations” might amount to 
could be considered a banana skin. However, if Bernstein is nevertheless willing to 
engage in a serious and committed exploration with poetry as a potential agency of 
public policy and politics, it is only by considering the specific values that Bernstein’s 
poetry promotes in the context of contemporary politics that any sense of how 
Bernstein’s poetics can be considered, as they are often claimed to be, of political 
importance. It is arguably in the reluctance of critics to consider specifically literary 
works in relation to those of contemporary policy analysts and political theorists that 
results in the dramatic felt difference between poetry and politics (almost in spite of 
the increased claims made for writing in political forms). The distance between the 
values promoted in Bernstein’s poetics (difference, instability, multiplicity etc) may 
seem, and in many ways are, very far from the political structures we are familiar with 
in contemporary democracies. However by analyzing those formal organization 
principles and values that Bernstein’s poetry presents and analyzing them in relation 
to those of political theorists, it is possible to posit just how Bernstein’s work might 
be considered to manifest political values. Indeed, it also brings Bernstein’s poetics 
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into closer approximation to the political value associated with sophistical 
performances in Ancient Athens. Perhaps the most apparent of the values expressed in 
Bernstein’s poetry is that of ‘difference’, of plurality and multiplicity. As readings 
throughout this thesis are intended to show, at a fundamental level his poetry enacts a 
dramatic sense of linguistic experimentation and difference that amounts to a 
celebration of the irreconcilability of differences. In this aspect, the values expressed 
by his poetics might be considered to resemble those found in the work of the political 
theorist and sociologist David Held, whose works on Adorno describe a method that 
embodies “contradiction” (1984, 84). Held’s political proposition of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ provides just such a framework or model through which to view 
Bernstein’s poetics of public policy. Indeed, by reading Bernstein’s poetics within the 
framework of Held’s analysis of contemporary geopolitics, it is possible to see what 
makes them so immediately relevant and potentially useful. The model of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ that Held advances is one in which he with great clarity lays out 
how societies could equip themselves more effectively to act collaboratively and 
collectively, while also enshrining maximum difference and non-honogeneity. The 
aesthetic values which Bernstein’s work promotes are remarkably in-tune with those 
that Held suggests in his work are necessary for the development of a ‘cosmopolitan’ 
global society. Of course, Held’s ‘cosmopolitan’ approach is just one perspective on 
how these values of plurality and difference could be developed into organizational 
political principles. However, it is worth considering the affinities between 
Bernstein’s poetics and Held’s politics as an example of the sort of political system 
that the values presented in Bernstein’s poetics might be considered to promote. Held 
has written of ‘cosmopolitanism’ that it is: “the triumph of difference”. This is a 
phrase that (in spite of its inherent triumphalism- Bernstein would most likely use an 
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alternative phrase such as the ‘proliferation of difference’) could equally apply to 
Bernstein’s poetics. At a formal level, an aesthetics of multiplicity is fundamentally 
written into what Held, writing of Adorno’s aesthetic theory, called “the whole 
internal organisation” of Bernstein’s art. The brief reading of a section of ‘Searchless 
Warrant’ that follows is intended to demonstrate this aspect of Bernstein’s formal 
strategies without necessarily pre-empting it. It is indebted in the tools used in the 
analysis to the groundbreaking 1978 work Poetic Artifice by the poet Veronica 
Forrest-Thomson, of whom Bernstein has written in his poem-essay ‘Artifice of 
Absorption’. Forrest-Thomson’s book proceeds by analyzing what she calls the “non-
semantic levels” of a poem’s artifice. However, following Bernstein’s lead in 
‘Artifice of Absorption’, where he states that “I would say that such elements as line 
breaks, acoustic patterns, syntax etc are meaningful” (1992, 12), this reading of 
‘Searchless Warrant’ focuses not on the poem’s thematic content so much as the 
semantic implications of its formal organization, what Bernstein calls “the extra-
lexical” (1999, 299) but nevertheless meaningful architecture of the poem. 
 
Germinal detonation inculcates missing resemblance 
not otherwise pared, or, wishing you’d said, sank  
curtly, brusque insolence narrowing on dated theatrics, 
brutalized homilies to regulated mists. The parson 
takes the moment to wish for a speedy return in a gabardine 
suit. Drips decorate the porcelain, view 
is emblazoned on polished pretense, insular 
monuments. A restive restraint corrals 
the aroma; reception areas are cordoned 
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off in other words liquid laminated. Restraint 
takes a breather, ripping through halls of necrotic 
prostration, autochthonous  
titillation (1987, 110)  
 
These opening lines of ‘Searchless Warrant’ immediately situate the reader in a 
poetics of, as the line puts it, “germinal detonation”. This phrase both enacts and 
describes what this poem dramatizes: the proliferation of multiple interpretative 
possibilities. “Germinal detonation” refers to a sense of explosive development, with 
things multiplying and germinating exponentially and this phrase enacts just such a 
process. Is “germinal detonation” germ warfare? Or does it refer to Emile Zola’s 
masterpiece ‘Germinal’? Its capitalized position at the start of the line suggests it 
could, and indeed, the tendency of Zola’s novels to build towards an explosive, 
possibly revolutionary conclusion could also make “Germinal detonation” a literary 
advice and a social commentary of the sort employed by the great ‘naturalist’ writer. 
“Detonation” recalls its anagram “denotation”, writing the phrase “germinal 
denotation” into the text. “Germinal denotation” could be taken as a cue for a reading 
practice that acknowledges the text’s capacity to “germinate”, i.e. spread multiple 
meanings across multiple planes. Indeed, it is part of the poem’s strategy that this 
process is enacted in a way that draws attention to itself. The phrase “germinal 
detonation” has stopped the reading in its tracks, (‘arresting’ the attention if we adopt 
the metaphor established in Bernstein’s title). However, the complete line reads 
“Germinal detonation inculcates missing resemblance”. The phrase “inculcates 
missing resemblance” seems to describe exactly what the preceeding reading has done 
when it replaced “detonation” with its “missing resemblance” “denotation”. Or 
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indeed, more generally, when it translated “germinal detonation” into ‘chemical 
bomb’ or ‘germ warfare’. At the level of sound, the line transitions from the edgy 
abundance of  “t”, “d” and “c” sounds, to the softer “s”’s of  “missing resemblance”, 
which also carry over into the next line in words such as “otherwise” “wishing” 
“said” and “sank”. However, the third line marks the return of “t” “c” and “d” 
consonants in the words “curtly” “dated” and “theatrics”. The effect is one of 
spreading, the “s” sounds spreading across the first and second lines but not 
eliminating the “t”, “c” and “d” sounds of the first line. This sense of ‘spreading’ or 
‘multiplicity’ can also be traced to a technique of grouping of words by their sound. 
For example, in line three the word “brusque” anticipates the word “brutalized” 
through the repetition of “bru”. Other possible groups in this section would be “said, 
sank”, “porcelain/polished”, “porcelain/ pretense”, “restive restraint”, “insular/ 
inculcates/ insolence”, “drips/ ripping”, “liquid laminated”, “monuments/ moment”, 
“gabardine/ germinal”, “cordoned/ corrals”, “reception/ regulated/ return”. These 
groups are generated through sound patterning. Another, different set could also be 
arrived at through semantic grouping of similar or connected ideas: “emblazoned/ 
monuments/ homilies/ decorate/ parson/ theatrics/ halls/ gabardine/ prostration/ 
pretense/” all suggest commemoration and ceremony; “drips/ liquid/ aroma/ sank/ 
mists” all suggest various degrees of liquidity; meanwhile, the group “pared/ brusque/ 
brutalized/ ripping/ restraint/ corrals” suggest various degrees of violence, control or 
force. One of the consequences of these semantic and sonic groups is that it increases 
the referential capacity of the poem. The ear and the eye become tuned up to looking 
for similar sounds and visual representations and the mind sees synonyms and other 
semantic links that aren’t there. The capacity of words to refer to other words is 
greatly increased by this process, creating a layered multiplicity of reference. The 
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most immediately apparent example of this is the one already discussed, “denotation” 
as a word referred to within the word “detonation”, but there are many other 
examples: “pared” could refer to its homophone “paired”, especially given the 
‘grouping process’ just described. Given the appearance of “prostration” a few lines 
down, the phrase “sank curtly” seems to refer to the word “curtsey”, a feature that is 
endorsed by the semantic link with “sank” and the phonic link with “curtly”. There is 
another group of words, too. A group of words from specialized or esoteric 
vocabularies: “necrotic” and “autochthonous” are the two clearest examples from this 
section of the poem. Requiring looking up in a dictionary, these words increase the 
sensation of multi-referentiality by encouraging the reader to translate the words prior 
to looking them up, to focus on component parts of the word to try and work it out. 
“Necrotic” in fact refers to a dead cell within live tissue and “autochthonous” is used 
to refer to something as originating where found, such as of a blood clot. As a 
metaphor within Bernstein’s poem, it could be taken to be a description of the word 
itself, its consonant-heavy pile-up of “chth” providing a ‘clot’ at the phonic level.  
Taken together these aspects of Bernstein’s poem create an overall effect that 
is one of language’s multiplicity, an increased and germinating referentiality that 
spreads across both the meaning and the sound of words. Indeed, the presence in the 
poem of the phrase “in other words”, further suggests this sense of language’s 
multiplicity of reference. However, the effect is not one of semantic free-play where 
‘anything goes’. Rather than this, the poem constantly addresses the kinds of systems 
that are used to read poems and to interpret meaning from language. There is a 
constant sense of interrogating regulation and systematization, which can be seen 
from the group of words relating to both ‘ceremony’ and ‘restraint’. These two ideas 
of multiplicity and difference on the one hand and regulation and system on the other 
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creates the poem’s most compelling dynamic and is not settled within the text: “a 
restive restraint corrals” and “restraint takes a breather”. This dynamic is one of the 
ways in which the text “embodies contradictions”, a feature of the poem that is also 
detectable in the frequent employment of paradox “restive restraint”, “regulated 
mist”, “corrals the aroma”, “liquid laminated” etc.  The image group related to liquid 
also provides a possible handle on what sort of poem ‘Searchless Warrant’ is. The 
frequency of ‘liquidity’ metaphors gives the poem a sense of saturation. This mirrors 
that of the saturation of referentiality just described. Indeed, so ‘saturated’ is the poem 
in liquidity metaphors and in referentiality, that it recalls Bernstein’s own metaphor 
for a poem in ‘Artifice of Absorption’, that of “a spongy surface” that can absorb 
differences and multiplicity and retain its essential shape. By forming a poetic surface 
saturated with multiple meanings and interpretations across different planes, 
Bernstein’s poetics is able to absorb each instance of the reading and interpretation 
process without fully realizing itself in totality.     
 
c. Semblance and Simulacrum 
 
Bernstein’s essay ‘Semblance’ was first published in a symposium on ‘Death of the 
‘Referent’?’ for the British magazine Reality Studios, run by the poet and publisher 
Ken Edwards. This initial publication is important, because it emphasizes that 
Bernstein’s essay is a response to a notion that had been used to describe the language 
experiments of the language writers, namely that their work explored an abstracted 
language in which the relation of words to their referents was severed. However, 
rather than “death of the referent”, Bernstein’s essay advances a case for “a recharged 
use of the multivalent referential vectors that any word has” (1986, 34). Bernstein 
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replaces the sense of the bridge between word and referent being severed with a 
notion of the fabric of the bridges (and tunnels, webs etc) between words and their 
multiple referents being more comprehensively understood and explored. In the essay, 
Bernstein explores how language writing explores “ways of releasing the energy 
inherent in the referential dimension of language” (35). He opposes the techniques of 
language writing with those of more “standard” forms of writing as follows:  
Sentences that follow standard grammatical patterns allow the accumulating 
references to enthrall the reader by diminishing diversions from a constructed 
representations. In this way, each work’s references work in harmony by 
reinforcing a spatiotemporal order by conventionalized by the bulk of writing 
practice that creates ‘the standard’ (36). 
Bernstein’s conception of standard language use, then, is one of diminishing returns 
whereby the act of reading and understanding is an automatic process of reducing the 
possible referents down to their minimum in order to understand the specific things 
being represented within the text. However, contrasted with this, language writing 
generates multiple possible referents on an ongoing basis, multiplying the referential 
possibilities for words, sentences and other sense units through increasing the 
possibilities both grammatically and sequentially. The example Bernstein uses to 
illustrate the difference is from the writing of Barrett Watten, where the accumulation 
of grammatically standard sentences placed side by side results in “a perceptual 
vividness… [which is] intensified for each sentence… [because of] the abruptness of 
the cuts”: “Words elect us. The lamp sits atop the table in the study. The tower is 
burnt orange…” (37). This example, chosen by Bernstein, illustrates the referential 
possibilities that Watten’s juxtaposed sentences incorporates. For example, “the tower 
is burnt orange” can clearly refer to “the lamp… atop the table” but needn’t in the 
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context just refer to this; it could also refer to an entirely other tower, a tower of Babel 
perhaps, indicated by the reference to “burnt orange”, the colour of the middle portion 
of the tower in Peter Brueghel’s The Tower of Babel painting. Bernstein’s essay 
suggests that this sort of multiplicity of meaning and uncertainty of referent is 
constantly inherent in all language use but that it is obscured by our lack of awareness 
to the conventions that operate in most standard texts. Bernstein’s essay is a work of 
poetics, i.e. concerned with the composition and constitution of literary texts. 
However, as with many of Bernstein’s texts, its relevance spills over into literary 
theory and also philosophy.   
Given that its principal subject is the referents of words as used within literary 
texts, the title of Bernstein’s essay, ‘Semblance’, clearly locates its theoretical 
underpinnings in relation to the works of postmodern philosophers and theorists of the 
“simulacrum”. In particular, the work of Baudrillard seems relevant, in whose 
writings (and in particular in Simulacra and Simulation) is diagnosed the hyperreality 
of the referent, whereby the ‘reality’ referred to by signs is both a product of them and 
consumed by them, dissolving and disrupting the sense of a stable relationship 
between word (or image) and referent. In contemporary business practices, media 
culture and public life, Baudrillard writes, “there is no greater referent or deeper 
finality than this ‘simulacral’ business” (1994, 126). The relevance of Baudrillard’s 
text to Bernstein’s conception of writing in such a way as to suggest as much of a 
multitude of referents as possible in as open and multi-structured a way as possible is 
that by doing so he is drawing attention to language as not referring straightforwardly 
to its signified (reality). Rather than this, language is conceived of as a network of 
possible referents which in fact constitute reality rather than point to it: i.e. language 
(and reality) are caught together as “semblance”. Indeed, in Content’s Dream 
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Bernstein has suggested that his language experiments and discursive escapism build 
on the work of Baudrillard, extending his work into the poetics and composition of 
texts themselves. He writes: “Baudrillard’s writing practice, however, mirrors the 
very code he wishes to be set loose from, without self-reflection on this fact” (198). 
Bernstein’s work, then, incorporates Baudrillard’s reflections on the “monopoly of the 
code” (198) but extends an awareness of this into the actual fabric of writing itself by 
constantly problematizing the prevailing code of discursiveness, rationality and 
clarity. Writing in the way suggested in ‘Semblance’ demonstrates an awareness that 
the unproblematic acceptance of word referring simply to referent is an acceptance of 
the prevailing structures through which the world is experienced. In contrast to this, 
Bernstein suggests a way of writing in which “textures, vocabularies, discourses, 
constructivist modes of radically different character are not integrated into a field as 
part of a pre-determined planar architecture; the gaps and jumps compose a space 
within shifting parameters, types and styles of discourse constantly crisscrossing, 
interacting, creating new gels” (39). The words he employs here emphasize his point: 
“gels” belonging to the language of the stage; architecture clearly suggesting material 
and structurality and “textures” and even “gap” referring both to clothing and 
textuality. Bernstein is emphasizing the fabric of words, their non-naturalness and 
their multiplicity.  
His title ‘Semblance’ itself enacts the essay within an ancient and enduring 
conversation about language, simulacrum and reality. Perhaps the most direct 
reference within Bernstein’s word choice of ‘semblance’ is to Plato’s The Sophist. 
The Sophist has been described by a number of critics as central to the philosophical 
process of investigating ‘simulacrum’ and ‘semblance’. Drawing on the work of Jean 
Luc Nancy, Max Statkiewicz has written extensively about the problematic 
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‘semblances’ within Plato’s text The Sophist. This makes itself felt at the level of the 
text itself:  
How to tell the sophist from The Sophist? Plato scholars acknowledge that 
there is no formal way to distinguish the two cases: neither capitalization nor 
italics are available in Greek manuscripts, and there are no other formal marks 
that would allow us to tell the difference between the man and the text” (102). 
Within the formal dynamics of The Sophist, then, is concealed a central ambiguity 
about reference, a problematic dual possibility of meaning. Given that Plato’s The 
Sophist is so concerned with divining the definition of ‘the sophist’ and in 
distinguishing it from his own activities as a philosopher, this ambiguity of referent is 
highly operative in undermining the certainties of definition that are supposed to be 
reached by the end of the dialogue. As Statkiewicz writes, this draws “Plato’s text 
into the mimetic play of the sophist” (103). At a purely formal level, then, The Sophist 
performs the sort of ‘sembling’ and dissembling play that Bernstein advocates within 
‘Semblance’. The context of the subject of the dialogue makes this ambiguity of 
referent even more potent and performative. The interlocutors in Plato’s dialogue are 
clear about their task: to define the sophist and distinguish it from the philosopher and 
the statesman. The sophist, it is suggested, is simply a “semblance” of the 
philosopher. The Eleatic Stranger is attempting to clarify the essence of the 
philosopher in order to distinguish it from that which it is not (but that might appear 
to be similar.)    
Deleuze, in particular, has developed a reading of The Sophist that regards it 
as pivotal within Platonism in reaching an endpoint or collapse of the system of 
essences as opposed to semblances: 
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It may be that the end of the Sophist contains the most extraordinary adventure 
of Platonism: as a consequence of searching for the simulacrum and leaning 
over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is 
not only a false copy but that it places in question the very notations of copy 
and model. The final definition of the sophist leads us to the point where we 
can no longer distinguish him from Socrates himself – the ironist working in 
private by means of brief arguments. Was it not necessary to push irony to that 
extreme? (2004, 294). 
The critic Paul Patton has summed up Deleuze’s reading of Plato’s Sophist as follows: 
Deleuze’s deconstructive reading of Platonism argues that it offers both the 
elements of a representational conception of the world, albeit in the meager 
resources of the theory of Forms, and the means to overturn that conception. 
To the extent that simulacra are defined by their power successfully to imitate 
the appearances of things, their existence threatens to undermine the very 
possibility of distinguishing between real things and mere illusions. Deleuze 
suggests that this is what occurs at the end of the Sophist where the Eleatic 
Stranger offers a definition of the sophist such that he can no longer be 
distinguished from Socrates himself (34).  
Deleuze’s reading of The Sophist, then, is as a text that paves the way for postmodern 
critiques of Platonism right at the heart of the Platonic project itself. The Sophist is the 
text that ruptures the stable relationship between the simulacrum and reality, between 
the poetic, mimetic way of interpreting the world and the philosophical method. The 
distinction between the two vanishes along with the distinction between sophist and 
philosopher, between semblance and reality. The world is understood as simulacrum, 
as a hyperreal web of referents. Indeed, Bernstein’s text The Sophist re-enacts the 
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same ambiguity of referent as Plato’s text: is his title referring to Plato’s The Sophist 
or to the figure of ‘the sophist’, merely capitalized for the benefit of titular 
conventions?  By locating his text The Sophist, his essay ‘Semblance’ and by 
extension his wider poetics in relation to this critical moment in philosophy when the 
Platonic project anticipates its own overthrowing, Bernstein provocatively channels 
his poetic project into an ancient and postmodern thought-debate concerning 
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Chapter 2. I. Bernstein Reading Cavell (and Talking to Albritton?) 
 
“I HATE SPEECH” - Robert Grenier 
 
Robert Grenier’s remark, with which he inaugurated the first issue of the little 
magazine ‘This’ in 1971, co-edited with Barrett Watten, is a categorically dissembling 
statement. It reads as an impassioned rail against assumptions about the natural place 
of ‘speech’ in poetry while undoing its own logic by being itself a speech-act, a fact 
which is highlighted by the capitalization and the emphatic colloquialism of the 
expression “HATE”. This utterance has become one of the most influential (and 
succinct) statements of intent by any writer associated with language poetry and has 
attracted significant critical attention. Bob Perelman has described this statement as 
“an important literary gesture” (1996, 40) and Ron Silliman declared it as signalling 
“a breach – and a new moment in American writing” (1986, xvii), whereas Marjorie 
Perloff has called it a “manifesto” (2004, 129). The statement’s power and impact 
comes from its ambiguity and multiplicity. It implies a move away from poetry that 
privileges the speaking voice and the personal subjective position; however, on the 
other hand, it also cautions against the logic that the subject can necessarily be 
avoided in a universalizing and totalizing way by being itself a speech act. Another 
aspect of this statement is that it might suggest an opposition between “speech” and 
“conversation” or “discussion”, where “speech” would refer to a univocal delivery 
from speaker to hearer and “conversation” would acknowledge multiple perspectives 
and demonstrate an awareness of the cultural and social implications of every speech 
act, while also implying reader engagement and reader-response. This interpretation 
of “I HATE SPEECH” makes it not just a negation of what has been described as 
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‘workshop poetry’, in Marjorie Perloff’s words “dominated by a regressively 
romantic concept of the poet as a man speaking to men (or a woman speaking to 
women – the principle is the same), by the notion that poetry is emotion recollected in 
tranquility, the poet speaking for all of us - only more sensitively, perceptively, 
expertly” (1998, 182). Rather than this simply negative and oppositional stance, 
reading “I HATE SPEECH” against itself as a positive statement transforms it into a 
suggestive endorsement of a poetic practice rooted in “conversation” and 
“discussion”. 
  The language poets have been nothing if not engaged in “conversation”. Their 
pre-occupation with poetics alongside poetry is just one aspect of this talkativeness. In 
countless interviews, talks, reading series, reviews, books of criticism, essays, radio 
shows, email list-servs, conference panels, blogs, online databases, publishing houses, 
little magazines, academic forums, and many other media, the language poets have 
stretched and explored the ways in which literary movements and communities can 
converse and engage with both writers of their own geographic particular and writers 
from all over the world. As Bob Perelman has put it, a number of language poets have 
attempted “to redraw or undo generic boundaries between poetry and criticism” (11). 
For language poets, the act of writing poetry has become a critical act that demands 
the same attentiveness and explorations of literary histories and conventions as the act 
of criticism; conversely, in their critical and theoretical writings, language poets have 
been at the forefront of expanding the parameters of critical writing in innovative and 
experimental ways.   Furthermore, collaboration, the act of putting the work of two 
poets in conversation with one another or two art forms in conversation with one 
another, has been a bedrock of language poetry and a mainstay of the way in which 
language poets have influenced their own reception history. Engendering theoretical 
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and critical discussions surrounding their work themselves, they have pre-empted and 
initiated a critical culture surrounding not just their own poetry but that of other recent 
experimental movements and tendencies, such as New Narrative writing, vispo, Flarf, 
Conceptual Poetry etc. This conversational culture has resulted in the publication of 
books of theory and criticism from many of the major language poets: Bob 
Perelman’s The Marginalisation of Poetry, Ron Silliman’s The New Sentence, Barrett 
Watten’s The Constructivist Moment, Lyn Hejinian’s The Language of Inquiry, a 
number of volumes by Rachel Blau Du Plessis and Bruce Andrews’ Paradise and 
Method, to name just a few influential volumes. Bernstein’s four volumes of essays 
have been a major part of this wealth of critical engagement on the part of language 
poets, as well as his edited collection The Politics of Poetic Form. Indeed, Bernstein 
has continued to play a critical role in continuing and expanding these dialogues 
across a diverse range of programs and initiatives, including the Poetics List Serv, the 
Poetics Program at SUNY Buffalo, the Electronic Poetry Center, the PennSound 
Archive, his Close Listening reading series, his LineBreak radio show, his syllabi on 
experimental poetry and poetics at SUNY Buffalo and University of Pennsylvania and 
many other projects besides. His involvement in PennSound and the Poetics ListServ 
are perhaps worthy of particular note because of their focus on presenting interviews 
and initiating conversations respectively. The Poetics ListServ is at its best (and 
conceptually) a forum for discussion of all aspects of poetry, poetics (fields that 
spread out into much wider discussions of culture and politics). Through these 
projects and others, Bernstein has brought into conversation experimental poetry and 
poetics from around the world.  
In his essay ‘Language Poetry and Collective Life’, Oren Izenberg has 
stressed the ways in which language poets fostered a literary community and 
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collective conversation: “Language poetry has, since its inception in 1971, devoted a 
significant portion of its energies to the construction of an ‘alternative’ literary 
culture, founding little magazines such as This, Hills, o-blek, Temblor, 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, Poetics Journal and Aerial, small presses such as Roof, Potes 
and Poets, O Books, The Figures, Tuumba, and Sun and Moon, and an endless 
number of mimeos, broadsheets, newsletters, reading series, collaborations, and, of 
course, conferences” (144). Given this development of the cultural mechanisms for 
the publication and dissemination of poetry, Izenberg remarks that language poets 
have created more than just an avant garde literary movement and that they have self-
consciously fostered a sense of themselves as “the kind of thing anthropologists 
would be interested in” (144), i.e. a ‘culture’ as well as a literary movement. Izenberg 
locates this impulse within Bernstein’s oft-employed phrase “official verse culture”, 
which he regards as “conceptually conflating “verse” and “culture”’ (145). In 
developing his analysis of language poetry as a social movement as much (he in fact 
argues that it is more) than a literary one, Izenberg prioritises their conversational 
modes, arguing that:  
It is just such an anthropological motive that underwrites Language poetry’s 
peculiar forms of self-presentation and preservation – its tendency to publish 
not just its poems but its conversations about poems, and not just those 
conversations, but jokes amidst those conversations, laughter at the jokes, 
stumbles, interruptions, and silences – as though on behalf of some future 
civilization studying its own past (145). 
Izenberg’s analyses of the impulses behind language poetry’s processes of self-
documenting the ‘conversation’ surrounding its production, which begin interestingly, 
ultimately leads to his shutting off a reading of the poetry itself, stating that language 
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poetry displays “what I take to be an objective and, indeed, deliberated feature of the 
work: the overall thinness or insubstantiality of the poems language poets have made” 
(140). This aesthetic judgement leads him to state that “the rising tally of similarities 
and texts places impossible demands on our capacity and will to attend to the manifest 
differences between one poem and another, to articulate the fine distinctions of tone 
or affect; until the effort to immerse oneself in Language poetry produces the 
sensation that language as Language poetry imagines and manifests it has neither 
affect nor tone, and that language as language poetry imagines and manifests it 
demands neither articulation nor, precisely, attention” (142). The argument being 
advanced is that the poems are secondary to the conscious effort to create an 
“alternative” socious or culture, and that language poetry’s value is not in the poems 
themselves, which are characterized as displaying homogeneity to the point of 
exhaustion, but in the movement’s iteration of social structure. Furthermore, Izenberg 
claims that it is precisely the lack of nuance and variety in the poems of language 
poetry that allows it to have any claim for the social: 
Language poets are Language poets in just this sense – they intend their poems 
not as sentences representing propositions, but as exemplifications of the 
species-specific creative competence to freely produce and to recognize new 
sentences as sentences in language (162).  
According to Izenberg, it is therefore in, as he sees it, language poetry’s lack of tonal 
differentiation and seemingly endless capacity for multiplicity and production of 
sentences (rather than any attention to what those sentences might mean or how they 
might mean) that language poetry most fully performs the capacity for societies to 
sociate themselves in relation to language. The syntactical experiments of language 
poets then come to be important only in as much as it creates new opportunities for 
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sentences to be recognized as such by the communities into which they enter. In this 
characterization, language poetry is represented as “an endlessly productive faculty 
generating a potentially endless array of “New Sentences”, and not for use or 
instruction but as bare proof of its existence and tokens of its nature” (162). Intriguing 
as Izenberg’s thesis is, it winds up portraying language poetry as a monotonous and 
monolithic collective machine producing language purely to demonstrate that it exists 
and is a viable society. At first there seems a certain plausibility to his conception to 
the extent that language poetry does iterate a sense of a society’s creativity and 
productivity through creating and exploring new forms of grammar and syntactical 
arrangements. Nevertheless, the characterization of language poetry as devoid of tonal 
variety or variety of any kind seems a misreading of language poetry and of poetic 
culture as a whole. Poets associated with language poetry have produced some of the 
most various poetic writing of the last forty years. I would argue that language poetry 
is considerably more multiplicitous in tone, style, affect, structure, organizational 
principles, vocabulary, content, subject matter, theoretical underpinnings, sound 
patternings and any other measurements that are used to delineate different kinds of 
poetry from other kinds of poetry than any other movement in literature. The zaum 
poetry of P. Inman and David Melnick, the ongoing lyrical “Readings” project of 
Beverley Dahlen, the slap-stick poetics of some of Bernstein’s work, the mega-scale 
works of Ron Silliman, the minimalist lyrics of Rae Armantrout, the outlandish 
performance-oriented work of Bruce Andrews, the historical layerings of Susan 
Howe. The list could go on and on. The work of none of these writers is alike, and 
certainly their works are distinctly more various in tone, affect and style than a similar 
selection of poets writing in more traditional modes, whose poems would display 
considerably more coherent approach to style, structure and affect. It seems as though 
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Izenberg mistakes this very multiplicity and variety in language poetry for its 
opposite; the works of language poets are too various, too different, too unlike other 
works, that for Izenberg this means he loses the capacity to pay attention to those 
differences. Language poetry, in its employment of wildly divergent and 
multiplicitous experimental modes, demands more from the reader than some more 
conventionally-oriented works. However, this is not in itself justification for claiming 
that those differences are not there or that they don’t matter and that what matters is in 
fact language poetry’s iteration of the socious through the simple fact of its 
production of sentences. The poetry of language poetry is as vital a part of its interest 
as a literary phenomenon and furthermore the poems and writings themselves need 
not be subsumed under a larger mega-project with the sole posited aim of articulating 
its existence through the production of language. This conception of language poetry 
subsumes the poetry under the word language in order to avoid paying heed to the 
differences and difficulties, the varieties and idiosyncracies of individual language 
poems.  
Izenberg’s characterization of language poetry as a flat, indistinguishable mass 
has also been suggested by critics such as Michel Delville, who describes “a 
reluctance to go beyond an emphasis placed strictly on the syntactic and semantic 
aspects of linguistic production” (238) and Albert Gelpi, who has remarked that 
language poetry’s “immediate consequence is to paralyze the capacity of language for 
change and effecting change and to reduce the range of reference and resonance to 
mere spread of surface”, even though he admits that some writers associated with 
language poetry have produced work that “denies this deadening premise” (538). The 
issue with these characterisations of language poetry is that they simply do not hold 
up to a reading of much of the poetry itself. “An emphasis placed strictly on the 
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syntactic and semantic aspects of linguistic production” needn’t flatten any possible 
meaningful reading of the poem. Rather, the conscious explorations of language at the 
level of language can in fact result in poems that have increased capacity for multiple 
meanings across multiple planes. However, in spite of these issues, Izenberg’s 
argument is a compelling one and one that if it were modified in such a way as to 
incorporate the poetry itself can articulate what it is that makes language poetry a 
social project as well as a literary one. In order to do this, it is useful to return to 
where Izenberg’s argument commences, the moment when he characterizes language 
poetry as putting an emphasis on “its tendency to publish not just its poems but 
conversations about poems.” The importance of ‘conversation’ to language poetry 
seems entirely obliterated and silenced in Izenberg’s later description of a kind of 
collective factory producing sentences that aren’t really meant to be read. However, 
by replacing conversation at the centre of a description of language poetry, and seeing 
both the poems and the critical work as part of that conversation a much less 
totalizing and monolithic picture emerges. Izenberg’s version fails to take into 
account the ways in which language poets respond to and read each others work and 
the ways in which language poems themselves have generated reading activity in such 
a way as not to inhibit “attention” in the way he describes but that in fact demand it. 
In this picture, language poems become fundamental to the project as expressions of 
difference (and not enveloped under a homogenous “thinness”) whose principal value 
is in the conversational explorations they generate when attested to with care and 
attention in their own right. It is a picture where ‘conversational activity’ can be taken 
to be of fundamental importance to the process of reading language poetry and to the 
social activities of language poetry more generally.  
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In reference to Bernstein’s poetics, this activity began with 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, the innovative magazine of poetics and criticism which he 
co-edited with Bruce Andrews from 1978 - 1981. An extended discussion of the 
journal forms the basis of the first section of chapter 3. However, another early 
instance of Bernstein and Andrews fostering and engaging in conversation was also 
engendered by the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Distribution Service, details of which 
have been made available online through the Eclipse Project (itself an extension of the 
sort of dialogic impulse that fuelled the communities of writers associated with 
language poetry). A distribution list and premises-less library of out of print titles by 
experimental and progressive poets, it was designed to enable sharing of titles among 
the members of the service (with the cost of photocopying and postage). As the 
header to one of the lists remarks: “Even when published, writing we wish to read 
often goes out of print with dismaying rapidity – closing off a dialogue. Out-of-print 
and unpublished works may still circulate among a small circle of friends. Here, we 
hope to sustain that dialogue and expand that circle.” Works were available either in 
their original published format or as photocopies, and the service was operated by 
Bernstein, Silliman and Andrews. As the critic Ann Vickery has noted, the service 
was conceived to “strengthen affinities of interest” (28) across the coastal divide 
between East and West Coast language poets. According to the Eclipse Project, it was 
a “short-lived” initiative, however, it nevertheless demonstrates the innovative ways 
in which language poets went about ensuring their works were ‘talking to’ as a large a 
circle of interested parties as possible and that those in the ever-expanding “circle” 
were able to participate, respond and ‘talk back’.  In suggesting ‘talk’ and 
‘conversation’ as paradigms for certain strands of poetics in both Bernstein’s oeuvre 
and language poetics more generally, the guiding principle is that these modes offer a 
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way of thinking about writing that the printed page and publication process had 
moved beyond or excluded and that the innovative and extensive publication (by 
which word I mean the full extent of their dissemination mechanisms printed and 
otherwise) processes employed by the language poets were able to re-engender. 
Perelman has written: 
Talk is the most mixed of media: social, bodily, clichéd, spontaneous, 
conflictual, identificatory. But the tone and rhythm of culturally perspicacious 
speech make for an effective token of the possibility of individual agency, 
however local, within the densely conflicted institutional grids of the 
contemporary socialscape. Print and the hierarchies of publishing and 
circulation are territories where social contentions are as densely coded as 
anywhere: the evanescent charms of talk are difficult to discern in printed 
speech (1998, 200). 
“Talk” as opposed to “printed speech”, therefore, offers something that is more 
overtly “social”, “conflictual” and “identificatory”. It offers a mode of engagement 
that lays itself bare as a way of interacting with societal and political pressures, 
something that gets obscured by the “social contentions” of the publishing 
marketplace. “Talk” is always something in motion and evolving, whereas the 
conventional understanding of the printed page would see it as something finalized 
and defined. The language poets brought these aspects of the aesthetics of “talk” onto 
the printed page through their rejection of the concept of the poem as emanating from 
a single unified perspective, their experiments with multiple points of view and 
multiple authorship, their insistence on reader-interaction and response to the text and 
their tendency towards poems that resist finality, unity and totality of perception and 
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understanding. Bernstein’s poetry is “conversational” in the sense of it being engaged 
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Chapter 2. II. “Can we talk?” (Bernstein, 2010, 187) 
 
“Can we talk?” This simple and familiar phrase is a way of inviting confidence and 
intimacy and a way of “getting down to business”, of sorting things out. It’s a mode 
of thinking, in a way, and possibly of starting afresh, as so often in contemporary 
usage, where the phrase  “can we talk?” pre-empts a change in relationship or a 
change at work. It signifies a start of a conversation, an addressing of things and 
suggested program of communication, of moving forward. Speaking of his time at 
Harvard University in an autobiographical interview with the poet and scholar Loss 
Pequeno Glazier, Bernstein has singled out two philosophers who he believes were of 
particular influence on his thinking: 
Two philosophers, Stanley Cavell and Rogers Albritton, were particularly 
important for me at Harvard. The first year I was there they split one of those 
grand tours of Western thought, Albritton from the pre-Socratics to the Middle 
Ages, and Cavell from the Enlightenment on. Each brought his own quirky, 
thought-filled style to the occasion (Bernstein, 2010, 42). 
The influence of the philosopher Stanley Cavell on Bernstein’s poetry has been 
discussed in a number of publications, both by Bernstein himself and by a number of 
critics. These works include Ursula Göricke’s dissertation ‘Poetry as Epistemological 
Enquiry: Reading Bernstein, Reading Cavell, Reading Wittgenstein’ (2003), which 
takes its cue from Bernstein’s essay ‘Reading Cavell, Reading Wittgenstein’, building 
on the importance attached to Cavell’s conception of “reading” in Bernstein’s essay to 
develop a sense of his poetry as a form of “epistemological enquiry”(15) through 
reading. Göricke’s essay convincingly extends Cavell’s idea of “redemptive reading” 
(16) to describe Bernstein’s poetics of collapsing the distinction between reader and 
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author and requiring the reading of texts to involve a reading by the reader of 
themselves as well as the language of the text itself. Her argument is that a reading 
that 
is willing to pay respect to each and every word and in this way to become 
receptive to the environments of words, to the fields of their everyday use, as 
well as the semantic interconnections between words and on a more complex 
level the interconnections between themes… amounts to a grammatical and 
epistemological enquiry (215).  
Receptivity is a crucial element of her argument and it involves the reader 
approaching texts with what she calls an “active passivity” (215), i.e. the ability to put 
aside existing viewpoints or demands (for meaning or form) and respond instead to 
the dynamics of the words themselves in order to learn about the dynamics of the 
world and society. As the critic Gerald Bruns has also remarked, for Cavell, “there is 
no reading that is not also a being-read” (1999, 196).    
 This chapter intends to further investigate Cavell’s influence on Bernstein in 
light of the preceding discussion of sophistry. In particular, I want to demonstrate that 
the act of “talking”, so central to the practice of the sophists, is an alternative and 
useful avenue through which to understand what Bernstein’s poetry does, as opposed 
to (and aligned with) “reading”. By doing so, the suggestion is that Bernstein’s poetry 
might be considered to enact a “conversation” and “discourse”. In this version of 
Bernstein’s “talkative” poetics, the second influential figure mentioned by Bernstein 
from his Harvard days emerges into view: Rogers Albritton.  Olaf Hansen has 
remarked of Cavell’s philosophical position that he always sets out from a position of 
questioning rather than answering, from a position of “unexplored territory”: 
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Cavell came into this world the way the pre-Socratic philosophers came into 
theirs. For the early Greeks, the cosmos was an unexplored territory, just as 
the New World, America, was for Cavell… For both Cavell and the early 
Greeks, questions inevitably arose concerning the relationship between 
language and nature, mankind and the self, and finally between the 
environment and society. (Hansen, Olaf, 12) 
That Hansen locates this philosophical starting point for Cavell with reference to the 
Ancient Greeks is of importance. The link between America and Ancient Greece is 
suggested and this might be particularly manifest in the philosophical approach to 
emergent democracy, where politics and philosophy are viewed as intertwined, and 
where ideas concerning how we arrange and organise ourselves remain as open 
questions and very much the domain of the philosopher. The affinity between 
Cavell’s philosophy and that of the sophists is most apparent in the question of how 
he philosophises than exactly what his books and essays take as their subjects. It is 
precisely in aspects of pre-Socratic philosophical mode and style that Hansen sees the 
kinship displayed most clearly: “Cavell offers moments of silent reflection and poetic 
admiration for both, the fragment and the paradox that we recognize from pre-
Socratic philosophy” (14). Hansen’s suggestion is that the importance in Cavell’s 
work of style and of wordplay displays affinities with that of the pre-Socratics, and of 
the sophists. Cavell is a philosopher who places an enormous weight on both aspects 
of his own style (the 256 word first sentence of The Claim of Reason is the most well-
known example) and that of the writers, artists and films the interrogation and 
interpretation of which forms the basis of his philosophical project. This ‘poetic’ 
aspect of Cavell’s philosophical approach has been noted by Bernstein himself, in an 
early essay on Cavell and Wittgenstein: 
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[Stanley Cavell’s] conception of philosophy shares with poetry the project of 
increasing an awareness of conditions- of where we are agreed, of what we 
have convened on; of the structures and grammars we live in; of how the 
syntaxes and grammars we create in turn create the world. To tell how it is 
with us, to reveal our attuning (which is often hidden) (Bernstein, 1986, 168). 
Bernstein stresses the openness at the heart of Cavell’s philosophical mode, where the 
task is to “increase an awareness… of how the syntaxes and grammars we create in 
turn create the world”. This formulation of Cavell’s philosophy puts language at the 
heart of his activity. If language use “in turn creates the world” then the mode of 
philosophizing becomes central to the practice of philosophy. Indeed, Bernstein’s use 
of the word “tell” here suggests that orality and ‘talking’ are operative within his 
conception of Cavell’s “conception of philosophy”. However, it isn’t until his later 
essay ‘Our Americas: New Worlds Still in Progress’, published in Attack of the 
Difficult Poems (2011) that this engagement with Cavell as a philosopher for whom 
philosophy is a “talk” really crystallises:  
The project of America - of the Americas - is a process not yet complete, a 
process that shall never be finished.  
For when it’s finished, it’s over.  
Our Americas is still in progress: as a talk, an experiment, an essay. Then 
again, perhaps our Americas is a formal procedure, a hypothesis or 
conditional, requiring aesthetic intervention, seat-of-the-pants ingenuity, and 
otherworldly reinvention. And this is why, it could just be, that we see the 
possibilities of our Americas most acutely in poetry: our poetics viewed under 
the sign of our exchange (2011, 72). 
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The conception of “our Americas” as “still in progress” and “a talk” clearly suggests 
the sense of an ongoing and unfinished project in which writers, thinkers and speakers 
of all kinds, are continually engaged in a process of renewal, defining and re-defining. 
In this essay, Bernstein is clearly referencing Cavell’s book-length essay This New Yet 
Unapproachable America, which itself draws on Emerson’s phrase from the essay 
‘Experience’ (2009, 320). As such, Bernstein is already situating his essay within a 
philosophical conversation in which Bernstein’s reading of Cavell, Cavell’s text, 
Cavell’s reading of Emerson and Emerson’s own writings and engagements with 
earlier texts form the key contexts. He is thus enacting a very Cavellian sense of 
philosophy as a conversation with the work of others, where receptivity and attention 
are the most important tools of the philosopher (and the poet). The key aspect of 
responsiveness as a philosophical tool is that it results in an ever shifting contextual 
interpretative framework through which to view the activities of philosophy and 
literature, where rather than new works replacing older works with their innovations, 
new works are instead understood as responding to, interpreting and conversing with 
older works in an ongoing and continuous conversation. Bernstein writes:  
My discussion of moral perfectionism, indebted to Stanley Cavell, would no 
doubt lead to a declaration of interdependence: that the poetics of the 
Americas cannot be complete, for if we ever arrive at its end, we will have 
destroyed its promise to be ongoing, regenerating, self-cannibalizing. 
(Bernstein, 2011, 66)  
Just as in Ancient Greece, the political and literary potency of the sophists was in 
crucial ways “performative”, so too is the element of performance critical to the 
project and process of articulating and challenging “Americas” for Bernstein. The 
mode of philosophizing is critical rather than accidental to the project. Just as the 
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sophists would never rest on an argument’s conclusion but would perform a virtuoso 
series of logical acrobatics to attempt to prove its opposite, Bernstein appears to 
envisage a poetics of the Americas as a constantly shifting, and always-in-motion 
process of revision rather than realization. He writes: “Our Americas is a 
performance” (67). 
If Cavell can be considered to have discovered a way of integrating the open-
ended, ‘conversational’, indefinite and ongoing project of  “this new yet 
unapproachable America” into the performative aspects of his texts in their continual 
engagements with other texts and films, then Rogers Albritton can be considered the 
modern philosopher for whom the performative aspects of “conversation” as a 
philosophical mode all but prevented him from publishing at all. In spite of only 
publishing a handful of academic papers in his lifetime, Albritton was widely 
regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of his age, including by P.F. Strawson, 
Hilary Putnam and many other renowned philosophers (Woo). He was able to achieve 
this renown against the reigning character of academic philosophy by making orality 
the mode through which he philosophized rather than textual publication. Albritton 
features heavily in Cavell’s recent book of autobiography/ memoirs, one of the most 
important influences and closest friends in his career. Cavell has suggested that 
conversation was Albritton’s way of disseminating his ideas and that it stemmed from 
a profound commitment to the act of philosophy itself. Indeed, Albritton’s reluctance 
to publish stemmed from a feeling that nothing was ever finished enough to commit 
to the printed page. As Cavell has written: 
“At the two-day event in March 2003 memorializing Rogers’s death some 
months earlier, following the sequence of scheduled addresses and symposia 
various of us participated in, when others were invited to contribute informal 
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reminiscences, so many marathon conversations with Rogers were reported 
that one might well conceive of his conversation as having become, whatever 
else, and along with his classroom lectures, his form of publication” (2010, 
394). 
Termed “the Socrates of our age” (DeRose, The Case for Contextualism, vi) by his 
former student the philosopher Keith De Rose, Albritton’s conversations were 
legendary, often lasting up to 11 hours. During these conversations, (and by all 
accounts they were conversations in the truest sense, not lectures) he would question 
and explore problems until he’d generated still more. Writing in Albritton’s LA Times 
obituary, Elaine Woo quotes a remark from the philosopher Thomas Nagel, who 
worked as a teaching assistant under Albritton: "He lectured as if he were struggling 
throughout the hour to figure out what he was going to say...This was a dramatic 
performance, but it had the form of extemporary philosophical creation" (Woo). 
Stuart Wolpert has noted a similar philosophical style in his own obituary of 
Albritton, published on the UCLA website: “In the classroom, Albritton was known 
for actually doing philosophy in real time, grappling right in front of his students with 
philosophical debates that have resisted solutions for many centuries.” Albritton’s 
mode, then, was one that above all performatively demonstrated the difficulties of 
philosophy and the struggles and challenges of thinking seriously and committedly 
about a topic. This same sense of “struggling… to figure out what he was going to 
say” can be seen from his few published texts. Albritton’s mode was conversation, 
where it is acceptable to correct, revise, turn around and, above all perhaps, practice a 
very serious sort of philosophical play. Albritton’s existing publications have not only 
the charm and everyday tone of a great conversationalist but the rhythms of prosody 
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too; for example, these excerpts from ‘On a Form of Skeptical Argument From 
Possibility’, a lecture on skepticism: 
I have been intermittently obsessed for years with a certain form of skeptical 
argument “from possibility,” as I will say. The idea of it is ancient and 
familiar. It’s that “anything’s possible,” as we say, so “you never know,” as 
we also say. Anything’s possible, so you never know. More expansively: you 
can always or practically always be wrong; but if you know, you can’t be 
wrong; so, you never or practically never know. That’s it, really, wrapped up 
in old newspaper and string. You may wonder what this package could contain 
that wasn’t rightly thrown out long ago. J.L. Austin dealt with it in 1946, for 
example, in a section of “Other Minds” headed “If I know I can’t be wrong,” 
and one might suppose that he had gotten rid of it forever. But you will gather 
that I don’t think he did, brilliant as that essay was and is (2011, 1). 
 
Austin would resist this suggestion, it seems; but I don’t see that he gives any 
reason to resist it, or explains how exactly it is to be resisted. It would no 
doubt be ridiculous to think that the whole use of “I know” is more or less 
loose, as if we never meant it quite seriously and it were in effect everywhere 
elliptical for “I know well enough” or “I know for all practical purposes.” 
That, I suppose, would be an incoherent idea; and the alternative idea that we 
mean it strictly, often enough, but are everywhere wrong that we know, by the 
argument from possibility or some other, is fantastic, or we wouldn’t be 
having this conference. But how awful is the awful truth that we are fallible 
human beings? Are we so fallible that perhaps we’re gartersnakes and not 
human beings, if we only knew it? Or perhaps we’re human beings, all right, 
	   98	  
but human beings are gartersnakes. Is that in the cards? Austin writes as if it 
were. (“It is naturally always possible (‘humanly’ possible) that I may be 
mistaken”.) “We are fallible human beings, unless we’re gartersnakes,” as one 
might say with a little smile, “but of course I don’t mean to excite you. Did I 
excite you? I do apologize. I only meant ‘unless we’re gartersnakes’ as one 
might say ‘D.V.’(2011, 6). 
 
Something is going wrong there, surely. Is it yesterday’s news that we may be 
gartersnakes? I would have thought not. On the contrary, it seems a demented 
idea. What if it is, and lots of other such ideas are, and in fact we are not 
practically always liable to be mistaken? (2011, 6) 
 I quote extensively from this lecture, not so much because of the specifics of the 
ideas expressed (though of course his engagement with skepticism is of relevance to 
his formal questioning of how and in what way we can ever know something 
sufficiently to put it down on paper) but because of the performative dynamics of the 
lecture itself, the sense of conversation and talking that pervade its construction. 
Albritton’s text is a conversation, in important ways. First of all, it is rooted 
fundamentally in the practice of talking. The first quotation above repeatedly says “as 
we say” and “as we also say” in an almost comic grounding of his essay in the 
everyday conversational language in which we talk about problems as we experience 
them. By doing so, he eschews jargon or an illusion of precision in favour of the 
shifting senses of words as we experience them in the language. Secondly, he appears 
to imagine an interlocutor who is set up in the essay as someone to engage with 
conversationally. In the case of this essay, this conversational interlocutor varies from 
his reading of J.L. Austin to an imaginary generalized character of “the skeptic”, with 
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whom he debates and argues. He even engages himself in question and answer 
philosophy, for example: “What’s wrong with the argument, then, that couldn’t be 
cleaned up if we had the time? It’s the possibilities, I think.” (10) However, he also 
permits himself contingency at almost every step of his argument, going back over 
things, altering and subtly re-conceptualising his points from different places of view 
throughout. This isn’t because he is a skeptic. For Albritton, skepticism is an easy 
way out, a rejection of complexity, just as most of the reasons against skepticism are. 
Rather, Albritton is engaged in a conversation with, what Ursula Göricke, quoting 
Cavell calls, “the truths and wrongs of skepticism” (6). The value of his practice of 
philosophy isn’t so much in the definitive answers it reaches, rather it is in the 
demonstration of and the awareness to difficulty. Albritton is committed to the idea 
that philosophy is difficult (an idea that is reflected perhaps in Bernstein’s recent 
collection of essays Attack of the Difficult Poems) and that there is value in 
acknowledging and struggling with these difficulties, even if a conclusion doesn’t 
present itself. This fact makes his texts ‘difficult’ in every sense of the word, both in 
the trains of thought he follows and in the seriousness of the ideas he is grappling 
with. It is as though he doesn’t expect to reach a conclusion but rather to reveal the 
problems of solving philosophical problems. As Albritton himself remarks in the 
lecture, “thinking practically anything is risky, and thinking you know it is riskier; life 
is risk, and nevertheless we know a lot” (2011, 5) 
In a sense it might be a perverse task, to posit an affinity between Bernstein’s 
poetry, the work of the sophists and Albritton’s philosophizing. Having published so 
little, an instinctive reaction would be to assume there is very little to go on. And yet, 
Albritton’s mode of philosophizing seems entirely “in tune” both with Bernstein’s 
“stuttering” (2011, 179) poems and the sophists’ fragmentary and performative 
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expressions of philosophical ideas over and above written work. W K Guthrie has 
written of the sophists that in part their exclusion from philosophy was down to the 
lack of surviving texts. While some authors have attributed this to the followers of 
Plato and Aristotle destroying them (or at least not showing any interest in preserving 
them), Guthrie instead believes that it is attributable to their own preference for 
conversation rather than the written word. “They were rather teachers, lecturers and 
public speakers, whose aim was to influence their own age rather than to be read by 
posterity” (53). In this way, I would argue, Albritton’s mode of philosophizing is akin 
to the mode of the sophists, as interpreted in the preceding chapter, and his 
contribution to philosophy is also somewhat equivalent, in that Albritton’s mode of 
engagement with language constantly performing an awareness of the way ordinary 
language use impacts upon our perception of reality. Indeed, the task of studying the 
thought of Albritton is not dissimilar to that faced when studying the sophists. 
Primary source materials are scarce and you have to rely on second hand reports from 
former students and colleagues. You therefore have to engage in an active process of 
“construction” when you interpret both the thought of the sophists and Albritton, as 
well as an acceptance of lacunae. You are obliged to form a conversation with and 
between the fragments of his texts, enacting a debate and dialogue between them 
rather than holding his ideas up as a canonical (and unchanging) artifact to be 
maneouvered around, as is sometimes felt to be the case with the published works of 
some philosophers. The poet Michael Palmer has written of Wittgenstein that his 
“entire body of work is built on an anxiety about the fragility of signification” (1985, 
253). In the case of Albritton, the anxiety is about the fragility (the palpable sense of 
impossibility) of what we can know and what we can say we know.  
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A counterpart or analogue from contemporary poetics to this practice would 
be the poet David Antin, with whom Bernstein published A Conversation with David 
Antin.  Antin is the experimental poet who has most exploited the rhythms of talk 
within his work. Having written both ‘deep image’, disjunctive, collaged minimalist 
poems and even sky-writing poems earlier in his career, Antin’s recent work has 
almost exclusively consisted of semi-improvised talk pieces delivered as one-off 
performances and then transcribed later. In his essay/ talk poem ‘radical coherency’ 
from the book Radical Coherency, Antin talks about why he stopped writing collage 
poems and moved instead towards talk pieces. The piece moves through a number of 
avenues and apparent digressions concerning his professional and personal life, 
circling back to the central questions that he is addressing in the piece. This is one of 
the central effects achieved by Antin’s writing, the ability to follow the paths of the 
mind towards surprising results through the medium of “talk”, as the following 
passage attests: 
it occurs to me that there are ways that the mind organizes things that are 
rather startling   that  are more surprising than what you can do mechanically 
    that are more surprising than what i can do by planning to sit down and 
  cut the pieces up or surprise myself by shaking them up in a hat or getting a 
machine to shake them in its hat for me  and i like shaking things in hats  
 hat no matter whose hat   but you don’t normally come up with things that are 
quite so surprising when you do that  or at least i haven’t for a long time (237) 
Talking, for Antin, is a process of revealing nuances and subtleties, of taking the mind 
to unexpected places. In this sense, talking is a receptive process in the same way that 
Goricke’s conception of Cavellian “redemptive reading” is, in that through “talking” 
neither the speaker nor the listener knows where the path of the talk will open out to. 
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“Talking” is a process through which the “talker” is able to reveal things about 
thought and language processes. “Talking”, for Antin, is a mode of thinking in which 
the routes followed are categorically undecided.  Marjorie Perloff has commented of 
this “talking” aspect of Antin’s practice 
He himself has insisted on his commitment to “talking” rather than writing, as 
for example, in the headnote to “what am i doing here?” (1973), where he 
declares “if robert lowell is a poet i dont want to be a poet    if robert frost was 
a poet i dont want to be a poet   if socrates is a poet ill consider it”. Socrates, 
in this scheme of things, because, in Antin’s view, his is a form of “talk” that 
epitomizes “the thinking capacity of language” and hence “poetry as inventive 
thinking (Perloff, 2001, 125). 
Antin’s self-identity with Socrates is rooted in the formal method of the dialogues, 
which, in their investment in the act of talking, are essentially sophistic acts. A 
Conversation with David Antin is a book-length transcript of a highly detailed 
conversation between Antin and Bernstein. The focus is on Antin’s practice of talking 
and performance, however, both Bernstein and Antin are clearly engaged in the book 
in an enactment of the power of conversation and of talking. The medium they chose, 
however, was not recorded talk but email, which, as they explain “offers some of the 
immediacy of talking together with the elaboration possibilities of writing” (back 
cover). The conversation is conducted as very much participative on both parts, each 
interlocutor interrogating the ideas of both the interlocutor and themselves. Each is 
demonstrably aware that they are engaging both with each other and more widely 
(anticipating the publication of their conversation in book form). What is particularly 
notable about the conversation is that while neither participant is reluctant to state 
their interpretations strongly and disagree with the other, equally, the modification of 
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interpretations and perspectives is palpable at a number of moments within the text. 
The conversation is characterized by fluidity and movement, with shifts back and 
forth to earlier topics or onwards to un-anticipated directions. Ideas in the 
conversation never seem fixed, with either player constantly modifying the ides 
expressed by the other. The overall rhythm of their conversation is of discovery, 
alertness and emergent ideas. For example, following an analytical close reading by 
Bernstein of Antin’s early poem ‘Poem in a Minor Key’, Antin then discovers another 
very early poem ‘passengers’, which was published (as ‘Passengers’) in The New 
Yorker. Given the parameters of their exchange, it is useful to look at the seams of 
their dialogue in particular, the junctions between question and answer, between 
answer and response. Early on in the exchange, discussing his early reading, Antin 
remarks, “the Greeks, the Agora, Pericles’ philosophical court, Anaxagoras, Socrates 
and Alcibiades and the image of the Parthenon and Phidias’s gold and ivory statue of 
Athena, that’s what got me. On the strength of that book, I snuck into the adult section 
of the local library to read the poems of Pindar. But they were disappointing.” 
Bernstein responds: “I often get a sense of poetry being disappointing to you, that the 
failure of poetry to do something it could be doing or doing better was a kind of 
inspiration for writing poetry (well you know that’s my current theory, speaking of 
theories, and I do see you as a particularly good model for it)” (13). Bernstein 
responds essentially to one word in Antin’s previous answer, the word 
“disappointing”, which is essentially a tangent to what Antin was talking about, his 
interest in the socratic and sophistic phenomenon of the agora in Ancient Greece. The 
conversation veers off briefly towards Bernstein’s theory of “disappointment” with 
poetry as an inspiration for poetry before picking up the strand suggested by 
Bernstein’s phrase “inspiration for poetry” to discuss how Antin first began writing 
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poetry. However, later on in their conversation, Antin picks up the cue he set up 
earlier on in the dialogue and returns to the theme of socratic and sophistic talking as 
a form of conversational performance in which the participants and performers were 
entertaining their audiences as well as delivering philosophical propositions: “the 
sophists’ paradoxical talk pieces and their public debates were ‘entertainment’ in 5th 
Century Greece. And in that world, Socrates was an ‘entertainer’. Lysias or Gorgias 
were also entertainments” (47).  This mention of the sophists is thirty four pages after 
their first mention at the start of the dialogue, but it is nevertheless the fruition of a 
seed that was planted previously. In this way, the structure of their extended 
conversation allows a much freer and unpredictable movement through ideas than 
straightforward expository prose would usually allow. There is certainly a logic to the 
way the conversation develops, however, it is an associative and cumulative logic 
rather than a narrative or discursive structure and as such it allows room for tangents, 
diversions, questions that remain unanswered and conversational avenues that don’t 
get pursued. As Emerson puts it in ‘Circles’: “Conversation is a game of circles” 
(256).  
The philosopher Adriaan Theodor Peperzak has written extensively on the 
practice of philosophy as a conversation. Antin and Bernstein’s conversation typifies 
many of the aspects of dialogue with which Peperzak characterizes conversation as a 
mode of philosophy: “From the perspective of speaking, each statement is addressed 
to a potential listener. As such, it invites the addressee to take up what is said as a 
suggestion for agreement, disagreement or amendment. Saying something to someone 
urges the reader to answer the speaker with a reply” (3). Conceiving of ‘conversation’ 
as a critical mode for understanding literature and philosophy, then, puts the impetus 
onto the responder to respond, making reading a responsive and conversational act, 
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rather than a passive and accepting one. As in Goricke’s characterization of 
“redemptive reading”, the conversational model for the relationship between reader 
and writer suggests a fluidity and open-endedness inherent in the act. No text is 
regarded as final or total, every text (a conversational utterance) is to be responded to 
and is dependent on context. This is an aspect of conversation that the conversation-
analyst John Heritage has stressed when he has described conversation as “doubly 
contextual, in that the action is both context-shaped and context-renewing” (22). By 
“context-shaped”, Heritage seems to mean that conversations are dependent on their 
context, and that the structure of conversations stresses the importance of context by 
being a specific response to specific circumstances in a particular space and time. By 
its very nature an utterance in a conversation stresses its relation to those other 
contextual utterances surrounding it: “the term ‘context’ here is used to refer both to 
the immediately local preceding activity in which an utterance occurs and also to the 
larger environment of activity in which that configuration analysably occurs” (22).  
Similarly, conversation is seen as “context-renewing” because again, every utterance 
within a conversation also forms the context for further utterances in that 
conversation, i.e. for “it will inevitably contribute to the contextual framework in 
terms of which the next action will be understood… Moreover, each current action 
will function to renew (i.e. maintain, adjust or alter) any broader or more generally 
prevailing sense of context” (22). Heritage’s assessment of the importance of context 
within conversation has important implications for considering Bernstein’s poetry as 
importantly “conversational”. Rather than perceiving the poem as a product issuing 
forth from one person in a moment of inspiration or genius, the poem is seen as both a 
network of contexts in itself and an utterance in a much wider network of contexts. 
The critical thing about this conversational conception of the poem is it acknowledges 
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the inevitable political efficacy of a poem as an utterance that performs a “function to 
renew (i.e. maintain, adjust or alter) any broader or more prevailing sense of context”. 
As such, with the responsibility of providing the context in which all subsequent 
utterances are in response to, a poem that doesn’t by its utterance “adjust or alter” its 
context is a conservative poem that “maintains” the context from which it emerged, 
whereas a poem that disrupts or reassesses that context through its form or techniques, 
makes an adjustment or alteration to that context. The sense of context, then, is as 
something continually in flux, a responsive tissue that alters according to each 
utterance (which itself is in response to the context of its own emergence). As 
Peperzak puts it within a philosophical framework:  
The realm of philosophy can then no longer be seen as a pantheon of heroic 
but isolated individuals or monological systems, which together (as a library) 
would form the history of philosophy. If philosophers are necessarily 
connected by addressing and being addressed, the philosophical tradition is an 
eventful and ever shifting history of awakening, suggestion, seduction, 
interruption, responding, struggling, educating and learning among friends, 
colleagues, strangers and enemies (2).  
Given this sense of the “conversation”, it is useful too, to consider the importance 
Cavell attaches to the sense of “conversion” in his essay ‘Philosophy as Education’ 
(2012, 212). The word “conversion” literally a part of the word “conversation”, 
requiring only the elision of the “at”. Cavell’s sense of “conversion” is as “rebirth” 
and “transformation” (212), drawing on Luther’s writings about Baptism, suggesting 
the potential of conversation as a transformative mode where ideas are not set down 
in the relative commitment of print. A conversational understanding of even printed 
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communication then sees the same openness and potential for transformation of 
thought in the ‘conversations’ of texts.    
This conception of a ‘contextual’ and ‘conversational’ model for conceiving 
of poetry and literature is evident in many of Bernstein’s own theoretical writings. 
However, Bernstein’s poetry also enacts this performance of “talking” and of 
“conversation” at the level of form. A number of critics have noted that Bernstein 
makes use of different “voices” within his poetry. For example, Göricke has described 
“a multitude of voices, moods and tones in the work” (181). An example of these 
voices is the poem ‘echo off (use other entrance)’ from With Strings (2001): 
 
Are we there yet? Everything  
must go, is gone. Slowly the rips 
fade from memory, foment 
anagrammatic tirades, saturate 
pensive perambulation (percussive 
reticence). My aim to  
loop corners and franchise  
agency – for exactly as long as 
it takes to blow the candles  
out inside all those 
headgear. 
 
Have you heard the one about the stalled  
Kaftan and the bumbling pulverizer? 
The Bronx crane operator and the Lisbon 
	   108	  
tailor? The foldaway recliner and the nylon 
railings? Perhaps the crease is semi- 
permanent. (53) 
Beginning in a state of both uncertainty (with a question) and in a state of 
approaching (i.e. not “there yet” but possibly nearly there), this poem invites the 
reader to immediately participate in the poem’s “we”, to become a part of the poem’s 
conversation. However, there is also a sense in which the conversation occurs 
between syntactical elements of the poem, where each sense unit modifies the context 
in which the sense units surrounding it are read and establishes a conversational 
relation between each line or syntactical unit. For example, the question “Have you 
heard the one about the stalled Kaftan and the bumbling pulveriser?” seems to draw 
on a formal tradition and history of one-liner jokes but removes its natural conclusion 
(the punchline). The expected context of the line is therefore removed and replaced 
with another number of set-ups without the punchlines: “The Bronx crane operator 
and the Lisbon tailor? The foldaway recliner and the nylon railings?” The reader is 
therefore put into the position of having to ascertain in what ways each of these one-
liners could be conceived of as connecting (however obliquely) to the other two, or is 
left to consider the formal dynamics of the joke itself, the casual assumptions they 
make about ethnicity and locality “the Bronx crane operator” and “the Lisbon tailor”, 
for example, which operate like stereotypical characterisations without the 
recognizable stereotype. The ‘punchline’ to all three jokes could be read to be the 
following line: “Perhaps the crease is semi-permanent”, where crease refers to the 
ridge created by folding or wrinkling as in the crease of a trouser leg as well as the 
sense of crease as in cricket: a demarcated area of play. “Crease” could therefore by 
appropriate to the “stalled Kaftan”, an item of clothing that would not usually have a 
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crease but might have in its “stalled” state. Similarly, the act of “creasing” has a 
relevance to the “foldaway recliner” and the “nylon railings”, which probably refer to 
railings where nylon is hung, rather than railings made out of nylon. The word 
“nylon” is also a “crease” of the words “New York” and “London”. Naturally, a 
“Lisbon tailor” would know how to produce a “semi permanent” crease. A “Bronx 
crane operator” might be concerned with in-“crease” in terms of construction of 
buildings in one of New York’s most densely populated areas, meanwhile a 
“bumbling pulverizer” is presumably in the business of de-“crease” (though, of 
course, that depends what replaces whatever has been “pulverised”). In this way, the 
poem’s seemingly discrete semantic units form a conversation with each other, which, 
through a process of conversational close reading which analyses the lines against 
their contexts results in a sense of the poem as constantly “context-shaped” and 
“context-renewing”.     
The metaphor of the “crease” in the above section also extends to the formal 
construction of the poem itself, which could be considered to “crease” or “fold” 
together distinct semantic items to be understood in dynamic and conjunction with 
other pieces of language. It is an idea that Bernstein has returned to a number of times 
in his poetry, most recently in the poem ‘Fold’ from Recalculating in which distinct 
sentences are ‘folded’ in such a way as to repeat the word in the verb position in the 
noun position: “I delay my delay, I hurt my hurt, I pain my pain, I word my word. I 
shock my shock, I risk my risk, I language my language, I act my act, I ache my ache, 
I stoke my stoke, I stash my stash, I turn my turn, I waste my waste, I fold my fold, I 
tether my tether, I weather my weather” (40). The technique of repetition of words in 
this way emphasizes the multiplicity inherent in all language. In fact, the terminology 
‘repetition’ here is misguided. The words are not in fact repeated at all; on the 
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contrary what is revealed is how the words used can change and amend in meaning 
through their re-appearance in the phrase. Bernstein here is enacting what Gertrude 
Stein wrote in ‘Portraits and Repetition’ about her own use of repeated phrases in her 
portraits, i.e. that “there was no repetition. In a cinema picture no two pictures are 
exactly alike one is just that much different from the one before and so in those early 
portraits I am sure you will realize when I read them to you also as there was in The 
Making of Americans no repetition” (1985, 177). Given that the words alter subtly 
depending on their context even within the same phrase, the reader is necessarily put 
in a position of interpreting how the first usage of “hurt” alters from the second 
instance in the phrase “I hurt my hurt”. The first “hurt” reads like a verb and the 
second like a noun which are both in this instance familiar usages of the word hurt. 
The unfamiliarity comes because of their proximity. You could conceivably “hurt” 
your “hurt” by causing more pain when already in pain, or you could perhaps “hurt” 
your “hurt” by performing a double negative and therefore “heal” your “hurt” which 
is in effect eradicating it and therefore possibly “hurting” it. This example (and the 
one it precedes: “I pain my pain”) brings to mind Wittgenstein’s dissection of the 
language game involving “pain”, i.e. his assertion that the word ‘pain’ is linked only 
to the physical manifestations of pain (“pain behaviour” (2010, 11)), that there is no 
direct link between the word ‘pain’ and pain itself. Bernstein therefore situates his 
‘folded’ language game in a classic Wittgensteinian language problem. As such, the 
reader is left to consider ever deeper what exactly could be meant by “I hurt my hurt” 
or “I pain my pain” if “hurt” and “pain” refer rather to the manifestations of “pain” 
and “hurt” rather than the ‘pain’ and ‘hurt’ themselves. Language in the poem then 
becomes represented as something extendable and malleable that can be folded back 
and over on itself and still have the capacity for semantic multiplicity. Indeed, 
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Bernstein’s poem could be taken even further- “I hurt my hurt’s hurt” or even “I hurt 
my hurt’s hurt hurt”.  This linguistic game specifically calls to mind Deleuze’s 
writings on “the fold”, which have received their fullest elucidation in the book The 
Fold on the thought of Leibniz but which recur at various times throughout his 
writings. Deleuze’s conception of “the fold” is both structural and subjective in nature 
(and is in fact the crease that reveals the interdependence of these two categories.) In 
an analysis of Baroque architecture that forms the first portion of the book, Deleuze 
writes that “the Baroque refers not to an essence but to an operative function, to a 
trait. It endlessly produces folds”(1). He then goes on to elucidate, as Graham Livesey 
has remarked, how in architecture, “the deployment of folded surfaces can create 
intricate topographical and spatial effects and affects; this means that a single gesture 
can achieve great complexity” (109). Bernstein makes use of a similar gesture in both 
‘Fold’ and ‘echo off/ use other entrance’, whereby the formal dynamic of the fold and 
crease opens the poem up to a multitude of reading directions whereby the poem 
increases its capacity to generate meanings that literally “echo off” each other. As 
Livesey further comments, Deleuze’s concept of the fold enables a structure (both 
textual and architectural) to include multiplicity, in the manner of “the folding of 
ingredients together” (110), as in cooking. This literary effect whereby multiple 
elements are folded together is widely employed in Bernstein’s work and is relevant 
to his poem ‘Dysraphism’, which is discussed in detail in chapter  4. For the purposes 
of this chapter though it is clear that the fold increases the conversational aspects of 
the poems, their capacity for multiple elements to converse with each other within the 
creases, folds and overlaps of the poem’s structure.  
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“My aim/ to loop corners and franchise/ agency” is an effective description for 
Bernstein’s language in both of these poems, which might be considered to “franchise 
agency” through the responsibility they put on the reader to interpret, create and 
respond to the poem’s language. For example, a phrase such as “pensive 
perambulation” draws attention to itself as much as language construction as it does a 
semantic unit. At the semantic level, though, it describes a state of linguistic and 
thought agility or exercise as well as an open and receptive consciousness. The word 
“perambulation” suggests a walk with no set purpose rather than a straight forward 
journey from A to B. When combined with “percussive reticence”, the poem employs 
both active and passive descriptions to characterize the state that the poem attempts to 
create. This state is related to what Stephen Mulhall, writing in relation to Cavell and 
Heidegger, calls “active passivity”, the ideal state for “thinking as thinking” (313), a 
state of which conversation is one method. Conversation relies on “blowing the 
candles out”, i.e. giving oneself up to a resistance of foregone conclusions and 
allowing the mind to be, to borrow Antin’s term, “surprising”. The phrase 
“anagrammatic tirades” can be seen to enact its own imperative, when it is recognized 
that an anagram of “tirade” is “read it”, where ‘reading” is a form of activity that 
requires both active engagement and passive attention. Throughout the poem, the sort 
of shift between the register in the first stanza and the second stanza is frequent, with 
irregular slips and alterations occurring at the level of structure and perspective. There 
is, in a sense, a conversation established between each section of the poem within the 
poem itself. There is no immediately apparent connection between the first stanza and 
the second, however, their proximity within the poem encourages the reader to place 
them in dialogue with each other. “Bumbling pulveriser” has a sound and visual 
relationship with “pensive perambulation” (built up through the repetition of sounds: 
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“b” “p”, “um” and “ul”), though the semantic meaning and the mood of the two 
phrases is oppositional. Rather than the thoughtful philosophizing encouraged by the 
phrase “pensive perambulation”, “bumbling pulveriser” suggests a half-
comprehending violence and annihilation.  
The poem ‘Questionnaire’ (2006, 67) also enacts a form of conversation within its 
form, by presenting 14 pairs of propositions, from which the reader is invited to circle 
the proposition from each pair which more exactly matches with their point of view. 
The first three pairs are below: 
DIRECTIONS: For each pair of sentences, circle the letter, a or b, that best 
expresses your viewpoint. Make a selection from each pair. Do not omit any 
items.  
1. a)  The body and the material things of the world are the key to any 
knowledge we can possess. 
b) Knowledge is only possible by means of the mind or psyche. 
2. a)  My life is largely controlled by luck and chance. 
b)  I can determine the basic course of my life. 
3. a) Nature is indifferent to human needs. 
b) Nature has some purpose, even if obscure. (2008, 67) 
While this poem may seem simplistically parodic, reducing difficult epistemological 
and phenomenological questions to multiple choice, by using the rhetorical device of 
opposing pairs, Bernstein in fact encourages the reader to address their viewpoints. 
The lack of authorial intrusion in setting up the pairs is noticeable, and the fairness of 
the comparisons is too. The reader is not goaded into favouring one sentence over 
another, rather to address and consider their personal viewpoints. While the set-up is 
that of market-research, it’s difficult to imagine what sort of product would require 
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this research to be done. For what kind of body would this sort of knowledge be 
useful? Rather, Bernstein’s ‘Questionnaire’ seems as though its greatest relevance 
would be as a political survey or even a referendum (!), in a form of state or 
government where what citizens believed about questions such as these formed the 
basis of decisions of public policy. In this sort of sate, it might be difficult to 
distinguish between the categories “philosopher”, “statesman”, “poet” and 
“philosopher”. It’s notable that the final pair of propositions is: “a) Art is at heart 
political because it can change our perceptions of reality./ b) Art is at heart not 
political because it can change only consciousness and not events.”(67) It is important 
to the effect of Bernstein’s poem that both of these propositions are valid. Neither one 
necessarily wins out over the other. Convincing arguments could be developed for 
either side and in fact they are both in some ways saying the same thing, i.e., that “art 
effects consciousness”. The difference between them is whether or not you believe 
that the effecting of consciousness in turn has any import on our political perception 
of reality. The tautness of the two propositions, however, is critical to the 
unresolvability at the heart of the poem. It doesn’t offer a neat set of categories for the 
reader to define themselves but rather encourages thoughtful self-reading and 
analysis, through the conversational and rhetorical medium of questions and answers.   
One answer to the set of oppositions concerning whether or not “art” can be 
conceived of as “at heart political” can be found in Barbara Cassin’s essay 
‘Sophistics, Rhetorics and Performance, Or How to Really Do Things With Words’ 
(2009). In this essay, Cassin suggests that language has what she calls a “world-
effect” (349), by which she means the ability “to transform or create the world”(349). 
She locates this power in a discussion of Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen and suggests 
that by arguing for Helen’s innocence in the piece, Gorgias engendered a world in 
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which perception of Helen was fundamentally changed, not necessarily because 
people were persuaded of her innocence but because her innocence was now 
“thinkable”. Her model for thinking of the speech in this way is “epideixis”, the 
rhetorical oratorical style of engaging in a ‘praise and blame’ speech in order to 
demonstrate the prowess of the speaker: 
The model for the sophist performance is epideixis, in the rhetorical sense of 
the term, and the model for rhetorical epideixis is the Encomium of Helen. It is 
an epideictic performance that produces not only persuasion but a “world 
effect”: we are now in a world in which the innocence of Helen— from 
Euripides to Offenbach and Hoffmansthal—is thinkable and even plausible. 
(350)  
In this way, Cassin’s conception of Gorgias’ performance recalls Heritage’s remarks 
concerning the “context-renewing” nature of all utterances within a conversation. By 
making an epideictic speech concerning Helen’s innocence, Gorgias has altered the 
context (the ‘conversation’) in which this issue will be understood. Given language’s 
transformative potential, Cassin asks: 
It is a question of a politics of responsibility with regard to the words that one 
employs: what world do we contribute to producing by speaking as we speak, 
and how is language articulated with our speech acts? (360). 
It is precisely this power of language to effect reality that Bernstein seems to suggest 
through the title to his volume Republics of Reality (2000). Alongside using language 
to open up possibilities for new forms of social and grammatical organization, 
Bernstein also shines a searchlight on the ways that language is currently used within 
our society and how this might be contributing to elements of our social and political 
structures. As Bernstein puts it in Recalculating: “All poetics is political/ All poetry is 
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politics/ All politics is poetics” (9). The power of this statement is in its rhetorical 
structure, using a tricolon structure of three statements, each an isocolon that opposes 
two words and which thread together three inter-related words: “politics”, “poetics” 
and “poetry”. The statement, by using the language of definition “All… is…”, 
encourages the reader to question what “politics”, “poetry” and “poetics” are and how 
the three statements follow one from the other. By doing so, Bernstein enacts his own 
‘conversational’ structure, which is that the arrangements of “truths”, however boldly 
stated, need to be questioned, interrogated, interpreted constructively, with attention 
paid to the political and structures they embody. “Poetics is political” because it 
concerns a study of language and linguistic structures, which in Bernstein’s view 
constitutes the basis of our social and political organization. However, in the next 
statement “all poetry is politics”, Bernstein has subtly shifted the goalposts. No longer 
are we dealing with the words “poetics” and “political” but “poetry” and “politics”. 
The statement that “all poetry is politics” might seem to follow seamlessly on from its 
predecessor but it is a startling one. In what way are poems written by teenagers in 
their bedrooms politics? In what way is love poetry politics? How can poetry of 
nature-appreciation be conceived of as politics? One interpretation of this statement 
would be that “yes”, these examples of seemingly apolitical poetry are “politics” 
because the language they use and the forms they choose endorse (or even enforce) 
aspects of how our society is structured. However, another aspect of these statements 
is that they enact suspicion over precisely such totalizing statements as themselves 
and that is precisely in engendering awareness of and taking seriously the totalizing 
aspects of language and rhetoric that “all poetry is poetics”.  
In a very different way, conversation (or at least “talking”) is central to 
Bernstein’s libretto ‘Blind Witness News’, for the opera written by Ben Yarmolinsky 
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and first produced at American Opera Projects’ Blue Door Studio. In this libretto, 
Bernstein powerfully reconstructs and parodies the hysterical (in every sense of that 
word) speech rhythms and formal organization of an evening news program. 
However, the conversation in question in this libretto is an anti-conversation where 
the sort of receptivity necessary for positive or productive discourse of the sort 
described above is paralyzed and cut off through endless repetitions and over-
simplification. The characters Jack James (anchor), Jill Johns (anchor), Jane Jones 
(weather) and John Jacks (sports) are instantly recognizable as pastiches of television 
presenters and reporters. Their names themselves display an alphabetic logger-jam: an 
inability to get beyond the letter “J”. Their speech style is characterized by bald 
statements that don’t in fact say anything. For example, the broadcast begins: 
Jack & Jill: This is the Blind Witness News 
with the Blind Witness News Team (15) 
The phrase “blind witness” is from a “made for TV” thriller starring Dallas’s Victoria 
Principal that aired in 1989. In the show, Principal plays a woman who is stuck in her 
home with her husband’s killers. She spends a significant amount of time during the 
film with tape gagging her, preventing her from articulating anything of sense. So, 
too, the characters in ‘Blind Witness News’ are trapped and gagged by infantilizing 
their audience and stunting any significant discourse. The presenters end up babbling 
their names in the manner of a child in a (presumed) attempt to have their name stick 
in the audience’s mind: 
I’m Jack Jack Jack Jack Jack Jack Jack Jack Jack Jones (15) 
When it comes to reporting the news, it’s a message of blinkered hatred that the 
presenters manage to get across: 
Tonight’s top story is war 
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Holy war in the North 
Holy war in the East  
Holy war in the West 
Victory, victory soon to be ours (16) 
There’s a surreal sense of panic in one of the hand-over segments, when the anchors 
are trying to steer the show towards the scheduled sports broadcast: 
Sports is getting squeezed, Jane! 
Sports is getting squeezed! 
Getting squeezed, Jane! 
Sports is getting squeezed! (32) 
This form of repetition, turning the wording of the same phrase over on itself, is not 
on the face of it dissimilar to that undertaken by Albritton in his works or Antin in his. 
However, the significant difference is that where as Albritton and Antin are thinking 
through language, turning phrases around on themselves to reveal things about what 
they mean, the speakers in ‘Blind Witness News’ are thoughtlessly employing 
numbing and desensitizing repetition to prevent thought or analysis. Rather than a 
conversation, ‘Blind Witness News’ reads more like a boxing match, with the 
presenters each trying to land their punch on the audience, reflected in the sports cast: 
“Nick hits Dick/ Dick throws fit”. It’s a highly charged and surreal text and it draws 
the audience’s attention to the bizarre within even the most banal forms of language 
use and phraseology. In Ezra Pound’s ABC of Reading, he famously formulated 
literature as “news that stays news”. In ‘Blind Witness News’, Bernstein manages to 
create “news that stays news” out of the format of news reportage on television. 
‘Blind Witness News’ is a parody of the sort of conversation that, as Heritage 
characterized it, merely “maintains” or endorses its context without modifying or 
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altering the context in which it is ‘aired’. The sort of news show parodied by 
Bernstein is the kind that actually shuts off conversation in spite of making use of the 
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Chapter 3. I. L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E as agora  
 
If ‘Blind Witness News’ is an example of an anti-conversation and discourse at its 
lowest and least receptive, then L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Magazine, the publication of 
writings about language-centered writing edited by Bernstein and Bruce Andrews 
between 1978 and 1981, might be considered an example of conversation between 
interested individuals where real exchange and experimentation were possible. As 
George Hartley has noted, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine “served as a forum for 
poets involved with so-called language writing” (4). Bernstein has echoed Hartley’s 
sentiments, writing of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E that it “was a site of conversation 
about a set of marked issues, a place to air differences but not necessarily to settle 
them” (2012, 282). As these two characterizations suggest, its principal purpose, this 
chapter argues, was as a testing ground and arena in which ideas concerning above all 
language and politics could be tried out, argued with, revised and reconfigured. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I read L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E as performing the same 
function for late Twentieth Century American poets as the agora did for 5th Century 
BC sophists: a permissive, antagonistic space for serious experimentation with 
language and logic, where the participants believed that what they were doing had 
political significance. However, just as the sphere of the agora both resisted and 
engendered community factionalism and politics among its intellectuals, so too did 
language poetry’s most vibrant forums become the frontline of increasing “groupism” 
(Vickery) and controversy. How does a loose-knit group of experimental and 
politically engaged writers with considerably skill at exchanging their ideas and 
‘going public’ with their work resist becoming both exclusive and defensive in its 
group mentality. This aversion to the potential for “groupism” among language 
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writers is something that Bernstein has stressed in ‘The Expanded Field of 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E’, where he writes that, “the description is part of the 
problematic, and it remains an open question whether this constellation of activity 
was a movement or a school, aesthetic tendency or convenient label, and whether the 
names for the phenomena were insulting labels or a standard for group solidarity” 
(2012, 281). This chapter reads some of these concerns and tensions across a number 
of issues of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, against and alongside the doubts and concerns 
over community politics expressed by Bernstein in his essay ‘The Conspiracy of Us’.  
As Cynthia Farrar has noted, of fundamental importance in the emergence of 
democracy in sixth and fifth century B.C. Athens was the awareness of the active 
political nature of the individual:  
political developments at Athens loosened and eventually broke the grip of the 
traditional hierarchy that had mediated the relationship between social 
interaction and the order sanctioned by the gods. These developments 
prompted the Athenians to conceive of themselves in specifically political 
terms, rather than in the social and economic relations constitutive of social 
order” (21).  
Key to these changes taking place was the role of language and specifically the 
awareness of language as something human about which the grammars and rules 
governing them could be discerned and decided upon by humans, rather than 
received, gifted and governed from divinities. Sophistic explorations of language 
were more than just a means of equipping ambitious individuals with the ability to 
speak persuasively in order to further their careers. Rather than this, attention to 
language and its structures was pivotal in sustaining the identity of individuals as 
fundamentally political. As Martin Ostwald has written, “democracy thrives, or is 
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supposed to thrive, on discussion and of that there was plenty in fifth century Athens” 
(245). Most noisy of all? The sophists; particularly when it came to questions of 
language theory and linguistics, with sophists including Protagoras, Antiphon, 
Gorgias and Prodicus all displaying extensive interest in questions of semantics and 
linguistic structures (Grimaldi, 33). As Susan Jarratt has noted, this investment in 
discourse and discourse practices was in itself a feature of the sophists work that set 
them apart from other thinkers as particularly grounded within the public sphere and 
the democracy. This is perhaps the feature of the sophists that most distinguishes 
them from other teachers of the period, including Socrates: 
Because they engaged in a range of public discourse activities including 
teaching, both shaping and advancing a political agenda through their talk, the 
sophists could be termed the first public intellectuals in a democracy (99).  
The fledgling democracy of Athens expressed its democracy in perhaps its most 
fundamental way through an investment in and exercise of human interrogation of 
and wrestling with language. The skills that the sophists demonstrated, taught and 
performed, skills that were social, poetic, linguistic and political, were therefore 
fundamental to encouraging and enabling political participation for citizens, but more 
than that they were crucial to the realization on the individual’s part as being 
fundamentally politically in nature. Jarratt quotes Eric Havelock from his study 
Liberal Temper in Greek Politics:  
Discourse as technique and political judgment as an operation of psyche go 
hand in hand. Each reflects our social conditioning and also helps to create it. 
Political judgment indeed, is hardly distinguishable from communication 
(102).  
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Building a sense of “political judgment” and awareness, therefore, is regarded by both 
Havelock and Jarratt as   concurrent with exploring, expanding, aestheticizing the 
ways in which communication is structured in society.  
Describing a similar process and suggesting a similar sentiment, Bernstein has 
stressed the importance that he attaches to notions of how communities assert their 
values through language: 
I do not think that all conventions are pernicious or that all authority is 
corrupt. But I do think it is essential to trace how some uses of convention and 
authority can hide the fact that both are historical constructions rather than 
sovereign principles. For convention and authority can, and ought, serve at the 
will of the Polis and not by the divine right of kings or the economic might of 
Capital. In this sense, I would speak of a phallocratic voice of truth and 
sincerity as one that hides its partiality by insisting on its centrality, 
objectivity, or neutrality – its claim to mainstream values; a voice that opts for 
expedience at the expense of depth, narrative continuity at the expense of 
detail, persuasion at the expense of conviction. This is a constantly self-
proclaimed public voice, implicitly if not explicitly deriding the 
inarticulations, stutterings, inaudibilities, eccentricities, and linguistic 
deviance of specifically marked special-interest groups (1992, 223). 
The language Bernstein uses in this passage intimates that he sees the use of language 
as of pivotal importance in ensuring society operates at “the will of the polis”. He 
objects to the “self proclaimed public voice” in favour of an unconventional, 
multitudinous array of linguistic aberrations and aversions.  Perelman has utilized 
political metaphors even further to suggest how Bernstein envisages the relation of 
poetics to state politics:   
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In A Poetics, Bernstein does not write simply as an ambassador for the 
formerly marginalized language movement but aims for more utopian 
conjunctions made possible through writing: he envisions a loosely 
confederated republic whose politics would be informed by a non-centralised, 
non-hierarchical poetry (although, to reiterate, Bernstein’s sense of “poetry” is 
opposed to its usage in creative writing contexts, where implications of craft 
and sensibility reign)” (80).  
An example of Bernstein’s own poetry where this sense of interrogating the 
socializing structures of language by which communities construct themselves is the 
first poem from his first published book, 1975’s ASYLUMS. The first poem, entitled 
‘Asylum’, explores aspects of the language of a source text, Erving Goffman’s 
influential book Asylums. By drawing on this text, which analytically deals with 
institutions such as asylums and prisons, Bernstein questions the sorts of language we 
use to close off and delineate the sorts of societies we choose to live in (or are 
relegated or assigned to by others). The text itself, Bernstein has written, “focuses on 
the beginning and ends of the sentences in Goffman’s text”1. This results in an 
extremely jagged and rough textual surface in which the poem frequently cuts or 
moves from different sense units and phrases onto others. In some cases, the varying 
registers and word groups of each sentence from which the words are taken from 
Goffman’s text are clearly audible and visible, in other cases, they are much harder to 
discern: 
  rooms, suites of rooms, buildings, plants  
in line. Their encompassing or total  
character  
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  ‘An	  Interview	  with	  Charles	  Bernstein’,	  Poetry	  Foundation,	  2010	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intercourse with the outside and to departure  
such as locked doors, high walls, barbed  
wire, cliffs, water, forests, moors  
conflicts, discreditings, failures  
of assimilation. If cultural change  
the outside. Thus, if the inmates stay  
victory. They create and sustain  
a particular kind of tension  
dangers to it, with the welfare  
jails, penitentiaries, P.O.W.  
camps, concentration camps 
  some worklike task and justifying themselves 
 army barracks, ships, boarding schools, work 
 camps, colonial compounds, large mansions (2) 
 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E is perhaps the place in Bernstein’s work where this 
sense of a multitudinous and poly-voiced poetic republic is realized most fully, its 
flag (if such a state would have a flag), the awkward and unprounceable title of the 
journal itself, in which the letters are stitched or woven together across the equal signs 
between each letter.  As Perelman has also pointed out in reference to the name of the 
journal, it is an expansive and consciously disruptive gesture that above all removes 
itself from normative language uses and structures: “in language, there is no word 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E” (80). By doing so, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E opens itself up 
onto the possibility of alternative sets of grammars and syntactical arrangements both 
political and linguistic. This ambition is written into the title of the journal and 
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pervades the idiosyncratic agglomeration of works that were published in its 13 issue 
run.   One of the most notable features of language writing was its capacity for 
community-formation and the strength of its self-sufficiency in terms of publishing 
and promoting its poets. In his pioneering sociocultural reading of the contemporary 
American poetry publishing culture, Poetic Culture, the critic Christopher Beach has 
noted the strength of the language poets’ “network of alternative presses and journals” 
which have helped to establish and sustain “an experimentalist subculture… 
increasingly dominant in terms of academic critical reception” (174). As Beach 
explains, the ‘success’ of language poetry as a phenomenon is in large part down to 
the community activities that were engaged in during the movement’s genesis: “the 
most visible alternative to the academic mainstream over the past two decades has 
clearly been Language poetry, the only context for American poetic writing of the last 
thirty years that has constituted both a viable movement and a recognizable 
community” (180). L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E played a fundamental role in this 
process, so much so that the journal’s title has been known to become synonymous 
with the poetics of the poets associated with the group itself. However, it is important 
to remember that there were innovative, successful and exciting journals and presses 
published by many of the writers associated with the group. Bernstein and Andrews’ 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E was one crucial part of a wide range of publishing activities 
that ensured work that could be considered within the context of language poetry was 
able to be read and written by an increasingly large number of people across the 
United States and very quickly in Canada, Britain, Australia, Russia and elsewhere 
too. As Vickery has noted, it was hoped by Bernstein that L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
would also reach across generic divisions, including writers and artists from other 
spheres and scenes: “Bernstein hoped that L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E would include 
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work that did not usually appear in a “poetry” context, such as art, music composition, 
performance art, philosophy or sociology” (29). As Vickery suggests, this urge to 
expand and cross-pollinate the language writing community was in part at least in 
reaction to fears that Bernstein had over the isolation and narrowing of divisive poetic 
groups. There was a sense in which language writing constantly had to resist and 
diminish the sense of dogmatism that was continually attached to it by commentaries 
from opponents of it. As Bernstein remarks, “language-centered writing was not 
intended to replace all other forms of writing but rather to open up new spaces for 
poetry and to combat the dogma that the only goal of writing is to produce 
transparent, conventionally representational works or I-centered lyric utterances- 
direct expressions of an author’s feelings (as if unmediated by language)” (2012, 
287).  
The writing in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E was (and remains) unusual and 
challenging for a number of reasons. Most notable is the approach to poetics and 
criticism employed by the journal’s contributors. This varies dramatically from 
contributor to contributor but there is a distinct sense that writing through texts and 
revealing aspects of their language is prioritized above clarity of exposition or 
explanation. As Bernstein again remarks, the journal favoured “discursive writing 
where the compositional imperatives of poem-making were manifest” (284). This 
isn’t to say that there aren’t pieces that display very precise and clear analysis, but 
there are also pieces in which the writing displays opposing traits such as confusion, 
fragmentation, discontinuity and very personal responses that are aversive to 
academic traditions. The second feature of the writing in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E that 
is unusual is the brevity of many of the contributions. Especially early in the journal’s 
life, rather than long and detailed essays, the pieces presented in 
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L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E tend to be under 2 pages in length. This has a number of 
implications: visually, it means that each page of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E usually 
features the end of one piece and the beginning of another. Work is not ordered in a 
conventional arrangement whereby one author is presented per page. This means that 
the reading experience of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E is one in which you are constantly 
aware of the piece’s situational proximity to other pieces in the journal, i.e., you 
cannot escape the contextual conversations and overlaps that each mini-essay has with 
the others around it. The shortness of each piece also means that the sense of a 
totalizing and ‘complete’ response to any topic is staved off in favour of a sense of 
cutting from one topic to another quickly. In this way, the reader is encouraged to 
make connections between the multiple mini-essays included in each issue rather than 
to focus on a singular understanding of any one piece. Finally, the miniature-essay 
form also adds to the sense of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E as a newsletter rather than a 
journal, where short essays and articles are presented as objects to be followed up on 
rather than digested or consumed. This adds to the sense of the journal as a forum by 
stressing its contemporaneity: it is a newsletter and as such acknowledges the always-
changing climate and context in which it is read. Like a forum, it is an arena in which 
the style of the journal and the poetics of its contributors are always changing, 
shifting, contested and contestable.   
As mentioned, one of the aspects of the editorial stance adopted by Bernstein 
and Andrews in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E that gives it the sense of forum and agora is 
in the dynamic conversations and reverberations that occur throughout each issue, 
where the (often very short) texts relate to each other in unusual and surprising ways. 
Issue 2, for example, begins with an excerpt from Roland Barthes’ Writing Degree 
Zero in which he writes:  
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Each poetic word is thus an unexpected object, a Pandora’s box from which 
fly out all the potentialities of language; it is therefore produced and consumed 
with a peculiar curiousity, a kind of sacred relish… It initiates a discourse full 
of gaps and full of lights, filled with absences and over nourishing signs, 
without foresight or stability of intention, and thereby so opposed to the social 
function of language that merely to have recourse to a discontinuous speech is 
to open the door to all that stands above Nature (2).  
By initiating the second issue of the journal with this excerpt, Bernstein and Andrews 
clearly situate the contents of the journal under the sign of Barthes’ sense of 
contemporary poetics as removed from authorial “foresight or stability of intention” 
and instead concerned with the “dense shadow of reflexes from all sources which are 
associated with [the words]” (1). They are also invoking the spirit of Barthes’s 
seminal text and its fundamental questioning of whether it is possible to write 
politically: L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E can be seen as a continuous rephrasing of that 
same question. The organization of the journal itself demands to be read in similar 
fashion, reflexively across the resonances that each essay, review and reflection 
generates among the others. For example, Barthes’ vision of an author-effacing poetry 
is interestingly re-cast in the immediately following piece in which Bob Perelman 
writes obliquely about the work of the poet Barrett Watten.  The piece is titled 
‘Perelman on Watten’, although rather than writing “on” the poetry of Watten, 
Perelman in fact writes “in” Watten’s texts, selectively using language sourced from 
Watten’s own text to engage with his work, as a note following the piece explains: 
“The words in this piece are mostly from Barrett Watten’s work. The excerpts are 
often accurate. Many of the rest come from Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, 
chapters 12 & 13, which distinguish imagination and fancy” (4). The logic of this 
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piece seems to embody that expressed by Barthes’ preceding excerpt. Perelman 
detaches the “words” from their initial context from Watten’s text and appropriates 
them within a new context in which they are able to provide a commentary or outside 
perspective on their prior usage. He also places them alongside the context of 
Coleridge’s language in Biographia Literaria, thus enacting a cross-cultural reading 
of committed political poetics. It is interesting that Perelman should first state “the 
words in this piece are mostly from Barrett Watten’s work” and then qualify this by 
remarking that “the excerpts are often accurate.” The suggestion initially is that the 
“words” rather than “sentences” are from Watten’s work, i.e. that Perelman has used a 
restricted vocabulary based on words that are found in Watten’s work in order, 
presumably, to analyse his work based on the sorts of words that he uses. However, 
the qualification that “the excerpts are often accurate” suggests that in many cases, 
Perelman is taking larger excerpts from Watten’s work and recasting them in a new 
construction surrounded by different words and their meanings. In both situations, 
Perelman’s piece provides an enactment of what happens when, as Barthes suggests, 
“the poetic word is an act without an immediate past”, i.e. it refers not just to its 
immediate usage by an author but to all its usages across contexts both written and yet 
to be written. Perelman’s text is an example of writing across the text in this way. 
However, by no means were the contributors to L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E always in 
agreement with one another. In fact, Bernstein and Andrews included contributions 
from writers who were disparaging about L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E and individual 
pieces within it. A few pages after Perelman’s Barthesian exercise in criticism, a letter 
to the editor is included from the poet John Taggart. In it, he responds to the first issue 
and criticizes the approach taken by many of the reviewers and critics for not giving a 
clear enough account of many of the books featured in the issue: 
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Many of the reviewers seem to feel an obligation to turn the review into a 
performance as near an “original work” as possible… I find it nearly criminal 
to so grandstand that a reader can have little or no conception of what the 
work is like (15).  
Taggart’s reaction is a useful one to consider and I do not believe that Bernstein and 
Andrews included it merely to set up Taggart as a fall guy for those who are ‘against’ 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E. At least part of the purpose of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E was 
to generate awareness, information and interest in the small press publications that 
were featured in its pages. To the extent that the variety of critical approaches made 
this difficult, the efficacy of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E as a critical forum and newsletter 
for contemporary poetry and poetics was diminished. However, the response to 
Taggart’s objection is that, for Bernstein and Andrews the dichotomy set up by 
Taggart between “original work” and review or commentary doesn’t hold up. No 
creative work is “an original work” in the sense of being entirely itself, isolated from 
the contextual and intertextual conditions in which it is both made and read. Equally, 
a review cannot avoid being (in this same sense) a “performance” in its own right, 
even if that performance is one of clarity and effacement in front of the work of art 
being described. This, the suggestion of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E is, is equally a 
critical “performance”, only it hides or attempts to hide that fact. As Bernstein has 
stated, the editorial values expressed in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E were “an equal 
commitment to exchange value as to the value of individual works” (2012, 282). This 
suggests that the responses, riffs, variations and performances that a text engendered 
were equally prioritized within the journal as the original works being described, 
making Taggart’s objection to the journal’s featuring of reviews and essays that 
amounted to performances in and of themselves essentially an objection to the values 
	   132	  
of the journal itself. However, his own response is included in the journal as an 
expression of its fostering of debate, of differing viewpoints, of intelligent analysis, 
variety and critique. Further on in Taggart’s critique of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, he 
writes “there may be a place for Barthes’ choreography du text (which I doubt) but 
surely it comes well after the basic identity of the text has been established” (16). By 
placing Taggart’s critique of the Barthesian model for criticism alongside Perelman’s 
example of an essay clearly influenced by it and the excerpt from Writing Degree 
Zero, Andrews and Bernstein create their own “choreography” within the ‘text’ of the 
journal whereby it is elastic and expansive enough to include differing, contradictory 
viewpoints. The invitation in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E is to read it across all its 
vectors and from all angles – almost as a large, serial, disjunctive text co-authored by 
all its contributors rather than as a collection of distinct essays by individual authors, a 
feature of the journal that is emphasized in the reading by the practice of putting the 
contributor name after each piece only, rather than at the beginning or in a contents 
page. This means that when the reader comes to an individual piece, they have usually 
begun reading before they necessarily realize who the author of each piece is, a sense 
of authorial identity being less important than the collective engagement that the 
journal enacted.     
In other works in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, the sense of a forum is emphasized 
by features within single works. For example, Bernstein’s own essay ‘Semblance’ 
from issue 13, subsequently reprinted in Content’s Dream, features a footnote and a 
detailed description and response to an objection made by the language poet Alan 
Davies:  
Alan Davies has objected that language and experience are separate realms 
and that the separation should be maximized, in this way questioning the value 
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of using language to make experience palpable. – But I don’t mean 
“experience” in the sense of a picture/ image/ representation that is calling 
back to an already constituted experience. Rather, language itself constitutes 
experience at every moment (in language and otherwise) (11).  
As this passage demonstrates, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E represented a live field of 
enquiry where poetics were being explored, refined and constantly nuanced and 
redefined rather than expounded in completed form. Bernstein modifies his usage of 
the word “experience” in relation to Alan Davies’ objection. In short, the magazine 
provided its contributors and readers with a forum-like space for thinking about 
language, poetics and politics.   Other aspects of the magazine that strengthened its 
sense as a forum included Bernstein’s aim that “guest editors would be called in to 
run special feature topics such as sexuality, politics and collaboration, as well as a 
forum on language writing and women” (Vickery, 29).  
In spite of the journal’s successes in helping to foster and engage the 
communities of language writers across both East and West coasts, one of the 
founding principles of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E was in fact to get beyond the 
narrowness of particular groups and scenes, as Bernstein and Andrews stressed in the 
introduction to The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book in 1984: 
Focusing on the range of poetic exploration, and on related political and 
aesthetic concerns, we have tried to open things up beyond correspondence 
and conversation: to break down some unnecessary self-encapsulation of 
writers (person from person & scene from scene), and to develop more fully 
the latticework of those involved in aesthetically related activity” (ix).  
In part, then, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E was aimed at making public some of the 
“correspondence and conversation” that was occurring between language writers and 
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had been for a number of years prior to the founding of the journal. 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E was a forum in which to extend this conversation further 
than the narrowness of the group itself. The first issue was distributed free to 200 
individuals who the editor felt might be interested in the contents of the journal, a 
gesture that can clearly be read as extending the audience for the sort of poetics 
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Chapter 3. II. ‘Thought’s Measure’ and ‘The Artifice of Absorption’ – 
Bernstein, Protagoras and Stein 
 
Originally published in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E v. 4 in 1981, Bernstein’s essay 
‘Thought’s Measure’ has been described by the critic Loss Pequeno Glazier as “a 
consummate philosophical essay” (Bernstein, 1999, 241) and is a useful example of 
how Bernstein expands the form of an essay essentially about the practice of writing 
poetry to be about the stance individuals and communities take to the structures and 
orders of the world. The essay begins with a number of staccato propositions about 
language and its relation to the world and to the act of thinking. 
Language is the material of both thinking and writing. We think and write in 
language, which sets up an intrinsic connection between the two. 
Just as language is not something that is separable from the world, but 
rather is the means by which the world is constituted, so thinking cannot be 
said to ‘accompany’ the experiencing of the world in that it informs that 
experiencing. It is through language that we experience the world, indeed it is 
through language that meaning comes into the world and into being. As 
persons, we are born into language and world: they exist before us and after 
us. Our learning language is learning the terms by which a world gets seen.” 
(Content’s Dream, 62). 
This passage makes clear that Bernstein sees language as the material through which 
we are able to both know and experience the world. Taking this premise, Bernstein 
develops an argument for poetry that lays bare its own ordering and structural 
principles as a means of drawing attention to the ways that the world is also structured 
and ordered through language. Rather than making use of received and traditional 
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poetic structures, according to Bernstein poets should aim to create new ordering 
principles and structures that draw attention to themselves as constructs. By doing so, 
Bernstein collapses the division between form and content in writing. Rather than a 
“shell” in which content is placed, the form of a poem (its language, its order and 
structure) is indistinguishable from its content, becoming the central issue at stake for 
the poet. The critic and poet Hank Lazer has acknowledged this elision of form and 
content in a discussion of this essay: 
Bernstein’s argument in ‘Thought’s Measure’ deepens the relationship 
between form and content, making content a product of form and the concept 
of a separate entity called “content” merely a “dream”. Thus, new ways of 
writing become crucial to Bernstein precisely because “various shapes and 
modes and syntaxes create not alternate paraphrases of the same things but 
different entities entirely (Lazer, 29). 
As Lazer notes, the indistinctness of form and content in Bernstein’s poetics makes 
novelty a key component of his understanding of writing. There is a positive value to 
“new ways of writing”, i.e. writing that tests and transgresses the limits of what is 
understood by “poetry”, writing that seems ‘strange’, ‘challenging’ and ‘new’. 
Indeed, the wide usage of the term “innovative poetry” or “innovative writing” in 
contemporary usage to refer to ambitious writing suggests that novelty has come to be 
prized above all other values in assessments of poetics.  However, while there is a 
suggestion that novelty as itself has a value in writing as it draws attention to the way 
language structures work in society as a whole, Bernstein’s language in ‘Thought’s 
Measure’, suggests that novelty is not necessarily the principal value of progressive 
writing. Novelty itself is, of course, a concept that comes loaded with social value 
with its overtones of “market innovations” capturing the commercial marketplace.  
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Rather than privileging “novelty” above all else, which might be seen merely as 
mimicking the capitalist triumph of market innovation, Bernstein inserts another 
crucial concept into his constructivist poetics: “responsibility”: 
If, in poetry, we wish to take responsibility for the work, the text, then we 
must intend the order, take the order as a crucial part of what we are doing. 
The idea of order suggests sequence but I also want it to suggest the mode/ 
shape/ form/ structure in which the ordering occurs. The question also arises 
as to what is the unit of ordering – phoneme, morpheme, word, phrase, 
sentence, etc. (Syntax is the ordering of strings of words.) What, then, is the 
measure, measure being the unit of ordering? The measure being something 
we discover in writing poetry not something we assume… I am putting 
forward a poetry that does not assume a measure but finds it, articulates it. In 
this context, a value in constructive work is that it lays the measure bare to the 
ear and eye, so that we can hear and see the structuring and how it creates 
(conditions) meaning by its structuring. So actively displays how meaning in 
the world comes to be (Content’s Dream, 75). 
According to Bernstein’s argument, there is an onus on the poet to take 
responsibility for the structuring principles of the poem, to demonstrate the ways in 
which these structuring principles (the poem’s “measure”) enact and construct 
meaning.  This is at once an aesthetic and an ethical responsibility. Aesthetically, 
where a poet focuses on an illusion of “content” and takes “form” for granted, a poem 
will necessarily miss out on ways of generating meaning. However, this is also an 
ethical point, signaled by the ethical overtones of the word “responsibility”. For 
Bernstein, when a poem actively manifests the ways in which its ordering principles 
create meaning, it by extension also actively draws attention to the ways that 
	   138	  
“meanings come to be in the world”. This leap from an aesthetic point about the ways 
in which poetry can be written to an ethical and political point about how poetry can 
challenge, question and reveal the way language structures constitute the world is one 
of the central premises of the revolution that language poetry engendered. It is 
precisely this facet of language poetry that has been described by the scholar Ming-
Qia Ma as representing an inquiry into “method”, where method is similarly 
understood as the processes and structures through which we know the world: “the 
diverse experiments in postmodern literature and in American avant garde poetry in 
particular, variously described as formal, stylistic and generic, can be read as… a 
critical inquiry into method itself” (6).  The forms language takes, the ways it creates 
meaning, become the content and the subject of the poem. In Bernstein’s writings, the 
ethical imperative of poetry that creates rather than inhabits forms through an 
investigation into the structural constitution of societies has its origins both in 
constructivist art practices (he writes that “construction is assumed to be an integral 
part of visual work… Yet, just as fundamentally, construction is at the heart of 
writing”(75)) and in his reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the ‘social 
contract’. Bernstein sees experimental poetic forms as a way of testing the limits of 
our language and therefore our social contract with our governmental structures. As 
he writes in ‘Comedy and the Poetics of Political Form’:  
Don’t get me wrong: I know it is almost a joke to speak of poetry and national 
affairs. Yet, in The Social Contract, Rousseau writes that since our 
conventions are provisional, the public may choose to reconvene in order to 
withdraw authority from those conventions that no longer serve our purposes. 
Poetry is one of the few areas where the right of reconvening is exercised (A 
Poetics, 225).  
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The sense in this passage is of poetry as a space where language’s constitutive 
processes are up for grabs and un-pinned-down, a public and social space where 
language performances authenticate and interrogate the political and linguistic 
conditions that we give our collective consent to.  Bernstein’s interpretation of 
Rousseau is critical here, and in particular in the emphasis that Rousseau puts on 
democracy as participatory both in an individual’s private and public contributions. 
For Rousseau, private freedoms are essential alongside public and social obligations: 
“Where shall we find a form of association which will defend and protect with the 
whole common force the person and the property of each associate, and by which 
every person, while uniting himself with all, shall obey only himself and remain as 
free as before?” (14). This articulation of the tension between both the freedom for 
private thoughts and public participation is reflected on by Bernstein in ‘Thought’s 
Measure’, where he considers “private” and “public” as two essential elements of the 
act of writing poetry: “To speak intimately, is to speak as one will, not as one should. 
Confusion, contradiction, obsessiveness, associative reasoning, etc., are given free(er) 
play. A semblance of coherence – or strength, or control- drops away” (80). 
Bernstein’s interest in the private is counterintuitive. A central tenet of his poetics is 
that poetry (and all language use) is social and public, has a constitutive impact on the 
society in which we live. In light of this, it might seem perverse or contradictory that 
Bernstein should also remark that “writing is in some senses the exploration and 
revelation of that which is private” (78). However, what is at stake here is not a notion 
of poetry as simply “private expression made public”, which might be considered the 
impetus of the dominant Confessional modes in poetry that the language poets were 
reacting against in the late 1970s. Rather than this, Bernstein sees the exploration of 
one’s private relation to thought and language as an investigation into one’s relation 
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to the world that is constituted through that language. Taking responsibility for one’s 
language (which is both a private and public act) enables one to avoid merely 
repeating dominant social modes. Confessional poetry, therefore, ceased to resemble 
the private when it became “a literary device to give the semblance of intimacy and 
authenticity” (80). In other words, when its modes of address became sanctioned as an 
accepted poetic norm. It is this aspect of confessional poetry that Ron Silliman has 
objected to as “the poem as confession of lived personal experience, the (mostly) free 
verse presentations of sincerity and authenticity that for several decades has been the 
staple of creative writings in the United States” (in Perloff, 2004, 133). In contrast to 
this, the private language explorations that Bernstein endorses are rooted in 
“obscurity” and “difficulty”: “the private can also seem to be the incommunicable” 
(80). The intimation seems to be that by acknowledging the obscure, confused and 
contradictory nature of private thought processes and language uses, the poet becomes 
aware of the illusory and contingent clarity and cohesion of language which is used to 
establish and maintain our social structures:  
The intense experience of separation that is a part of a continuing power of 
privacy in writing can make tangible what otherwise seemed invisible: the 
world made strange so that we can see it, as in a dream of the familiar 
becoming foreign… It is measure that we have seen, that language is 
measure… A privacy in which the self itself disappears and leaves us the 
world (81). 
A poem’s “measure”, therefore, is explicitly linked by Bernstein to the notion of 
democratic policy making and the way we choose to assent to governmental systems. 
As such, the reconstruction and investigation of poetic form that Bernstein posits as a 
politically efficacious space for experimental writing bears analogy to the similar 
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process of philosophical and conceptual reconstruction that the pragmatist critic 
James Campbell has described in relation to the works of John Dewey. As Campbell 
writes: “Under Dewey’s method of social reconstruction, the philosopher, as an expert 
of a certain sort, has a special role to play through the evaluation of the concepts and 
ideas that enter into social discourse” (52). The suggestion is that the philosopher is 
able to influence the sorts of concepts and ideas that become accepted and debated by 
a society through evaluating, devising and revising them. This is not dissimilar to a 
Platonic appraisal of the social value of pure theory or pure philosophizing, with the 
crucial difference that Dewey would reject a notion of “pure philosophy” in favour of 
his pragmatist approach to philosophical questions. Poetry in the sense that Bernstein 
conceives of it, is less concerned with what Campbell calls the “evaluation of 
concepts” than with “measure”, i.e. the tools through which we evaluate, formulate 
and communicate. That is to say: language. In this, Bernstein’s usage of the word 
“measure” relates to both the metre and to the modes of measurement. The “measure” 
of a poem is a manifestation of  the constitutive relationship between language and 
society, how society is “measured” and what is held to be true for that society. The 
critic Jerome McGann has interpreted Bernstein’s use of the word “measure” in its 
rhetorical and poetic sense (as rhythm, meter and other linguistic measurements), 
claiming that because thought is bound up entirely in language and cannot be 
considered except in language, the structures of thought are also the structures of 
language: 
If, however, truth is seen as a function of language – of thought as act – then 
the “measure of thought” becomes rhetorical and stylistic: “measure” in the 
poetical sense of the word. Charles Bernstein’s important essay ‘Thought’s 
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Measure’ argues such a view of thought and explores some of its implications 
for the practice of writing. (McGann, 1993, 142) 
In positing “truth as a function of language”, McGann proposes a pragmatic 
apprehension of relative truth that recognizes the importance of rhetoric (of language) 
in the ways truths are established by communities. Elsewhere, McGann has 
characterized Bernstein’s position as “an inheritor of the Saussurean legacy that sees 
“reality” as a function of the language(s) by which we speak of it” (2010, 103) and 
“the Blakean belief that for human beings the world – including the natural world – is 
human, that is, is the precious responsibility of human beings” (104). These remarks 
are quoted from McGann’s experimental essay ‘Private Enigmas and Critical 
Functions’, which rather than proceeding in an expository and academic manner, 
instead enacts a conversation between three pseudonymous interlocutors (Anne Mack, 
J.J. Rome and George Mannejc). This form allows McGann to articulate conflicting 
and divergent interpretations of the value of Bernstein’s poetic strategies, as well as 
enacting the drama of private thoughts and public address that his title alludes to. As 
such, he mimics the process through which for Bernstein the world is constituted: 
through debate, criticism, private language uses and above all engagement with texts 
and language.  McGann situates this attitude to truth, reality and language in reference 
to the semiotics of Saussure and the Romanticism of Blake.  He sees the profound 
sense of “responsibility” for the ways language use creates the world within Blake 
and the attitude that languages consist of “collective products of social interaction, 
essential instruments through which human beings constitute and articulate their 
world” (Harris, ix) within Saussure.  However, an earlier progenitor would be the 
sophists, and in particular Protagoras, who famously articulated a relativist, rhetoricist 
and humanist position in the fragment of his work Truth: “Man is the measure of all 
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things - of the things that are, that they are; of the things that are not, that they are 
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3. III. Protagorean Measurements 
 
Few words are more loaded with sophistic inflection than the word that Bernstein 
chooses to denote the forms, structures and constructions of language that poetry 
foregrounds: “measure”. In particular, Protagoras’s man-measure doctrine (quoted 
above) is both controversial and contested, its implications (if any) to the 
development of philosophy obscured by opposing interpretations of its value. As 
Edward Schiappa has remarked, “of extant fragments, perhaps none is as important 
and difficult to interpret and understand as Protagoras’ human-measure fragment” 
(117). In this section, the resonances of the term within the thought of the Ancient 
Greek sophist Protagoras are unpacked, alongside some contemporary readings of the 
term’s agency from contemporary commentators Ugo Zilioli, Cynthia Farrar and 
Edward Schiappa. In light of these discussions, I read the man – measure doctrine as 
an early example of what Bernstein would consider ”a difficult poem”, one that has 
enacted the generation of “a legacy of multiple and contradictory interpretations” 
(Schiappa, 117) through its complex semantic, aural and rhetorical structures. In the 
section that follows this one, these readings are reintegrated alongside a close reading 
of Bernstein’s poem ‘Sentences’ from his book Parsing.  
The difficulty of interpreting the Man-Measure doctrine stems both from the 
inherent ambiguities within the language employed by Protagoras and from the lack 
of surviving context surrounding its use. While most critics accept the utterance was 
the beginning of a work entitled Truth, whether or not this work built on the premise 
of the fragment or developed it is unknown. However, Edward Schiappa has noted of 
the Greek word “metron” (“measure”) that “in addition to the obvious literal sense of 
assessing quality, “measure”, can also refer to appropriate proportion or ordering… 
	   145	  
Hence, Protagoras’s claim that humans are the measure of all things is provocative. 
The statement challenges its hearers to consider the ways in which humans are 
“measures”’ (119). Given this ambiguity (where “ordering” can be interpreted in the 
sense that Bernstein uses it in ‘Thought’s Measure’, as “structure”), Protagoras’s 
fragment suggests that humans are both constitutive of reality and responsible for 
“measuring” its social truths. This interpretation also suggests the poetic reading of 
the word “measure” or “metre” as a literal “ordering” or “grammar” of the poem. 
Schiappa also identifies a usage of the word “metron” to refer to “the regulation of 
opposites” (119) in the work of Heraclitus. This interpretation of the word is 
particularly interesting in relation to Man-Measure as it enacts an opposing structure 
of its own between the two key words. Man-Measure can be seen to create and then 
dismantle an opposition between “Man” and “Measure” that is reflected in this 
semantic interpretation of the word as “the regulation of opposites”. According to 
such a reading, man and ordering principles become interdependent, with man a 
product of measurements, language and ordering systems as well as a generator of 
such systems.2  A process of understanding and meaning-generation, therefore, is 
conducted through contradictions and oppositions, through proto-dialectics. It is this 
aspect of the word “measure” that has been stressed by the French philosopher 
Clemence Ramnoux, who puts the case forward that:  
Protagoras takes as his goal to show men how to master a game that is beyond 
him, to know this world which is in perpetual contradiction. This mastery 
consists in “playing with” contradictions in order that we can draw out the best 
possible part on all occasions (Ziebertz, 88).  
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A further interpretation of the phrase is identified by Schiappa through a paraphrase 
by Hermias, whereby “measure” equates to the word “limit”. By this interpretation, 
Protagoras’s doctrine is radically agnostic and, in a sense, pragmatist: if “humans are 
the measure of all things”, they cannot know objective truth, only contingent truth as 
verified and endorsed through processes of socialization. What humans are able to 
perceive (by whatever means) is the limit of what we can know. If language, then, is 
the process by which we are able to think and conceive, and “measure” is interpreted 
as “limit”, then “man is the measure of all things” could be seen as a companion 
statement to Wittgenstein’s “the limits of my language are the limits of my world” 
from the Tractatus (2007, 88). Indeed, it is this radical doctrine that attracted 
Ferdinand Schiller, who, as Steven Mailloux has demonstrated, posited Protagoras at 
the centre of his emerging pragmatism:  
According to Schiller, Protagoras intended both the subjective interpretation 
of the dictum – individual men are the measure of all things – and the 
objective interpretation – mankind in general is the measure. Furthermore, the 
double meaning itself points up the epistemological problem of how to get 
from one aspect to the other, from the subjective perceptions and assertions of 
one man to the objective truth, in some sense ‘common’ to all mankind (29).     
Schiappa has also demonstrated how as a linguistic construct, the Man-Measure 
doctrine has aural complexities as well as semantic difficulties, and he suggests that it 
is at least in part constructed based on aesthetic considerations alongside philosophic 
ones. He claims that the appearance of the word “estin or einai” (meaning “to be” or 
“is”) can be explained as “an acoustical enhancement of the statement” (119). This 
aspect of the phrase as an arrangement of sounds as well as a statement of views helps 
to open it up to multiple readings and interpretations. As an arrangement of words 
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based on sound patterning as well as semantic communication, Protagoras’s man-
measure doctrine can be read as a poem, that is, as a work where the text’s artifice is 
as important as its content. It is this reading of the phrase that suggests a reading of 
metron that acknowledges its subsequent usage in poetry as “meter”. As Gregory 
Nagy has remarked, “metron” is much wider than simply referring to “rhythm”, it can 
refer to a poeticized way of speaking: “meter was a “measure” in the sense that it 
gave “measure” to language to create a special language that was differentiated from 
whatever was understood to be everyday language” (370). The word “metron” in 
Protagoras’s fragment can therefore be interpreted as a signal that the words are to be 
interpreted poetically and interpreted aesthetically as much as a statement of objective 
truth or fact.   
Perhaps the most provocative recent reading of Man-Measure is contained 
within Tom Cohen’s Anti-Mimesis From Plato to Hitchcock. Cohen rejects a 
humanist reading of the dictum and offers an alternative post-humanist interpretation, 
reversing the emphasis from “man” to “measure”. He begins by establishing a link 
between “measure” and the act of reading, through analyzing the association Plato 
sets up between Protagoras and reading in the Thaetetus and also in the relation that is 
set up between Protagoras and aesthetics through Plato’s employment of the term 
“kallista”, or “the most beautiful” (73). From there, he enacts a volte-face argument 
that opens the man-measure fragment up to a radical new possibility: 
We might try to reread the text by reversing the predication of Protagoras’ 
dictum to read not that “Man” is the center, (individually or collectively), the 
measure of all things as such, but that Man – an empty term, a linguistic 
subject position or place-holder momentarily without definition – “is,” or is 
supplanted, disarticulated, or situated by an activity that encompasses (and 
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produces) “him” reflexively, one which at base can be called measuring. Such 
measuring resituates the human against something that is perceptually exterior 
to and before it, as itself a forgetful if semiotic figure and effect that is retro-
projected as a site. Moreover, the metron also strips the human of face 
momentarily, requires it haltingly or failingly put that on, perpetually, yet 
again, in the act of language (74). 
Cohen’s essay raises a number of affinities of the term “measure” with a reading of 
Bernstein’s use of the term in ‘Thought’s Measure’. Not least among these is the 
primacy that he gives towards language and materiality rather than subjectivism and 
humanism. The suggestion from Cohen’s reading is that Protagoras’s dictum can be 
taken to express conditionality of humans through language, that rather than a 
“measure of all things”, man is produced, sustained and conditioned by the structures 
and constructions through which we interact, communicate and make meaning. A 
similar observation can be found in the writings of Cornelia Wells, who writes of 
“language’s us” rather than “our language” (282). Cohen goes further than to situate 
this interpretation of Protagoras’s text as purely linguistic, suggesting that in Plato’s 
Thaetetus the moment at which perception awakes is a knock on the door, thus 
establishing his materialist reading in the “prenominal, prefigural or even preletteral” 
(74). However, the value of Cohen’s text to a reading of Bernstein’s use of the term 
“measure” is primarily in the focus that he attributes to linguistic structures, and the 
focus he draws away from the subject position: “the renowned but often banally 
translated “Man is the measure…” could be more interestingly tracked, perhaps, if we 
did not assume “Man” as the given narcissistic subject, but reflected “him” back into 
the parameters of measure itself” (103). One of the compelling aspects of Cohen’s 
reading is that the fragment itself has done so much to perform his argument. A short 
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text (reduced often to just two words: anthropos metron), Protagoras’s text has 
enacted hugely conflicting and competing readings and interpretations. It’s form itself 
rejects singular meaning and intention, denying absolute truth by its obscurity and 
obliquity. It foregrounds grammar through the complex and reflective relation set up 
between “man” and “measure” and it expresses the contingency and interdependence 
of humans and linguistic structures. It also expresses the tension between individual 
and community that was discussed in the last section in reference to Bernstein’s 
‘Thought’s Measure’. Above all, though, Man - Measure is a text that foregrounds 
itself as a text and foregrounds the act of “measuring” and reading. 
The philosopher Ugo Zilioli has made a compelling case for understanding 
Protagoras’s Man – Measure doctrine in a similar way, as an oblique text that 
performs its own difficulties. He argues that Protagoras is philosophizing within the 
gnomic style, i.e. making use of allusion, suggestion and abstraction rather than “a 
clear analytic statement”(115). By positing this stylistic choice, Zilioli claims that 
Plato’s criticism of the doctrine as inconsistent are misplaced. In the Thaetetus, Plato 
has Socrates ‘reveal’ Protagoras’s doctrine as self-refuting and inconsistent by 
claiming that if Protagoras defines what is true by what is true for individuals being 
true for those individuals, then the viewpoint that the Man-Measure doctrine is false 
would have to be regarded as valid by Protagoras.  For Zilioli, it is because of 
Protagoras’s style that Plato’s objections to the Man – Measure doctrine fall down: 
Protagoras’ maxim neither openly says what relativism is nor hides what it is; 
rather, it gives hints at it. If, by following a codified pattern in Presocratic 
philosophy, Protagoras adopted such an indirect style in formulating his 
relativism, one could not accuse him of being inconsistent, since Protagoras’ 
	   150	  
enunciation of his relativistic views cannot be read in a relative or objective 
way but in an oblique one (115). 
 
According to Zilioli, the gnomic style adopted by Protagoras itself vacates 
itself from being held to be objectively true or false and therefore escapes the logic of 
Plato’s self-refutation or inconsistence argument. This argument has also been 
advanced by Harold Brown, who has claimed that Plato’s objection “has no force 
against any consistent relativism, even the extreme relativism of Protagoras. Its 
apparent cogency derives from a tacit acceptance of the absolutist assumption that we 
are justified in making a knowledge claim only if it is based on an unquestionable 
foundation” (Phillips, 29). Therefore, rather than make an explicit claim that can be 
displaced by an argument that it is inconsistent or self refuting, instead, Protagoras’s 
utterance can be seen as prioritizing a process of reading, interpretation and 
“measuring” that draws attention to the ways in which meaning is made (through 
language, meaning-generative and interpretative practices). Correspondingly, Zilioli 
claims that Protagoras is more concerned with “showing” than “saying” in his method 
of philosophical discourse. He relates this aspect of Protagoras’ philosophical style 
specifically to the manner of philosophizing engaged in the work of Wittgenstein, and 
in particular to Wittgenstein’s famous “ladder” analogy: 
The distinction between ‘say’ and ‘show’ has been drawn by Wittgenstein in 
his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The Tractatus is composed by a series of 
sentences, each one numbered following the pattern of those possible logical 
implications one can establish between them. Strictly speaking, Wittgenstein 
does not argue for the logical plausibility of his sentences; this work is left to 
the intelligence of the reader, who is invited to establish logical connections 
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between the sentences. Once he has done that, the reader is invited “to throw 
away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it” (117) 
Zilioli sees Protagoras’s utterance as making use of a parallel technique that rather 
than providing answers, it provokes interpretative processes. The dichotomy he posits 
between “saying and showing” in Protagoras and Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
methods is analgous to the distinction that McGann establishes with reference to 
Bernstein’s poetry between poetry that “represents meaning” and poetry that “enacts 
meaning” (123). McGann sees Bernstein’s poetry as enacting processes of meaning 
through creating linguistic constructs that can be read in many different ways. In these 
constructs, “what comes of such a text depends upon how the reader reconstructs the 
linguistic relationships: because choices will and indeed must be made if even the 
simplest act of reading is to be attempted” (120). His poetry, therefore, is not a 
vehicle for communicating ideas but an enactment of the conditions whereby ideas 
and meanings can be generated, as McGann writes: 
Bernstein’s is a philosophical poetry not because it is a “poetry of ideas” but 
because it is a “poetry of thought and thinking.” One might abstract from the 
work an “idea” about knowledge as a process of knowing – as opposed to a set 
of knowns, whether factual or ideological. But the writing would mean to 
make it clear that such a view is itself another way of knowing the writing. 
(111) 
Bernstein’s poetry enacts an engagement with language at its limits, and 
dramatizes the ways in which linguistic systems and structures construct our realities. 
He does so through the “measure” of his texts rather than through the ‘ideas’ they 
contain. In part because of the fragmentary nature of their surviving texts and the 
unreliability of some third party accounts, the sophists have similarly been treated by 
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some scholars as important largely due to the ways in which they philosophized rather 
than the ideological content of their philosophizing as such. Under such a reading, 
Plato’s description of the sophist as “the art of contradiction-making, descended from 
an insincere form of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from 
image-making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that 
presents a shadow play of words – such are the blood and lineage which can, with 
perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic sophist” (Schiappa, 5) identifies (albeit 
pejoratively) the crucial aspects of style and substance that make sophistry as a 
philosophical mode so radical and subversive. These ‘qualities’ – contradictoriness, 
humanism, linguistic experimentation and with no claim to absolute truth – are 
remarkably similar to those qualities that Bernstein’s poetry positively embodies. Just 
as this “shadow-play of words” doesn’t necessarily involve a retreat into subjectivism 
but can in fact open up the methods of interpretation, reading and debate on which 
commonality is founded, so too for Bernstein:  
The investigation or revelation of meanings, relying only on one’s own private 
convictions and insistences, one’s ear and the measure one finds with it, is not 
an isolating activity but its opposite – the exploration of the human common 
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3. IV. ‘The Artifice of Absorption’ 
 
The materiality of language, its syntax, grammar and artifice become crucial within 
Bernstein’s poetics because they present an opportunity to explore the ways in which 
humans are measured by and measure the social and lexical structures under which 
they live. Added to this, language is the socially conditioned site where what feels to 
an individual like private thoughts and perceptions become situated in a public sphere. 
This impulse within Bernstein’s writing has been present since the advent of his 
career, including his masters dissertation, which he wrote on Wittgenstein and 
Gertrude Stein. The light hearted subtitle for the piece was “The Three Steins”- 
including his own name alongside those of his two subjects. While this is in one sense 
a quip, like most of Bernstein’s humour, it is also active and purposeful. Not merely 
signaling his own investment as a writer in the grammarian tendency that he sees in 
the works of Stein and Wittgenstein, by doing so Bernstein also suggests the 
importance of the personal within their work. An amended version of a section of this 
dissertation was published in the anthology Gertrude Stein Advanced, entitled 
‘Inventing Wordness: Gertrude Stein’s Philosophical Investigations’, in which 
Bernstein puts forward a case that Stein’s work can be considered as “declaring, or 
dramatizing, the struggle between the public and the private: “official” morality 
versus the personal imperatives of justice, “private” experiences versus rigidly 
academic forms of expression” (57). He sees this as an advancement of a dialectic of 
“inner and outer” within the Nineteenth Century novel, but whereas the struggle was 
located within the microcosm of the family in previous fiction, Stein’s contribution is 
“the internalization of this dialectic into the prose composition itself” (58). Bernstein 
argues that Stein’s use of strange and non-normative grammar enacts this drama of 
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interiority and exteriority by suggesting (though not, Bernstein argues, adhering to) 
the notion of a “cryptic” or “private language” made up of a set of symbols:  
It is as if the words stand for something else – are the embodiment of 
something that really exists on another level. Thus the words are seen as outer 
trappings (signs) that refer to and are separate from the real inner meaning. It 
is just this disjunction of inner and outer (similar to the disjunction of pain and 
pain-behaviour) that I want to refute by saying that the words refer only to 
themselves and that the meaning is internal to the prose. For if the unsayable 
“inner” meaning is only being translated into the “outer” language it would be 
as if  we already had a language full blown prior to learning the one we speak: 
as if we had a form of life before we could speak and so were translating our 
pre-existing concepts into the public language. That would perhaps be an 
explanation of a private language but it would not account for the fact that 
learning a language is learning those concepts – that the limits of our language 
are the limits of our world (59). 
 
This concern with testing the limits of language as the site of a dialectic between 
public and private is evident in Bernstein’s early book Parsing (1976), in which the 
focus is on the process of reading. In linguistics and computer science, parsing is the 
process by which texts and systems are understood through an analysis of the 
grammatical dynamics within them.  This can refer to either a computer programme 
that parses texts or the human process of engaging with texts through their grammars. 
By suggesting “parsing” as a model of reading, then, Bernstein is prioritizing the 
meaning-generative properties of grammar and syntactical relationships, and in 
particular the relations of individual syntactical components with other syntactical 
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components and with the structure of the text itself. It is in this sense that Parsing can 
be regarded as enacting a performance of the relation of private individuals to public 
life, of private thoughts to society and community. The first poem, ‘Sentences’, 
consists of a 26 page catalogue of sentences, almost all beginning with the words “I”, 
“you”, “it”, “she” and “he”. There is a great deal of variety in the clausal structures of 
the sentences, from simple one clause sentences, “I think a lot” (3), to more complex 
sentences with modifiers: “You try to escape the fact of its absence, of its flight, of its 
no longer being there” (7); to multi-clause sentences: “I cannot tell you but you feel 
it” (25), “He was dying and he called for me” (13). There are also a number of 
sentences that purport to be sentences but that flaunt one or more aspects that we 
might assume constitutes a sentence: “The touch” (3);  “you say to yourself is it me is 
it my fault is it something I’m mistaking or getting wrong or failing to see” (17); “you 
design patterns to get it all down, you stay up all night trying to figure out the puzzles 
you’ve created for yourself, you can’t understand why so few care, you forget about 
what you were thinking and can’t remember”(17). Parsing forces the reader to 
consider what a sentence is. For example, “The touch.”, would not normally be 
considered a sentence. It lacks a verb, even an implied or absent verb present in 
sentences such as “the more, the merrier”. However, within the context of its 
surrounding sentences it does communicate (albeit ambiguously) possible 
interpretations of its meaning as a sentence: “It sort of comes to you. I never look at it. 
The touch. My hands fit. It’s the feel. I just look at them.” (3) 
In this example, the contextual sentences help to create possibilities for what 
the absent but suggested verb might be, such as:  “The touch surprises”, “The touch 
feels natural”, “The touch is difficult to describe”. Alternatively, it might be tempting 
to read “The touch” as essentially a parallel sentence to the subsequent “It’s the feel” 
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and postulate it as “It’s the touch.” “The touch” in this context isn’t translatable as 
any one of those possibilities (any one would be pure presumption), but all and more 
are contained within and suggested by the sentence. Bernstein dramatizes the way that 
sentences come to make meaning as a process of them drawing on the context of 
surrounding sentences and also on the previous texts and experiences of the reader. 
The sentence “The touch” provokes the reader to consider times when they may have 
uttered such an incomplete sentence, out of, for example, the sensation that the 
experience of the sensation of touch was incommunicable. As such, this sentence 
enters not only a process of socialization with the sentences that surround it in the text 
but the sentences of other texts and of the textual exchanges that our lives consist of. 
In isolation, it is an example of a sentence at its most ambiguous, idle and resistant, 
without the usual marker and agency of a verb. However, in its context, this sentence 
is anything but isolating. On the contrary, because of its ambiguity it opens itself up to 
the reader’s cognition and invites a personal investment on the part of the reader into 
the meaning, more so than the more transparent and immediately assimilable 
sentences that encompass it. It is because of the opacity of this sentence that it 
resonates. There is an irony to this sentence’s incompleteness too. We are taught in 
schools that every sentence requires a verb, and by that rule, this would not be 
sentence. However, while it can be read as a sentence that lacks a verb, it could also 
be read as a sentence that lacks a subject, so that the missing element is in fact “The 
[something’s] touch”, where “touch” is a verb not a noun. By this reading, “The 
touch”, might more readily pass the ‘rule’ of having a verb and therefore being a 
sentence, but it is distinctly less open to meaningful interpretation by the reader. In 
this way, Bernstein’s ‘Sentences’, probes and questions some of our beliefs about 
what constitutes a sentence. In the lecture ‘Poetry and Grammar’, Stein famously 
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remarked that “Sentences are not emotional but paragraphs are” (1931, xx) The 
emotional content of text is not contained within the unit of sentence, rather it is in 
that sentence’s relation to other sentences that emotion is able to register. As a 
sentence, “The touch” does not give itself up to an emotional response from the 
reader, however, when combined with (and measured against) the other sentences 
surrounding it, it begins to register itself as a unit that triggers an emotional response. 
However, the emotional content is not in the sentences’ integration into a whole but 
rather in their situation within the context of other sentences. As Jean-Francois 
Lyotard has extrapolated of this passage: “the feeling or the sentiment is the linkage, 
the passage” (67). The sentence is a unit, and as such it has nothing to be measured 
with or against in order to create “emotion”. However, when placed alongside other 
sentences, a sentence becomes measurable and the possibility of emotional content. 
The importance of the act of measuring to this process of realizing emotion in writing 
through the combination of sentences or units has been emphasized by the critic Don 
Byrd when he sums up Stein’s pronouncement in equation form, like so: “sentence A 
is not emotional and sentence B is not emotional but the paragraph composed of 
sentence A plus sentence B is emotional” (207). 
Bernstein’s investigation into sentences ought to be considered alongside one 
of the most well-known pieces of language poetics, Ron Silliman’s The New 
Sentence.  In this text, Silliman traces a genealogy of the definitions of a sentence, 
including that of the OED of a sentence as “such a portion of a composition or 
utterance as extends from one full stop to another” (64).  As seemingly loose and 
indefinite as this definition is, there are a number of sentences within Bernstein’s 
poem that challenge even this idea of what a sentence is. The following sentence 
appears in the text without any full-stop or capitalization: 
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you design patterns to get it all down, you stay up all night trying to figure out 
the puzzles you’ve created for yourself, you can’t understand why so few care, 
you forget about what you were thinking and can’t remember (17).  
In spite of this, in a work entitled ‘Sentences’, this unit of prose demands to be seen as 
a sentence, the commas separating its clauses emphasizing that these are individual 
units within a larger unit, a sentence. This sentence might be considered to be an 
attempt to write an emotional sentence, a sentence with “the balance of a paragraph” 
as Stein remarks (131). The clauses separated by commas in this sentence perform the 
dynamic of a paragraph in that they string sense units together that could stand alone 
as separate sentences. It is therefore possible to interpret this sentence as having 
meaningful emotional content on a number of levels. The relation of the words 
“down” and “up” in the first two clauses creates a sense of balance and rhythm, as 
does the juxtaposition of “forget” and “remember”. The reader’s attention is also 
drawn to the two words “puzzle” and “pattern”, which are connected by their 
alliterative “p”. They encourage the reader to conceive of the sentence as a “puzzle” 
rather than a fixed “pattern”, and a “puzzle” enables the reader to move the pieces 
around like a jigsaw. For example, rather than the commas necessarily determining 
the units of sense, it is possible to consider other alternatives for sense units such as: 
“to get it all down, you stay up all night” and “trying to figure out the puzzles you’ve 
created for yourself, you can’t understand why so few care”.  Bernstein’s exploration 
of sentences is an exploration of the unit of writing at which language enters into 
relations with other units of meaning. Silliman describes this as “it is at the unit of the 
sentence that the use value and exchange value of any statement unfold into view” 
(78), that is to say when language becomes a public and social entity that forms 
relationships with and measures itself alongside those similar units of language in 
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which it is placed in context. Silliman writes in ‘The New Sentence’ that, “the new 
sentence is a decidedly contextual object. Its effects occur as much between as within 
sentences. Thus it reveals that the blank space between words or sentences is much 
more than the 27th letter of the alphabet. It is beginning to explore and articulate just 
what those hidden capacities might be” (92). Or as one of Bernstein’s sentences from 
‘Sentences’ puts it: “I want by now to get some clear idea where we are in respect to 
each other.” (6) 
The tension between private and public, between interiority and exteriority, is 
played out at the level of the sentence because sentences have their own internal 
grammar and syntactical logic at the same time as reaching out, suggesting and 
becoming part of the logic and grammar of other sentences in their vicinity and 
paragraphs as a whole. Language poet Bob Perelman has remarked of these kinds of 
sentences: “parataxis is crucial: the autonomous meaning of the sentence is 
heightened, questioned and changed by degree of separation or connection that the 
reader perceives with regard to the surrounding sentences” (61). In ‘Sentences’, this 
question of separation and connection becomes lodged as a psychological struggle in 
which voices attempt to articulate things about both themselves and their relation to 
others through language: “You can’t take pride anymore./ You remember when a guy 
could point to a house he built./”; “You just get used to it.” (5). The use of pronouns 
in these sentences enacts a struggle to connect to others and the sensation of a gulf or 
disconnect between the self and an other. Whereas “You can’t take pride anymore” 
might be considered to refer to a 2nd person individual exterior to the voice, “You 
remember when a guy could point to a house he built”, seems rather to refer to a more 
general “you” that is disengaged from a specific other person and states more about 
the individual speaking than any one external to him/her. The “you” of ‘Sentences’ is 
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almost always of the later sort, saying much more about the speaking subject than 
about a 2nd person subject. The difficulties of speaking in a way that communicates 
things about anyone other than the self is constantly asserted in these sentences where 
the second person dissolves into the first. The word “guy” in this sentence suggest 
that these difficulties are in part conditioned by social structures in which building a 
house would be the province of a “guy”, where “guy” is both a man and an emptied 
out non-person, as in a “guy fawkes”.  
In his poem-essay ‘Artifice of Absorption’ from A Poetics, Bernstein focuses 
on the ways in which texts both resist and invite “absorption” and on the question of 
“absorption” and its implications for identity politics: 
It’s as if the very desire not 
to be absorbed creates a new threat 
of absorption – down to the individual divided 
against itself – its non-social “identity” 
at odds with its social selves (20)  
Bernstein posits “the dynamic of absorption” as “central to all reading and writing” 
(23). His argument is that poems on the one hand can be considered as “a spongy 
substance, absorbing vocabulary, syntax & reference… A poem can absorb 
contradictory logics, multiple tonalities, polyrhythms” (22). However, on the other 
hand, a poem can resist absorption into dominant cultural exchange practices by 
foregrounding its artifice and displaying anti-absorptive formal effects and 
techniques. Part of the paradoxical effect of using these techniques, Bernstein argues 
is that they disrupt a sense of the poem as a completed object on which the reader is 
looking on from outside and rather create a sense of the reader being in “a deeper 
absorption in the poem”: “impermeable textual elements may actually contribute 
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toward absorptive effects” (29). The terms Bernstein uses, “impermeability”, 
“antiabsorption” and “absorption” suggest a dichotomy, however, in the senses that 
Bernstein employs them, they are not a dichotomy but rather fluid and interrelated 
categories that take place in the act of reading. A realist novel, or a confessional poem 
might be considered to be absorptive in that there is an attempt to absorb the reader in 
its representation of a narrative on the one hand or the poet’s internal thoughts on the 
other. The sensation might be that the reader is “inside” the poet’s mind or “inside” 
the narrative. However, the reader’s absorption in these texts might be limited by their 
lack of agency within the texts. Once absorbed within these texts through the 
transparency of their language-uses, there is nothing for them to do but accept that 
language and let it wash over them. On the other hand, a text that uses anti-absorptive 
tactics and techniques to disrupt the sense of linguistic transparency may in fact result 
in a “deeper absorption” because the reader becomes a part of the poem’s meaning-
generative capabilities and is therefore within the poem as an active agent rather than 
merely looking on from outside as an observer. Bernstein’s tactic of laying his essay 
‘The Artifice of Absorption’ as poetry, making use of the disruptive and anti-
absorptive techniques of linebreaks can be read in this way as an attempt to resist the 
absorptive elements of traditional academic prose (the sense of following a mono-
logical argument) and instead enact a deeper absorption within his essay which 
involves itself as a poem within the issues it deals with. Poetries that achieve this 
balance of impermeability and absorption are often by their nature what Marjorie 
Perloff has called “difficult poetries, difficult at least if one’s norm is the “direct 
speech, direct feeling” model” (Radical Artifice, 45). It is by their difficulty that they 
require an active absorption on the part of the reader, this absorption is not automatic. 
Bernstein’s conception of the absorptive as a central category to his poetics endorses 
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an idea of his writing as engaged in a performance of the dialectic of public/ private 
and interior and exterior. Through the foregrounding of a poem’s artifice and 
“measure”, the reader is continually confronted by the dilemma of where to stand in 
relation to the poem and how much of themselves to allow to be absorbed into the 
poem. This is explicitly stated towards the poem-essay’s conclusion when Bernstein 
states “absorption & its many con-/verses, re-/ verses, is at heart a measure/ of the 
relationship between/ a reader &/ a work” (88). Bernstein also makes the connection 
between adopting such a “measuring” and “active” stance to poetry and adopting such 
a stance to the social constructs with which one interacts vis-à-vis the world, such as 
the absorption of “mass entertainment,/ from bestsellers to TV to “common voice” 
poetry” (55). The effect here is similar to that which Tom Cohen observes within 
“man is the measure”. Rather than repeating narratives of the subjective position 
within the world which are so often the subject of narratives and “common voice 
poetry”, through anti-absorptive strategies, the reader’s attention is drawn away from 
“man” and onto “measure”, where measure stands for rhetorical strategies, narrative 
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Chapter 4. The Sophistics of The Sophist 
 
The philosophical activities of the sophists are entirely bound up with their 
contributions to the field of rhetoric. The critic Christopher Lyle Johnstone has noted 
that a cornerstone of sophistry is 
Fundamentally a combination of political excellence (politke arete) and skill 
in the art of speech/ argument/ reasoning (logon techne). What is disclosed in 
certain sophistical teachings is a distinctive form of consciousness, a way of 
being in the world that embraces chance, circumstance, instability and 
particularity (2006, 282).  
In sophistics, then, a sense of politics is intertwined with rhetoric. There are at least 
two ways to understand this: the first would be that the sophists taught the art of 
persuasion, a rhetorical tool that would have been extremely useful to aspiring 
politicians (and would still today). The second argument (the one that is being made 
in this thesis and which Johnstone appears to be making in the way he characterizes 
the sophistic “way of being in the world”) would be that the sophists taught an 
awareness to and exploration of all uses of rhetoric in all language uses, including 
those of politics. The expansive and instructive explorations of language use that the 
sophists developed, including incursions into syntax, grammar, correct use of 
vocabulary etc was a way of placing language at the centre of the way the world is 
constructed, experienced and governed. There is a sophistical link between 
consciousness (how the world is experienced by humans) and language. For example, 
Johnstone writes of a sophistic interest in “the potential psychological impact of how 
words sound” (282) and “the way the psyche responds aesthetically to the sounds of 
words” (282). Once language (and in a wider sense, aesthetics) is placed as 
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fundamental to consciousness in this way, language also occupies a position at the 
centre of politics and the way political systems develop.  Gyromas W. Newman has 
written of the influence of sophistical rhetoric on contemporary American political 
speeches. He has analysed speeches by Johnson, Reagan and Nixon for those 
elements that appear to him to have a basis in sophistic rhetoric (2009). However, 
according to the interpretation of sophistics advanced in this thesis, sophistic 
rhetorical teachings were more about the employment of rhetorical devices for their 
own sake, not to persuade but to encourage awareness of language’s inherent capacity 
to persuade. If, as Newman persuasively argues, rhetorical persuasive tactics are alive 
and well within contemporary political speech making, then sophistic explorations of 
language in such a way that explores the fundamentals of the ways language impacts 
upon our conscious and thereby constructs our political systems become critical in 
encouraging a more democratic and open political engagement from publics. 
Bernstein’s book The Sophist enacts this process through what Henry Sussman has 
called a “multifaceted exploration and dramatization of distinct poetic modes” that 
investigates “different aspects of linguistic ambiguity, flow, syntax, and semantic 
slippage” (2005, 52). As such, Bernstein’s rhetoricized and sophisticated poetics 
emerges as not only one that reveals and critiques the ways in which language is used 
to construct politics but also one that communicates, occupies and creates “a way of 
being in the world that embraces chance, circumstance, instability and particularity”. 
Bernstein’s rhetorical devices are not always directly classical ones. Indeed, it 
would be somewhat unsophistic of him if they were. The sophists were highly 
inventive and experimental language users, and Bernstein follows suit in not just 
employing new prosodic and rhetorical devices within his text but by naming and 
framing them as such, too. Within The Sophist, then, he coins his own techniques, 
	   165	  
such as ‘Dysraphism’, which in a note that accompanies the poem of the same name 
he describes in the following way:  
Dysraphism is a word used by specialists in congenital disease to mean a 
dysfunctional fusion of embryonic parts – a birth defect. Actually, the word is 
not in Dorland’s, the standard US medical dictionary; but I found it “in use” 
by a Toronto physician, so it may be a commoner British medical usage or just 
something he came up with. Raph literally means “seam” so dysraphism is 
mis-seaming- a prosodic device! But it has the punch of being the same root as 
rhapsody (raph) – or in Skeat’s – “one who strings (lit. stitches) songs 
together, a reciter of epic poetry”, cf. “ode” etc. In any case, to be simple, 
Dorland’s does define “dysraphia” (if not dysraphism) as “incomplete closure 
of the primary neural tube; status dysraphicus”; this is just below 
“dysprosody” [sic]: “disturbance of stress, pitch, and rhythm of speech (44). 
“Dysraphism”, therefore, is a rhetorical device that combines a number of separate 
elements: “mis-seaming” as a way of organizing disparate elements in a poem 
paratactically or disjunctively; the sense of the poem as “stitched” together (with 
suggestions of bricolage and collage aesthetics); finally, “dysprosody” as a 
“disturbed” textual surface of the poem. Bernstein’s concept of “dysraphism” runs 
counter to conceptions of recent poetry that have stressed “unprecedented 
fragmentation” (Gioia, 9). Rather than fragmentation or breaking apart, the emphasis 
is placed on the ways that language units are combined together. Elsewhere, Bernstein 
has written that he is “interested not so much in disconnected bits… but how these 
bits form an overall weave, so that it’s a kind of spell-creating but where the spell is 
continually exposed or surfaced” (Content’s Dream, 391). This is an essential 
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distinction and one that is borne out in the poem itself, where clausal connections and 
the movement between sense units is more pronounced than any sense of disjunction.  
In the poem ‘The Truth in Pudding’ from his most recent book of poems, 
Recalaculating, Bernstein formulates this priority as: “three types of fragmentation, or 
three aspects of any fragment: disjunction, ellipsis, constellation” (7). Fragmentation 
for its own sake is not the emphasis, it is rather the ‘ellipsis’ of one thing into another, 
the juxtaposition or ‘disjunction’ of fragmentary parts and the ‘constellation’ of 
multiple parts. These structural organizational principles are pivotal within the 
movements Dysraphism takes as a poem and the ways in which it can be read 
productively in a way that moves beyond a sense of its fragmentation. While the text 
resists totalized unity of immediate semantic perception, at the level of grammar and 
sound, the poem is remarkable for its albeit strange and at times overwrought sense of 
structure, of conjoinedness, which itself has semantic implications: 
Did a wind come just as you got up or were 
you protecting me from it? I felt the abridgment 
of imperatives, the wave of detours, the sabre- 
rattling of inversion. All lit up and no 
place to go. Blinded by avenue and filled with 
adjacency. Arch or arched at. So there becomes bottles, 
hushed conductors, illustrated proclivities for puffed- 
up benchmarks. Morose or comatose. “Life is what 
you find, existence is what you repudiate.” A good example 
of this is “Dad pins puck.’ Sometimes something  
sunders: in most cases this is no more than a hall. (44) 
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Even in this short section from the start of ‘Dysraphism’, there is a semantic cluster of 
words related to connectivity, such as “abridgment”, “adjacency”, “conductors”, 
“avenue”, “becomes”, “wave”, “arch” and “hall”. The phrase “sometimes something 
sunders”, suggests breaking or fragmentation, but the following clause reverses this 
by asserting “in most cases, this is no more than a hall”, i.e. something that connects 
two or more things. Indeed, the use of alliteration within this phrase acts against its 
semantic assertion of fragmentation by creating a noticeable sonic structure that rather 
than suggesting a breaking apart in fact holds the words together like glue. This short 
section reads as if it is an experimental exercise or master-class in forming 
conjunctions, in linking from one clause or sentence to the next through grammatical 
arrangement. The first sentence poses a question, two clauses balanced around the 
word “or”. This question establishes a link to the next sentence, which one might 
assume will answer the question posed but doesn’t, instead suggesting that the poem 
will be “a wave of detours”. The three clauses that make up the second sentence are 
linked by commas, creating a more pronounced break between each idea expressed 
and those adjacent to it. The next sentence involves a posited but absent subject, 
linking it to the previous sentence in the reader’s attempt to go back to figure out who 
the subject is who is “blinded by avenues and filled with adjacency.” Similarly, the 
sentence “So there becomes bottles…” uses the word “so” to tie that sentence to the 
previous ones by way of suggesting the continuation of a line of thought. Likewise, 
the colon used in “Sometimes something sunders: usually this is no more than a hall”, 
suggests a link between the two clauses, though the semantic link between the two 
remains open and uncertain (as a doorway on to a hall, perhaps). Overtly laying bare 
the ways in which his units of text are conjoined together, Bernstein at once stresses 
“the overall weave” and “exposes the spell”.  He also enacts what Jonathan Levin 
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calls the “poetics of transition” (1999). Specifically, in his study of that title, Levin 
analyses Stein’s prose as dramatizing “the movement of words” (145): “though her 
style would develop in different directions, it is marked throughout by an effort to 
create a composition of words abstract in design and resistant to the illusions and 
clichés of narrative and lyrical conventions” (164). As such, Levin argues, “every 
moment, for Stein, is the site of a new transition; every word, every time it is spoken, 
is the agent of that transition” (164). Transition as both an aesthetic quality and a 
technique of writing is a way of “resisting the repose that would put an end to the 
continuous movement of perception” (152).  For Bernstein, too, his work constantly 
inhabits transitional moments (syntactical moments) across words and phrases, 
phrases and sentences, sentences and lines, lines and poems, poems and sequences, 
sequences and books. Indeed, his usual practice of publishing pamphlets and collating 
them into book forms later can be seen as a furtherance of this interest in the 
transitions between things. This is in part what gives his work its anomalous, 
enigmatic qualities and may also be a reason why, of all the language poets, his poetry 
seems to have altered and shifted away from the poetry he first began writing in the 
1970s. However, it isn’t that Bernstein has transitioned away from that early work, 
but rather that his poetics throughout his career has been marked by transition. 
Transition can be seen to haunt the first poem in his first book, too, with its 
memorable lines “rooms, suites of rooms, buildings, plants” (1) indicating the 
cumulative transition of perceiving a group of rooms and then multiple groups of 
rooms. The “suites” transition into “buildings” and the “buildings” transition into 
“plants”, where “plants” is interpreted both as an industrial complex and as an organic 
growth. This poem, as with ‘Dysraphism’ is constantly foregrounding the moment of 
transition from one percept to the next, a facet that is altogether more startling when it 
	   169	  
is taken into account that the work is formally a ‘deletive’ text, i.e. a deletion of the 
source text of Erving Goffman’s Asylums. In Bernstein’s work, as in Stein’s, a 
transitional attitude or “way of being in the world” is manifest syntactically, in the 
syntactical orderings of language and the unusual and enigmatic phrasings in his 
poetry. As such, his writing stages what Levin has called in reference to the writings 
of William James (and their influences on Stein), a process of “emphasizing those 
aspects of language that exceed conceptual meaning: conjunctions and prepositions, 
adverbial phrases, inflections of voice indicating finely nuanced shades of meaning” 
(154).  
A poetics that foregrounds these transitional aspects of language is one of 
percept rather than concept, which isn’t to say that these aspects of language when 
integrated into a poetics do not have semantic capacity. Rather, as Levin’s phrase 
“exceed conceptual meaning” suggests, these aspects of language exceed and resist a 
totality or summary of meaningful content and instead result in plural, potential, 
multiplicitous and uncertain or unstable meaning. The critic Susan Jarrett has written 
illuminatingly of the role (at once problematic and integral) of the sophists in the shift 
or transition from “mythos” to “logos” that occurred in Ancient Greece and which 
engendered the Greek Enlightenment and the advent of democratic culture. In 
Rereading the Sophists, she describes how traditional readings of this period suggest 
that this shift from a mythic culture to a logical one occurs concurrently with a shift 
from an oral culture to a literate one (31). However, Jarrett proposes an alternative 
interpretation that foregrounds the role of rhetoric (and in particular the radical 
rhetoric of the sophists) into this change in attitudes in Ancient Greece. Her reading 
fundamentally complicates the idea of a “unidirectional historical flow from mythos to 
logos” (32).  Drawing on the writings of Eric Havelock in particular, Jarrett sketches 
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the traditional reading of mythic culture, where “audiences totally identified with the 
tale, lulled into a semi-hynotic state by the meter of the verse” (31). According to a 
traditional reading, epic poetry enforced “an uncritical acceptance of tradition” (42). 
This assumption is one that Jarrett interrogates, putting the case forward that the 
“paratactic” structuring of epic poetry did in fact demand critical attention and 
awareness to tensions and crises within constitutions, however, her most radical move 
is to insert a troubling third category within the oral/ literate and mythos/ logos 
divides: nomos. Her concept of nomos emphasizes a human agency in validating, 
influencing and naming collective norms or customs, whereby these norms and 
customs become the province of the human rather than a given from nature or the 
Gods. This is an ultimately more open and democratic way of approaching systems 
than that of both mythos and logos. And it is one that suggests that the transitional is 
more than a stage between mythos and logos but a condition or mode of experience 
and of communication. For example, she writes that if:  
logos in its ultimately Platonic form signifies a necessary system of discourse 
allowing access to certain Truth, then nomos stands in opposition as the 
possibility for reformulating human “truths” in historically and geographically 
specific contexts (42).   
This formulation of nomos attributes it a pragmatic and contingent conception of 
multiple “truths” and equips its communities with the wherewithal to determine 
structures and “truths” through their own processes rather than through recourse to a 
hard and fast logical “Truth.” The way that nomos is able to communicate its 
contingency is through the medium it uses to actualize customs within communities, 
which Jarrett posits as rhetoric, i.e. the conscious, aware and deliberate use of 
language. Within this framework, the sophists become critical and highly influential 
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to the development of democratic procedures. The result of the relativist and multiple 
“truths” of nomos and the sophists is not necessarily a breakdown or anarchy, but 
rather a greater understanding of “the overall weaves” and an openness and awareness 
of the “spells” used to uphold it. What makes Jarrett’s study particularly relevant to a 
reading of ‘Dysraphism’ is that she locates it with reference to the forms and 
structures of epic poetry within mythic culture. She describes how “Links between 
parts of the story are paratactic , i.e., loosely associative based on temporal sequence 
without strong emphasis on causal relations between events” (33). However, 
patterning within the structures began to be based on “sensual pleasure” (33) due to 
the element of performance integral to the practice of epic poetry in the period. The 
sophists, therefore, integrated an already established interest in the sounds and 
constructions of sentences from epic poetry into their compositions in a way that drew 
attention to linguistic constructions as constitutive of the nomos or customs through 
which society is orchestrated. They used the logical procedures of “logos”, such as 
seemingly coherent logical arguments, but they did so in a way that prioritized 
awareness of them as language-constructions designed to persuade and of the 
importance of language in establishing so-called logical “Truth”. The stitched and 
woven together language units that make up ‘Dysraphism’ display a similar pleasure 
(or at the very least attentiveness to) the sounds of words, and this sonic patterning 
varies in effect from lulling the reader with the sorts of sentences used in logical 
argument, “We need/ to mention that this is one/ that applies to all eyes and that its 
application is only on the/ most basic/ and rudimentary level” (45), to jolting them 
upright with the tacky dazzle of “nowhere to go but pianissimo” (44).  
Another rhetorical device employed within this section of ‘Dysraphism’ is 
homeoteleuton, which, as Untersteiner has noted, is a sophistic device that has been 
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attributed to Gorgias’s invention (200). Homeoteleuton is the repetition of sounds at 
the end of words. A particularly clear example occurs in this section of ‘Dysraphism’ 
in the sentence “Morose or comatose.” The effect of the homeoteleuton in this 
arrangement, balanced around an antithetical “or”, focuses attention on the 
distinctions between the two words, which are similar in both sense and sound. 
Semantically, while “morose” refers to a state of sullenness or ill-temper, i.e. a 
voluntarily difficult or aversive mood, “comatose” refers to an unwilled state of torpor 
and unconsciousness. The crucial difference between the two states is that one 
suggests consciousness and even agency, the other suggests stasis and paralysis. 
When the end of words is similar, though, the ear tunes more readily into the 
differences at the start of words, in this case “mor” and “coma”, which, in their near-
neighbour sounds “more” and “comma” stress linkage and connectivity. A related, 
though inverse antithetical structure is present in “Arch or arched at”, in which 
multiple meanings of the root “arch” are contrasted with each other. “Arch” is a term 
for a raised structure that connects (and most commonly supports) two points. The 
“arch” of the sentence in question, therefore, is the word “or”. However, “arch” is 
also a term for pre-eminence or felt pre-eminence, such as in “archbishop” or even 
“archmodernist”. This meaning is related to that of patronizing or condescending, 
where pre-eminence is perhaps felt too much. The phrase “arched at” might refer to 
the motion of an animal, especially a cat, which arches its back to seem larger when it 
feels intimidated or threatened. Arching, therefore, can be defence as well as a 
connect, a signal to keep your distance as well as a support mechanism. Somewhere 
within this arrangement is also the ghost of a concept: anarchism, the avoidance of 
being “arched at”. The particular brand of anarchy proposed in ‘dysraphism’ is a 
syntactical and linguistic anarchy, where logical procedures are disturbed and 
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disrupted in order to unleash multiple possibilities for meaning and reference. “Arch 
or arched at” appears to set up two contrasting or opposing ideas, and yet the 
opposition he establishes is curious and aslant. “Arch or arched at” isn’t an opposition 
of two contrasting terms but a modifying intervention that opens up the difficulties 
inherent in interpreting the words. 
Paradox is central to Bernstein’s rhetorical arsenal in ‘Dysraphism’. Many 
phrases and conjunctions appear contradictory or paradoxical at first reading. A good 
example is found in the phrase “filled with adjacency.” It is not immediately obvious 
how something might be “filled” with the quality of being “next to” or “beside” 
something, the two words suggesting both inside and outside of something at the 
same time. However, in music, the term “adjacent” is the word for the link between 
two notes in a scale, the almost imperceptible interval between two connecting parts 
of a musical progression. By inserting this sense of “adjacent” into the phrase, it more 
readily becomes apparent how one could be “filled with adjacency” as one is “filled 
with anticipation”.  Similarly, in the mock-aphorism “Life is what you find, existence 
is what you repudiate”, the distinction that is being made between “life” and 
“existence” is confusing. How can one’s “life” be defined as “found” in contrast to 
one’s “existence” as a rejection or “repudiation”? How can “existence” be what one 
denies the truth or validity of. The first difficulty is in discerning the distinction 
between “life” and “existence”. Life would seem to refer to a quality of humans, 
animals and plants, i.e. living beings, where as “existence” can refer to any object, 
concept or idea.  From this basis, then, “life” is “found” as it is what we know and all 
we can know, where as “existence” is the term used to describe things that are man-
made, that are not, therefore, “found” in the way that natural things are. Constructed 
things, such as concepts, ideas, language etc are necessarily involve the act of 
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“repudiating” because they do not have the validity of being “alive” or “natural”. 
However, the proposition that “existence is what you repudiate” suggests that as a 
fundamental part of our existence we constantly validate or repudiate structures and 
value systems by the very act of being, of existing. The rhetorical unit used as an 
exemplar of this point, “Dad pins puck”, hardly seems to clarify matters, except as a 
combination of words based more on their sonic patterning, three monosyllabic 
words, one of which is a palindrome and the other two alliterative, than their semantic 
sense. It could be read as a radical and irreverent reimagining of a fundament such as 
“God is good”, with its patriarchal assumptions exposed through the use of the word 
“Dad”. In this reading, the word “puck” would refer equally to a ‘hockey puck’ as it 
would to ‘Puck’, the character from A Midsummer Night’s Dream who is able to 
unsettle normative assumptions through his baffling and confusing language uses, 
outlandish behaviour and slapstick humour. From a poet who has published a book 
called “Little Orphan Anagram”, it is worth heeding the possible rearrangements of 
letters within any line. In this case, the presence of “spin” and “puns” gives a clue as 
to how ‘Puck’ (or the poet as ‘Puck’) can reverse, undermine and denormalize the 
patriarchical assumptions underlying “Dad” (into ‘DADA’?).  
The overall effect of this highly rhetoricised poetic surface is to focus 
attention on the way that the poem is “stitched” or “mis-seamed” together. The 
emphasis is on an analysis and exploration of the connections between textual units 
(and, importantly, on the gaps between things, the degree of continuity). Untersteiner 
quotes Jules Marouzeau as remarking of Gorgias that:  
Exact correspondence between the knowledge possessed by the speaker and 
that of the hearer does not necessarily exist and is even rare; speech does not 
mean strictly the same thing for both of them, because they differ in their 
	   175	  
mentality, their culture, their grasp of the language: a new element of 
uncertainty and approximation… Words produce on us impressions which are 
more numerous in proportion to the number of pieces of knowledge, feelings, 
memories we carry in our minds (195).  
This theory of language and its relation to knowledge bears remarkable similarities to 
that expressed by Bernstein when he positions himself as against a  “conduit theory of 
communication (me > you)” (78). Rather than understanding things in this simple 
model whereby communication is a direct transference of ideas from ‘speaker’ to 
‘spoken to’, the act of reading and language use becomes a way of placing things 
“adjacent” to other things and placing yourself “adjacent” to the language used, i.e. 
within the discourse itself. Understanding how things are “adjacent” to one another is 
the way that one is able to understand how structures (linguistic and political) 
constitute us.  In a discussion of Bernstein’s position on this point in Dance of the 
Intellect, Perloff quotes Bernstein as follows: 
The distortion is to imagine that knowledge has an object, outside of the 
language of which it is a part – that words refer to “transcendental signifieds” 
rather than being a part of a language which itself produces meaning in terms 
of its grammar, its conventions, its “agreements in judgement”. Learning a 
language is not learning the names of things outside language, as if it were 
simply a matter of matching up “signifiers with signifieds”, as if signifieds 
already existed and we were just learning new names for them. (219)  
Her conclusion is that language poets, including Bernstein, take “poetic discourse to 
be, not the poetic expression in words of an individual speaking subject, but the 
creation of that subject by the particular set of discourses (cultural, social, historical) 
in which he or she functions” (219). Furthermore, poetic discourse is an exploration 
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of the ways in which the structures and organisations of language effect the ways in 
which the subject is positioned in relation to, i.e. (“adjacent” to) these discourses. As 
Perloff has more recently put it:  
Here, in a nutshell, is the animating principle of the movement: poetic 
language is not a window, to be seen through, a transparent glass pointing to 
something outside it but a system of signs with its own semiological 
‘interconnectedness’. To put it another way: ‘Language is material and 
primary and what’s experienced is the tension and relationship of letters and 
lettristic clusters, simultaneously struggling towards yet refusing to become 
significations’ (158).  
As both of Perloff’s formulations suggest (the second drawn from the writings of 
Steve McCaffery), the language poets see language as something that is experienced 
as part of the discourse, which entails a certain adjacency to linguistic units and 
language usages. Hank Lazer has identified a practice within the grammar of 
Bernstein’s poems of “besidedness” that locates this process of adjacency at the level 
of the text’s composition. He writes that this “besidedness”  “is manifest in alternative 
or multiple phrasings” (129), i.e. usages of words that point towards other alternatives 
outside of themselves. An example from ‘Dysraphism’ would be “All lit up with no 
place to go”, where “all lit up” points towards the alternative “all dressed up” outside 
of itself, hence setting up an alternative possibility “beside itself”. The term 
“besidedness” is an important one and it acknowledges the multiplicity of phrasing 
and meaning that Bernstein is able to weave into his poems. It suggests a way out of 
logical single-mindedness in the colloquial “beside yourself” for being “out of your 
mind”.  The example that Lazer gives is from the book Dark City: 
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     (I 




Love may come and love may  
   go 
 
but uncertainty is here forever 
 
{profit?}  
Lazer suggests that Bernstein is able to integrate multiple ways of meaning 
into the poem through utilizing the semantic multiplicities of alternate versions and 
mis-hearings of words “amour”/ “armour”/ “ardour”, for example. Brian McHale has 
acknowledged Lazer’s understanding of this technique (283) and detects it at work in 
a line from the poem ‘Hitch World’, in The Sophist: “is Greek, grief to me” (53), 
which plays on the phrase “it’s all Greek to me” and also the mis-heard word, related 
by sound, “grief”.  The richness of this particular mis-hearing is that it conflates both 
sonic and semantic resonances, calling to mind “Greek tragedy” in the dynamic he 
establishes between “Greek” and “grief”. Similarly, in the poem ‘Foreign Body 
Sensation’, Bernstein writes of “toys/ to hunger for/ a hankering, systematic/ seals of 
aquamarine,/ sleds portrayed (weighlayed)/ against whose barn?” (104). In this 
modified version of the “besidedness” device, the words are connected not simply by 
their similarity in look or sound but by a very loose sense of half rhyme. In creating a 
linguistic and sonic universe for the poem in which “portrayed” is able to trigger the 
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word “weighlayed”, Bernstein radically increases the sense of constant play between 
the sound of words and their connections to other words through related sounds. This 
device of increasing the referential capacity of his compositions (through an 
attentiveness to the sonic possibilities of every word) is central to the ways in which 
Bernstein is able to critique a sense of language as a direct communication between 
two individuals and rather explore language’s multiple ways of making meaning and 
iterating societal structures through a thick and highly referential linguistic surface: 
Not ‘death’ of the referent – rather a recharged use of the multivalent 
referential vectors that any word has, how words in combination tone and 
modify the associations made for each of them, how ‘reference’ is not then a 
one-on-one relation to an object (Content’s Dream, 115) 
What is created is a sense of a taut linguistic surface crackling with referential 
possibilities and multiplicities of meaning. As one poem from The Sophist is titled, 
Bernstein’s rhetorical devices achieve a “surface reflectance” in which the reader’s 
“job, right at this moment, is to get busy with your mental pictures” (161).  
Combinations of words, then, that are generated not as “an expression in words of the 
individual speaking subject” become integral to Bernstein’s poetics. The poem “I and 
the” from The Sophist is, as an endnote of the poem explains, a compilation of the 
most frequent words used “in psychoanalytic sessions involving 29 generally middle 
class speakers averaging in age in the late twenties. These speakers, 21 of whom were 
men, used a total of 17.871 different words in the session. In the poem, frequency is 
presented in descending order.” (80) The data Bernstein employs in the poem is from 
research conducted by Hartvig Dahl. Because it uses found language in the poem, the 
focus of the reader is automatically skewed towards issues of structure, arrangement, 
process and order. By removing authorial intent or expression as to the specific words 
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that form the poem, Bernstein increases the attention given to other factors of its 
composition.  
The critic Ellen Zweig, writing of the poet Jackson Mac Low, has suggested 
that found text and chance operations enable the poet to “get rid of the ego” (81) or 
suppress the lyric perspective. In the case of “I and the”, one of these features is the 
tri-colon structure whereby each line of the poem consists of three words and each 
stanza consists of three lines. In the titular first line, “I and the”, this structure focuses 
attention on the relation of the individual and subjective voice “I”, the connective, 
clausal and relational “and” and the objective “the”. The psychological condition of 
“besidedness” is summed up succinctly in this line: “I and the”. The poem therefore 
establishes itself within a traditional binary of the self and the other, i.e. the external 
world. The following two lines of the first stanza continue this relational exploration 
of the individual and others: “to that you/ it of a”. However, the structure of the poem 
in fact undoes this binary of self and other through its explorations of what the 
frequency of words we say under certain conditions say about us collectively, rather 
than simply individually. The intertwined nature and mutual collective investment in 
social modes and community forms is stressed by the poet Robin Blaser when he 
remarks, “the marvel of our delicate, pronominal I needs also to be honored. It stands 
or sleeps alongside things, in fact alongside the whole world of its garnering.” The 
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Chapter 5. I. Sophistic Parody, Performance and Linguistic Acrobatics in With 
Strings and Girly Man 
 
“One must destroy one’s adversaries’ seriousness with laughter and their laughter 
with seriousness” (Gorgias, in Spariosu, 93). 
 
“the process of reading is not a half-sleep, but, in highest sense, an exercise, a 
gymnast's struggle” (Walt Whitman, xix) 
 
In a career that has seen Bernstein collaborate with many fellow poets, artists and 
musicians, perhaps his most on-going collaboration has been with the artist Susan 
Bee, his wife. Alongside collaborative book art projects such as Little Orphan 
Anagram and Log Rhythms, Bee has also frequently designed the covers for many of 
Bernstein’s books. Sharing a deep-rooted sense of humour and absurdity with 
Bernstein, her images are independent illuminations and companions to Bernstein’s 
poetry rather than illustrations. The painting that adorns the cover of the Sun and 
Moon Press edition of The Sophist is a case in point. Entitled ‘Do Gentlemen Snore?’, 
the cover painting shows an enlarged and intimidating bloke in top hat and tails 
unceremoniously expelling a much smaller figure from a red room. Dressed in what 
looks to be a Greek chiton (tunic), the smaller bearded figure looks to be defiantly 
protesting his innocence with one outstretched open palm, while he also looks to have 
something ‘up his sleeve’, with the other hand tucked into his tunic. My reading of 
this image interprets the larger figure as ‘official verse culture’ or ‘the academy’, 
while the other figure is a symbol of the subversive, the poet, the sophist. While the 
might of the suited individual isn’t in question, the sleight of hand and cunning glint 
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of the smaller figure points towards a possible strategy for defense. The red room 
brings to mind H.G. Wells’s famous ghost story ‘Red Room’ (1894). In the story, the 
narrator attempts to spend a night in a room that is known to be haunted. However, 
when the candles he has brought with him to illuminate the room gradually extinguish 
themselves, he grows more and more alarmed. There then ensues a frenzied and 
ultimately failed ‘game’ of relighting the candles and out-witting the perceived ghost 
that verges on the comic. Exhausted, the narrator falls over and knocks into furniture 
causing him to fall unconscious. The conclusion of the story involves the recovering 
narrator recognizing that the room was haunted not by a ghost but by fear instead. 
Two elements of this story tie it to Bee’s painting. One is the title she gives the work, 
“Do Gentlemen Snore?”, which refers to a silent horror film made by Hal Roach 
studio in 1928 with a plot that is equal parts comic and horrific. The second is the 
dialectic that is set up between seriousness and play, which is one of the most 
significant energizing forces in Bernstein’s poetry and was also a live issue for the 
sophists in Ancient Greece.    
In Chapter 4, I focused on how, in The Sophist, Bernstein follows Gorgias’s 
lead in creating an intensely varied and dramatic linguistic texture through the use of 
rhetorical devices. I showed how, by doing so, his work can be seen as a language 
performance that explores, as Untersteiner wrote of Gorgias: “the irreducibility of 
antitheses” (194). In this chapter, I explore some other aspects of Bernstein’s style 
that also correspond to crucial impulses within sophistic rhetoric: parody, humour and 
performance. That the element of performance was critical to how the sophists’ work 
was seen in Ancient Greece (and, how they saw themselves) can be seen from looking 
at some of Plato’s dialogues concerning the sophists. In Gorgias, Plato connects 
sophistry to poetry and to theatre when he has Socrates remark that “poetry is a kind 
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of popular harangue… or don’t you think that poets practice oratory in the theatres?... 
a popular oratory of a kind that is addressed to men, women and children” (847).  
Similarly, as the critic Scott Consigny has observed:  
When Aristotle discusses Gorgias in the Rhetoric, it is primarily in respect to 
his ‘poetic’ style… Aristotle also follows Plato in characterizing Gorgias’s 
performances as “theatrical”, classifying them as epideictic displays or 
spectacles designed primarily to entertain audiences at festivals (151).  
This understanding of the importance of theatricality to Gorgias’s style can be 
evidenced with reference to his Encomium of Helen, in which he concludes that he 
has been concerned as much with pleasure as with the seriousness of the debate: “I 
wished to write the speech as an encomium of Helen and an amusement for myself.” 
However, while theatrical and poetic elements to Gorgias’s style were widely 
remarked on by Ancient commentators, the importance of these within his 
philosophical thinking has been left to contemporary analysts. 
Consigny has put forward a convincing case for the importance of 
performance in Gorgias’s rhetorical and stylistic practice. His argument is that 
Gorgias’s mode of philosophizing begins by using existing forms (the genres of 
epideictic oratory and encomium, for example) and parodying them to the point where 
the ‘constructedness’ of all discourse becomes apparent:   
I suggest that in his manner of speaking and writing, Gorgias adapts to the 
protocols of existing genres, but that he playfully differentiates his own work 
from those conventions through parody, overtly artificial figuration and 
theatricality. In so doing, he draws attention to the conventions of the genres 
in which he is writing and hence to the rhetoricity, situatedness and 
artificiality of all texts (150). 
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Consigny’s study is important in the weight it puts behind the inter-reliance of 
Gorgias’s style of performance and what he calls his “substantive thought” (152). 
While critics going back to Plato have remarked upon Gorgias’s distinctive style, and 
(fewer) on his philosophical contributions, very few indeed have ever posited a link 
between the style of his philosophizing and the content of his philosophy itself. In the 
same manner that critics have suggested a correlation between Plato’s dialogue form 
and the content of his philosophical work, Consigny suggests that the theatrical and 
poetic elements that were fundamental to Gorgias’s method were also constitutive of 
philosophical meaning and integral to his philosophical contribution. At the risk of 
being considered non-serious, linguistic playfulness and performance was at the heart 
of Gorgias’s philosophical project. I intend to argue that in Bernstein’s critical 
writings a similar process occurs. Furthermore, I suggest that one significant 
development in Bernstein’s poetry since 1999, his books since My Way (1999) and 
With Strings (2001), is the centrality of this stylistic mode in both the poetic and 
critical texts, the increasing mergence of these generic strands within his work. 
Consigny identifies three important elements to Gorgias’s style: parody, artificial 
figuration and theatricality, and in the sections that follow these three stylistic features 
will be dealt with individually in relation to Bernstein’s style. 
Parody can be considered essentially sophistic. As an art form that has its 
basis in imitation, parody takes the form of ‘appearances’, of ‘semblance’, which is 
one of the defining characteristics identifying the sophist in Plato’s dialogue (292). It 
is therefore no surprise that parody should be an appropriate art form for Gorgias the 
sophist and an unacceptable one for true philosophy, as Mihai Spariosu has remarked: 
Because for Socrates the mimetic poet deals in appearances par excellence and 
therefore cannot have any claim to real knowledge, he must naturally be 
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replaced by the philosopher-king as a moral and political leader in the ideal 
republic (154). 
By this Socratic characterization of sophistic parody, imitative forms are contrasted 
with real knowledge. It might be assumed that mimesis is closer to deception than 
truth. However, the potential power of imitation, of parodic forms, is precisely in its 
ability to, as Consigny has remarked, “undeceive” (169). It is paradoxical and 
counter-intuitive, but parody and imitation is a possible mode of expression that is 
less deceptive than apparent clarity because it lays bare its own construction and 
mocks its own rhetorical strategies. As Bernstein remarks, in My Way: “sincerity is 
closest to deception” (187). Parody, by exposing the rhetoricity and artificiality of 
modes of discourse, is able to make the reader or listener aware that all discourse is 
conditioned by rhetoric and all truths are situated in their social constructions: 
Gorgias engages in this practice of undeceiving his audience in each of his 
texts, drawing attention to the ways in which every persuasive text conceals its 
rhetoricity, displaying the ways in which rhetors present themselves as 
“speaking the truth as it really is” and thereby unmasking the deceptive tactics 
that partisan rhetors use to manufacture ostensibly impartial truths. He uses 
parody, paratropic figuration and histrionics in his epideictic performances to 
disabuse the audience that any account of things, including his own, is an 
objective representation or mirror of “things as they really are.”… Stated 
another way, Gorgias’s performances display, or show, as well as tell his 
audience about the situated and fabricative dimensions of logos (169).    
One of the most famous examples of sophistic parody is Gorgias’s ‘Treatise on Non-
Being’. As Guthrie remarks, “A great deal of ink has been spilt over the question 
whether this was intended as a joke or parody, or as a serious contribution to 
	   185	  
philosophy, but it is a mistake to think that parody is incompatible with serious 
intention. Gorgias’ purpose was negative, but none the less serious” (194). 
Bernstein’s essay ‘Against National Poetry Month As Such’ ought to be understood in 
terms similar to these, as a serious as well as playful parody of epideictic oratory, a 
form of ‘praise and blame’ oration in which values relevant to the community are put 
forth. It’s also a parody of a political manifesto, in which how poetry is positioned 
within the community is a critical question. He chooses a target “National Poetry 
Month”, which was in many quarters hitherto untouchable as an example of a 
creditable attempt to raise the profile of poetry and increase readership for poetry in 
the United States. He then produces a highly convincing and rhetorically dexterous 
assault on, not only the current state of “National Poetry Month”, but also on the 
whole concept and fundamental principles of such an endeavor, i.e. that poets should 
want more readers and greater popularity for poetry. It is no accident that this speech 
is initiated in a reimagined agora:  
April is the cruelest month for poetry.  
As part of the Spring ritual of National Poetry Month, poets are symbolically 
dragged into the public square in order to be humiliated with the claim that 
their product has not achieved sufficient market penetration and needs to be 
revived by the Artificial Resuscitation Foundation (ARF) lest the art form 
collapse from its own incompetence and irrelevance, and as a result of the 
general disinterest among the broad masses of the American People (2011, 27) 
Bernstein situates his oratory in an imaginary “public square” or agora because he is 
passionate about a public community life where debates concerning poetry are 
debates concerning what kind of community we want to be. It is also part of his 
method of ambiguous parody, utilizing the format of public rhetoric in order to 
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present an argument that locates the potency of poetry in its aversion to the 
mainstream. His parody begins with the mis-quotation of Eliot, “April is the cruelest 
month for poetry.” This nods to the sort of aphoristic, pleasantly benign extraction in 
which National Poetry Month might indulge, taking a line from a poem out of its 
context and ignoring its difficulty. However, of course, Bernstein’s employment of 
Eliot’s words is laced with rhetorical venom, setting up National Poetry Month as a 
sitting duck, teed up for him by an icon of Modernist literature. The essay follows a 
classical rhetorical structure. This early portion of the essay is the opportunity for 
Bernstein to put forward his version of the “thesis”, i.e. what he sees Nation Poetry 
Month as. When it comes to his antithesis, Bernstein’s argument continues in Gorgian 
style, turning widely held truths decisively on their heads:  
The path taken by the Academy’s National Poetry Month, and by such 
foundations as the Lannan and Lila Wallace - Reader’s Digest, has been 
misguided because these organizations have decided to promote not poetry but 
the idea of poetry, and the idea of poetry too often has meant almost no poetry 
at all. Time and time again, we hear the official spokespersons tell us they 
want to support projects that give speedy and efficient access to poetry and 
that the biggest obstacle to this access is, indeed, poetry, which may not 
provide the kind of easy reading required by such mandates (29). 
In this passage, Bernstein employs numerous rhetorical strategies in order to disarm 
and persuade his audience. He parodies rhetorical usage of what might be considered 
by the organisers of National Poetry Month “poetical” language, i.e. the “time and 
time again” expression, and the metaphor of a “path”, meanwhile combining this with 
the vocabulary of marketing and commerce “swift and efficient access”. The 
rhetorical turns centre around the definition of the word “poetry”, which undergoes 
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considerable scrutiny in this passage and in the essay as a whole. The rhetorical 
device of chiasmus, the combination of two clauses in a reversal structure, is 
employed. In this example, the key concepts around which this double chiasmus 
pivots are “poetry” and “the idea of poetry”: “these organizations have decided to 
promote not poetry but the idea of poetry, and the idea of poetry too often has meant 
almost no poetry at all.” By involving “the idea of poetry” in this chiasmatic drama, 
the reader is encouraged to consider what poetry is and how it can matter. Similarly, 
ambiguity over what poetry is is at the heart of the following sentence, which employs 
paradox to underline the distance between the concept of poetry that Bernstein is 
attacking, that of “easy reading” and the concept of poetry he is endorsing, where 
difficulty is the chief value of poetry. This sentence expresses that “poetry” is the 
greatest obstacle to the “swift and efficient access to poetry”. The paradoxical notion 
of how poetry can be the greatest obstacle to itself is typical of sophistic rhetorical 
wordplay, and has the effect of making plain the two opposing interpretations of what 
poetry can be. However, it expresses a parallel notion: that the greatest 
‘encouragement’ to poetry would be by removing poetry.  
Following his thesis and antithesis, the logic of his piece of rhetoric demands a 
synthesis. Bernstein delivers with characteristic parodic skill. Rather than a “National 
Poetry Month”, Bernstein proposes an “International Anti-Poetry Month” (itself an 
inverse of parody and mimesis, the sophistic alternative to the legitimized version), 
and goes on to detail what this would entail, some of which include: 
Poetry readings would be removed from radio and TV (just as they are for the 
rest of the year) (30). 
All verse in public places will be covered over – from the Statue of Liberty to 
the friezes on many of our public places (30) 
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Cats will be closed for the month (30) 
Children will have to stop playing all slapping and counting and singing 
games and stick to board games and football (30) 
Comic and overblown, this parody synthesis may be, but Bernstein’s proposed 
Anti-Poetry Month as a concept would reveal more about the functions poetry can and 
could play in our society (as well as its contemporary status) than National Poetry 
Month does, which instead proves Bernstein’s maxim that, “the more you dilute art, 
the more you increase access. But access to what?” (29). While clearly playful and 
comic, Bernstein’s Anti-Poetry Month is an ingenious rhetorical tactic that points 
towards an understanding of poetry that recognizes that to create meaningful “poetry 
that matters” and increase readers of “poetry that matters”, it is essential to regularly 
clear the boards of preconceptions of what poetry is. Rather than wheeling out light 
verse that conforms to a diagnosis of what poetry is, his Anti-Poetry Month would be 
a kind of conceptual detox that would enable revitalization as a constant conceptual 
possibility for poetry: “Poetry is very much alive when it finds ways of doing things 
in a media saturated environment that only poetry can do, but very much dead when it 
just retreads the same old same old.” (30)   
This impressive piece of rhetoric is both a skillful and persuasive argument 
against the retrograde and conservative values of National Poetry Month and also an 
intensive rhetorical performance in which oratorical devices are employed in order 
that the concept of “poetry” itself is able to somehow unshackle them and point 
towards new and innovative uses for the term. Straining under the weight of these 
rhetorical devices and what amount to essentially marketing debates, Bernstein enacts 
the escape of “poetry that matters”. A crucial element of both Gorgias’s and 
Bernstein’s parodic oratorical style, however, is that they do not dissolve merely into 
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the ridiculous. Bernstein does not allow his argument to dissolve into the parody. His 
version of an Anti Poetry Month is both conceivable and conceivably conducive to 
positive developments within poetry. His arguments “against National Poetry Month 
as such” do stand on their own well-reasoned and expertly rhetoricised feet. However, 
his parodic mode of discourse at the same time prevents his version of poetry from 
situating itself as a dominant replacement for that of the Academy of American Poets. 
Bernstein’s parodic argument doesn’t propose a new “official verse culture”, it insists 
on the importance of unofficial verse cultures.  
A parodic style is also evident in the poem ‘poem’ from With Strings. A 
parody of a poet offering explanations to a poem prior to reading it at a poetry 
reading, this poem parodies the idea that a poem is reducible to brief remarks 
explaining the resonances of the work. The remarkably bland explanations appear to 
add little to an understanding of the hypothetical poem in question, and the self-
centeredness of the imagined poet seems to think very little of the listeners’ 
intelligence, explaining what a “dog” is and what the “seasons” refer to: 
Just a few things first 
let’s see 
a dog- well for those of you not 
from here – a rather common domestic 
pet, four legs, tail. 
I should say 
the seasons in the poem refer 
to the seasons in the northeast 
so that fall refers to the leaves 
falling and winter is cold and usually 
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gray- often I will use the seasons 
in a metaphoric way,  
as you will see (26). 
One of the most interesting aspects of this work, of course, is the invitation it proffers 
to the reader to write the imaginary poem for themselves. With just a few bare facts 
concerning a number of images used within the poem and some stylistic aspects, the 
reader is forced to “construct” a reading of the poem for themselves. As such, 
Bernstein’s parody in fact imitates a constructive reading practice itself, and requires 
of the reader the sort of active reading practice that language poetries demand and 
which Walt Whitman was encouraging when he suggested that the reader was 
required to perform “a gymnast’s struggle”. Indeed, another effect of this poem is that 
it encourages the reader to think about what it would be like to require an explanation 
of what a “dog” refers to in a poem. The inadequacy of the description (another 
tricolon- “pet, four legs, tail”) encourages the reader to recognize that when we use 
words their meanings are conditioned by social circumstances. Someone from a 
country where dogs are infrequently domesticated and most often stray may not in 
fact realize that dogs are domesticated and may certainly not understand the 
emotional resonances of dogs for their owners in the USA. However, that doesn’t 
make the idea that you can explain away the meaning of a poem in a number of short 
explanations any less absurd.  Indeed the imagined poet in question appears to make 
banal any depth or interest the images may have: “And when/ near the end/ I mention 
a green/ chaise lounge, this is a couch/ upon which I often sit” (27). The bathetic 
denouement of the poem reduces what might be imagined to be a psychoanalyst’s 
chaise longue into a mere “couch/upon which I often sit”. Parody in this poem is not 
simply a way of poking fun at a poet’s over-eagerness to offer preparatory 
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explanations for their poem but also a performance of an active reading method and 
the un-explainability of poems as such. 
Bernstein’s interest in a poem’s ability to transcend any explanation that might 
be offered for it is also evident in the poem ‘johnny cake hollow’, also from With 
Srings. The language in this poem is unrecognizable and difficult to make sense of 
(rather than nonsense text): “Xo quwollen swacked unt myrry flooped/ Sardone to 
fligrunt’s swirm, ort” (27) This poem demands both an active and passive response 
from the reader. On the one hand, the reader has to acknowledge their passivity in the 
face of a poem that so foregrounds its lack of access, its hostility towards being 
totalized into a unified interpretation. On the other hand, in order to read the poem 
meaningfully (which is possible) the reader is required to actively attempt a location 
of meaning in the sounds of the words. Paradoxically, this active process of 
construction of meaning takes place in part as a passive submission to the poem’s 
sounds. In my own experience of this poem, the most meaningful reading experience 
came when I asked someone to read it aloud to me and I was then able to tune in to 
the sound of the poem and create meaning in the rhythms and cadences of the word 
‘strings’. However, another level of meaning can be approached by reading the poem 
visually and looking out for words and phrases with visual correlation to words we 
recognize from our own languages. “unt”, for example is a phoneticization of the 
German word for “and”, while “swirm” can be construed as a verb contraction of 
swim and squirm (which I’m imagining is loaded with embarrassment and 
particularly useful when describing teenagers in swimming classes at school). Similar 
readings can be built from words such as “Chyllrophane”, “flooped” and more. Once 
begun, it is an intoxicating process, requiring of the reader an acrobat’s virtuosity in 
generating multiplicities of meanings. “Flooped” could be a combination of being 
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tired (colloquial American “pooped”) and having the “flu”, but in the context of the 
line, where “myrry” seems like a qualifier such as “very” and “swacked” seems like 
an active “swipe” or “whack”, I rather read “flooped” as somewhere between “flew” 
and “dropped”.  While this poem is ostensibly a sort of made-up language of sounds, 
it is rather a collection of sounds through which the reader is invited to construct or 
perform a meaning. Of course, even within this reading process, I’m constantly made 
to be aware that my definition of each word and phrase is simply that, a best guess 
based on the contingencies of words, sounds and semantic networks I have at my 
disposal. While this is the condition of reading any poetry, by foregrounding it within 
the reading method demanded by the poem, Bernstein enacts a performance of active 
reading methods. Parody (or more broadly ‘imitation’) is key to the poem’s effect. It 
can be seen as a parody of a poem, following the form of a poem (using linebreaks, 
for example, starting each line with a capital letter) but removing one crucial aspect 
that might be expected of a poem (for it to be written in a language that someone 
might ‘understand’). This is how I read the title “johnny cake hollow”, as something 
that looks like a “johnny cake”, i.e. a cornbread cake, but that is hollowed out inside 
and is instead a shell for the reader put in their own performance of the text. However, 
this acting of reading is both socially and politically conditioned. This is suggested by 
the title, since “johnny cake” is a word with a contested social history and etymology, 
having its origins in Britain of the seventeenth century (journey cake) and becoming a 
word mainly used by the African American community in the South.  In performing a 
reading of the poem, the reader becomes aware of the social and political conditions 
through which they read every text.  
Bernstein’s ‘Recantorium (A Bachelor Machine, after Kafka and Duchamp)’ 
(2011, 271) employs rhetorical parody in an assault on accessibility as a dominant 
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aesthetic value basis. Just as with ‘Against National Poetry As Such’, ‘Recantorium’ 
situates itself in the public-debate chamber of an agora from the outset. The difference 
in this poem is that Bernstein plays the figure of ‘the accused’ or ‘the condemned’, 
enforced into ‘recanting’ and renouncing all his former sins against “Accessible 
Poets” (271). The essay/speech begins: 
I, Charles, son of the late Joseph Herman, later known as Herman Joseph, and 
Shirley K., later known as Sherry, New Yorker, aged fifty-eight years, 
arraigned personally before this Esteemed Body, and kneeling before you, 
Most Eminent and Reverend Readers, Inquisitors-General against heretical 
depravity throughout the entire Poetry Commonwealth, having before my eyes 
and touching with my hands, the Books of Accessible Poets, swear that I have 
always believed, do believe, and by your help will in the future believe, all 
that is held, preached, taught and expressed by the Books of Accessible Poets 
(271). 
Theatre is at the heart of the effect of this essay, which is, when spoken, a thirty five 
minute oratorical performance displaying in abundance what Consigny calls referring 
to Gorgias, “histrionics” (169).   Parodying the form of a renunciation speech, 
Bernstein engages in a tour de force of irony and double speech, setting up a 
heightened and dramatic “straw man” (the Poetry Commonwealth) and ironically 
recanting his beliefs while simultaneously asserting them. Rhetorical devices utilized 
in the piece include the tricolon, which is employed throughout as both a rhythmic 
feature and a repetitive echo. For example, “I was wrong, I apologise, I recant” (272), 
repeated (with variations) at the start of every paragraph (that’s over thirty times), is 
reminiscent of the famous “veni, vidi, vici” conjunction. However, rather than a 
statement of pride, Bernstein turns Caesar’s utterance into an ironic announcement of 
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renunciation. This tricolon is echoed by another in each paragraph: “I abjure, curse 
and detest the aforesaid error and aversion” (276). The variations of the phrase 
become ever more excessive and elaborate, while maintaining a riff on the tricolon 
structure: “I am with regret filled and by errors o’erwhelmed, having chosen the 
broken path over the righteous, the warped over the erect. I cant and recant” (277). 
Details of Bernstein’s own career are laid out before the feet of the agora, recanting 
what feels like almost anything that Bernstein has ever been criticized for. Therefore, 
he recants not only those aspects of his poetic career that mainstream or conservative 
poets might find difficult to stomach (“I altogether abandon the false notion that form 
in poetry is political and social”) but also those with which he has been criticized by 
figures on the avant-garde (“Academic employment is the mark of a compromised 
poet who has sold out. Radical poets prove their authenticity through poverty”) (276-
277).  
The effect of this masturbatory rhetorical excess is a certain redundancy, an 
alienation strategy and a defence mechanism, which makes this work as challenging 
and difficult to cope with as it is amusing and exhausting. This is indicated by the 
term “Bachelor Machine”, with which Bernstein titles his essay. A Bachelor Machine, 
or “machine cèlibataire” (Tajiri, 196) is a term coined by Marcel Duchamp for an 
inoperative mechanism that either destroys itself, or does not lead to its conclusion. 
As Yoshiki Tajiri remarks, “all bachelor machines are ultimately dysfunctional” 
(196). A Bachelor Machine is therefore a construction that does not consummate its 
own internal logic, that fails on its own terms and avoids conclusiveness. As an 
analogue for Bernstein’s ‘Recantorium’, then, the bachelor machine implies that 
Bernstein’s parody is intended neither as a genuine rescinding of the values expressed 
nor as an assertion of their contrary. Rather than reach a conclusion or put forward an 
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argument, his parodic text makes use of imitative and parodic forms to raise questions 
and encourage consideration of poetics and poetry’s value. The self-indulgence of the 
piece, its irritating repetitions and ingratiating obsequies is a concerted strategy to 
undermine certainty. Above all, if it achieves anything at all, his “Bachelor Machine”, 
could be considered to “undeceive” in the same way as Consigny sees Gorgias’s work 
as anti-deceptive. By enacting a histrionic and parodic performance, Bernstein draws 
attention to the way “official verse culture” and culture in general is officiated and 
constructed through rhetoric. In this, too, his practice can be considered related to that 
of Gorgias: 
In so far as he underscores and thereby draws attention to his own rhetorical 
maneuvers, Gorgias does not present his own writing as free of rhetorical 
conventions. In this respect, he may be said to be engaging in self-parody as 
well as parody of other texts. For while parody tends to be other-directed, 
drawing attention to the artificial conventions of existing genres, styles and 
authors, self parody draws attention to its own situatedness and artificiality. 
Insofar as they are self-parodic as well as parodic, Gorgias’s texts thus mock 
themselves as well as other texts, and in this respect, they are highly self-
conscious, self-aware, and self-critical (Consigny, 176). 
In similar fashion, ‘Recantorium’ is the crux of self-critique in Bernstein’s critical 
works, a mechanical apologia gone berserk to the point of utter absurdity and 
redundancy that nevertheless encourages the listener/reader to consider what it means 
to write and read poetically. Rather than inviting the reader to be convinced by either 
his recantations or their ironic counter-assertions, Bernstein encourages the reader to 
become aware of the way our cultures are constructed through an extravagant 
comedic conceit. Distrusting the ironies and double speech of Bernstein leads to a 
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general awareness of rhetorical construction in all discourse. As an essentially 
imitative art form, parody is the ideal mode through which to achieve this. As he puts 
it in My Way: “If you are not going to distrust the comic, then what are you going to 
distrust” (187). While this quip might seem at first rebarbative and flippant, it in fact 
suggests what both Gorgias and Bernstein foreground in their works: a crucial 
dialectic of trust and distrust. In On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy, Bruns 
quotes Cavell’s emphasis of  “fraudulence and trust as essential to the experience of 
art” (42). Cavell’s point seems to be that a work’s authenticity as an artwork is 
constantly at stake. On the one hand, an artwork shouldn’t be accepted entirely on its 
own terms and the critic or viewer is required to take a skeptical or distrustful attitude 
to the possibility that it may in some way be ‘fraudulent’; on the other hand, the 
viewer of an artwork is required to become a “participant” in the work in order to 
possibly apprehend whether or not it is fraudulent or genuine. In order to achieve this, 
the viewer must become, in Bruns’ phrase, a “hostage” (42) to the work: “taking [the 
work] upon ourselves, without being able (try as we might) to justify our action on the 
basis of concepts or criteria” (42). Bernstein has repeatedly guarded against a sense of 
his work being considered “ironic”. He has written: 
If I 
prefer to speak of the comic rather than  
the ironic it’s because the nature of literary  
irony can be taken (Kierkegaard didn’t) 
as an especially, even uniquely, context- 
dependent form of discourse, as if 
there was some other discourse that was 
context-interdependent – the words just meaning 
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what they say no interpretation (interruption) 
necessary (2010, 286) 
Bernstein’s reluctance to acknowledge irony as a technique at work in his poetry 
comes from the sense that it is too narrow a definition, that irony refers to a mode of 
double speaking in a specific context where a figure is able to say something other 
than what they actually say. For Bernstein, everything is ironic in the sense that 
nothing ought ever to be taken at face value and that there is no way of speaking that 
is not dependent on the context to be interpreted. Bernstein’s aversion to “irony” is 
also evident in the conversation ‘Characterisation’, which is included in the book 
Content’s Dream. In the book, Bernstein objects to the term “ironic” for his project 
and has his point endorsed and explained by the poet Robert Grenier: “I think it isn’t 
ironic because irony presumes some sort of point of view from which some measure 
of restraint can be applied to such statement by arbitrating in such a way that it seems 
to be something that it’s not” (460). Grenier’s point objects not just to the sense that 
irony implies it is possible to simply say something that you mean, but also raises a 
question over how and from what perspective would it ever be ascertainable when 
something was meant and when it wasn’t. In part, Bernstein’s suspicion of irony is 
due to the position it has within some quarters of postmodern cultural theory, and in 
particular the description of “blank irony” employed by Fredric Jameson in 
Postmodernism and the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Jameson regards irony as 
reactionary in its current form, which he regards as lacking “any conviction that 
alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some linguistic 
normality exists” (50). Jameson’s characterization of “blank irony” in fact captures 
Bernstein’s own sense of the difficulty of the category of irony. However, whereas 
Jameson sees this form of writing as essentially reactionary by reinforcing the social 
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order without any power to stabilize or effectively reconstitute it, Bernstein’s poetry 
instead performs a multitude of voices, mimicries, parodies, pastiches and 
unsyntacticalities in order to focus attention on the critical discourse of skeptical 
distrust in which alternative modes of communication can be opened up. For 
Jameson, pervasive irony has lost its ability to refer to the truth and therefore loops 
back to a reconstitution of society. For Bernstein, by suggesting that there is a 
position that would enable a way of speaking the truth which irony is only masking, 
irony is not adequate to express the constantly contextual and social implications of 
language use. The poet Rae Armantrout has written of Bernstein’s poem ‘Sentences 
My Father Used’ from The Sophist that it uses irony in order to “represent the way 
our speech can turn against us, causing us to incorporate oppressive ideologies” (54). 
As such, Armantrout’s reading suggests that Bernstein’s poem is able through its 
employment and investigation of un-meant statements to critique and draw attention 
to the ways in which our language use can endorse the politics and society we 
validate.    
Jameson’s argument about irony appears to suggest that the pervasiveness of a 
kind of “blank irony” is a condition diagnosed under postmodernity. He repeatedly 
refers approvingly to the ironic capabilities of the eighteenth century. However, by 
doing so he fails to take in to consideration the full extent of the multiplicitous and 
parodic tradition, a tradition that includes Gorgias and the sophists. Gorgias was 
repeatedly condemned during his life as a confidence trickster; memorably (along 
with other sophists) in Plato’s Sophist, but also in a number of other ancient sources. 
Consigny reads this not as evidence that Gorgias was in fact a confidence trickster but 
as evidence that he deliberately acted the part of a confidence trickster, in order to 
engender a performative dialectic of trust and distrust similar to that which is 
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represented by the imitative form of parody itself: “a persistent trait of the characters 
he creates is that of a bold self-confidence concerning his own knowledge, a person 
who is able to speak persuasively and authoritatively on any subject whatsoever” 
(191). This boastful know-it-all character, termed the alazon is contrasted with the 
Socratic eiron (characterized by an initial ignorance but an ability to follow reason 
and logic towards knowledge), and the confrontation between these two characters is 
a central drama of Plato’s Gorgias. However, as Consigny argues, Gorgias’s 
“flamboyant braggadocio underscores his own presence as a distinct character”, 
alerting his audience to the no less performative style of Socrates and other eirons. 
His bold claims to argue persuasively on all sides of an argument on any topic at all 
are a performative demonstration of the situated and artificial quality inherent in the 
presentation of any argument, however meek and sincere the presentation style may 
appear. By inviting the reader or listener to distrust his claims, Gorgias invites the 
reader or listener to distrust all claims and adopt a skeptical awareness of the 
performativity of all knowledge presentations. This employment of a dialectic of trust 
and distrust is inherent within Bernstein’s use of parody, particularly in the 
‘Recantorium’. While usually delivered ‘straight’ by Bernstein in readings, this 
merely heightens the absurdity of the imitative sincerity of a repentant sinner. One 
response to this long recantation is to simply beg the (rhetorical) question: “You can’t 
be serious??” That is, at least, in part, the point. The listener enduring this 
performance has the uncanny sensation that they are being taken for a ride. You find 
yourself asking, “Am I seriously meant to sit here and listen to half an hour’s worth of 
a series of overblown, hyperbolic and ironic statements as the successful poet and 
academic Charles Bernstein puts himself in the position of attacked, defeated and 
quite possibly tortured soul?” In my experience of seeing this work performed at the 
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University of Sussex in 2008, reactions to the work included irritation, disbelief and 
laughter. By eliciting this response, the ‘Recantorium’ achieves a similar performance 
of the drama of fraudulence and trust that Cavell considers central to the experience 
of art. In ‘Comedy and the Poetics of Political Form’, Bernstein refers to this 
conception of poet as confidence trickster: 
Anything that departs from the sincere or serious enters into the comic, but the 
comic is anything but a unitary phenomenon, and the range of comic attitudes 
goes from the good-humoured to the vicious, from clubby endorsement of the 
existing social reign to total rejection of all existing human communities: poet 
as confidence “man”, deploying hypocrisy in order to shatter the formal 
autonomy of the poem and its surface of detachment; the sincere and the 
comic as interfused figure, not either/or but both and. Our sincerity is always 
comic, always questionable, always open to mocking (A Poetics, 227) 
However absurd ‘Recantorium’ might seem, the premise of an artist-sophist being 
held accountable and answerable for a mode of aversive poeticizing that is held to be 
unacceptable to the demands of an ideal republic is exactly the sort of condemnation 
that the sophists and poets received through their expulsion from Plato’s republic. 
This is essential to the success of the comedy of ‘Recantorium’. The irony is at once 
sincere (Bernstein sincerely doesn’t mean to renounce the things he says he does) and 
absurd- his own sincerity is mocked and exploded at the same time as he mocks and 
explodes the sincerity of sincere and normative discourse. As a text that foregrounds 
the performative aspects of its delivery, a crucial aspect of ‘Recantorium’ is in its 
performance, its “enactment” (Bernstein, My Way, 23). A theatrical text that relies as 
much on sound patterns, pacing and rhythm as it does on the semantic meaning of the 
essay’s content, ‘Recantorium’ is electrifying when read aloud, with Bernstein 
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delivering his renunciation in the manner of a battling sophist under attack in an 
agora. This is an aspect of Bernstein’s work that will be explored in more detail in the 
next section. However, as a conclusion to this section, it is worthwhile briefly to 
consider how reading or listening to parodic poetry of the sort described above 
encourages the reader or audience to be aware of their own performativity, the ways 
in which they too rhetorically perform roles as a daily procedure of persuasion and 
language use. In the important interventionist essay ‘Some Problems about Agency in 
the Theories of Radical Poetics’, critic Charles Altieri seemingly automatically is 
forced into an awareness and performance of his own rhetorical strategies when faced 
with the experiments of radical and innovative poetries. The essay begins with a 
description of his initial aims in the paper, to critique the ways in which “radical 
poetics may be too willing to let the working of language itself be the primary source 
of vision of agency” (208). However, Altieri goes on to describe how at a conference 
in Vancouver he was “forced” to reconsider his views because the “other papers were 
so terrifyingly good and the poetry readings so engaging” (208). Nevertheless, he 
continues:  
My enforced newfound humility does not extend so far that I no longer feel 
strongly that my complaints are justified. But I no longer know how to assume 
a position from which to make the criticisms (except by the indirection here 
which I hope the reader will indulge), and I am convinced my own ways of 
valuing poetry are woefully inadequate for dealing with the most innovative 
contemporary writing. So I hope representing the basic argument of this paper, 
then commenting on it, will enable me to play the roles simultaneously of 
sacrificial victim and clever self abnegating pedagogue. It may take both roles 
to get clear on where theorizing about contemporary poetry has to go (208).  
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It is striking that an awareness of performativity immediately becomes central 
to Altieri’s engagement with language poetry and that he willfully becomes involved 
in a kind of sophistic game of rhetoric and play.  Also apparent is that Altieri 
positions himself as being forced to become aware of (if not change) his “own ways 
of valuing poetry”. Central to both sophistic and language-centered ways of 
addressing the world is a constant re-evaluation and awareness of the values attached 
to processes and cultural procedures, where these are not taken for granted but instead 
doused with an enormous pinch of salt (creating friction). Even more striking is that 
Altieri’s own language as the essay develops seems to suggest the roots for exactly 
this sort of poetic and parodic performance, of the kind that engenders ongoing 
processes of re-evaluation of value systems through experimental and innovative 
language use: 
I have been led to these questions in part by my own anxieties about 
addressing an audience as sophisticated as the one at the conference, and in 
part by Charles Bernstein’s persuasive arguments that the very dream of a 
universal audience for poetry, or of a universal addressee for the poet, no 
longer makes sense: our political arena is an agonistic and culturally diverse 
one in which the very effort to find universality tends to mask specific 
interests, and our psychologies seem to demand that we resist a commodified 
cultural order by taking on what Bernstein calls an “aversion to conformity” 
whose fullest realizations probably consist in the modes of singularity that our 
versing enables us to maintain (209). 
The italics are mine, to emphasize the presence within Altieri’s remarks of a sophistic 
backdrop, whereby the publics are encouraged to be awakened and alert to the nature 
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of persuasion within the “agonistic and culturally diverse” “political arena”. This 
could be considered the Gorgian parodic project transplanted to the parameters of late 
Twentieth Century western capitalist democratic culture. Consigny writes that: “As 
with parody, Gorgias uses his overtly artificial, paratropic tropes to disabuse his 
audience of the illusion that any views are objectively “true”… With his deliberately 
‘thick’ or opaque style, he foregrounds his own situatedness: and in so doing he 
invites his audience to reflect on the arbitrary assumptions and biases in their own 
language” (183). Just so, for Altieri, radical poetics can “function in the larger cultural 
arena to foster a consciousness of the material and ideological density of language 
that should help resist certain kinds of subjection inherent in the media driven 
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5. II. The Performances of Poetry 
 
In a number of different ways, Bernstein has shown an interest in the performances of 
poetry. He has editorially presided over reading series and poetry performances at The 
University of Buffalo and The University of Pennsylvania, and two poetry radio 
shows, LINEbreak and Close Listening. In addition, he has been instrumental in 
developing PennSound, an online resource of audio and visual material on the web. 
Furthermore, he has edited Close Listening, Poetry and the Performed Word, a 
collection of essays related to the performance of poetry. He has also written a 
number of works that consider the poetry performance as an active site for poetic 
inquiry. In ‘Thelonious Monk and the Performance of Poetry’, Bernstein writes: 
(One advantage of hearing  
work performed 
 is that it does 
not allow opportunities to  
reread or rehear; at least in my 
work, it pretty much forces listeners 
to get lost, to give up 
any notion of following in detail, fore- 
grounding tempo & sound, 
association and & texture  
[making the experience  
more like hearing music or watching 
a movie]. Of course, the ability to read in 
detail 
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is just what gives the written  
its primacy – much of what 
is happening pros- 
odically, thematically, & structurally can’t 
really be grasped in performance) (My Way, 20) 
The counter-intuitiveness of this argument (he argues for the value of performance 
based on what is lost in hearing a poem rather than what is gained) resembles that of 
many sophistic dissoi logoi (or contradictory positions), where debates were argued 
from either side of an issue, resulting in curious twists and turns in logical paradox. 
However, Bernstein’s point is a serious one. Since language poems are conceived of 
as open-ended and inconclusive entities in which responsive attention to sound and 
semantic irregularities is more important than a unity of apprehension, a form of 
transmission that encourages the listener to forego any notion of a totality of 
apprehension through the physical impossibility of “re-hearing” live performance has 
in itself a positive value. In a fundamental way, Bernstein’s poetry and critical 
writings communicate that every reading or hearing of a poem is in itself a 
performance. As Bernstein has written, “the story of our everyday life – where 
troubling/ social acts are performed as if without/ premeditation or self conscious 
intent, it’s/ the sort of acting that resembles puppetry” (My Way, 23). The alternative 
Bernstein sets up is between an awareness of performativity (“acting”) and un-self-
consciously acting under authorised normative models of behavior (“puppetry”). Of 
Gorgias’s theatrical delivery of speeches, Consigny writes that he carefully 
constructed his performances to make it more obvious that “every utterance is 
inescapably perspectival and partisan, spoken by a limited, situated individual… The 
art of acting, which is the art of constructing a character, is pivotal to the act of 
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invention, for it delineates a rhetor’s initial biases, commitments and ways of seeing 
and judging, each of which opens up some avenues of enquiry and closes down 
others.” (190) Reported to have worn costumes to aid in the artificializing of his 
delivery, Gorgias was a renowned and successful performer of his works at festivals 
(151). Froma Zeitlin has related the artificiality of both poetic and sophistic 
performance to gender politics within Ancient Greece, stating that as with cooking 
and cosmetics, sophistic performances were considered to “traffic in deceptive 
appearances and pander to the appetites and gratification… a certain, effeminate 
roster of pleasures” (370). It is along these lines that I read the title of Bernstein’s 
collection Girly Man. Rather than “manly” (370) in the Platonic ideal, Bernstein 
associates himself more with what Zeitlin refers to as “the ranks of male trickster 
figures who fall furthest from the ideal of manliness” (370) through an aesthetics of 
insincerity, imitation and play, what Bernstein calls, in ‘Comedy and the Poetics of 
Political Form’, “dialectical play, the insincerity of form” (A Poetics, 220). This is 
political because it underscores the artificiality of all modes of delivery, including so-
called “natural speech”. While Bernstein does not “act” his poems in the same way as 
Gorgias acted his speeches, he does pay close attention to the delivery of his poems 
and demonstrates an awareness that all performance modes for poems are constructed, 
whether they are dramatic or much more mundane: 
many poets will make much 
of the authenticity or naturalness of their reading  
style – mumbling, stumb- 
ling over words, fumbling through papers, virtual 
inaudibility, sitting in a chair bent over page, 
no discernible shape or rhythm in the pro- 
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jected sound of the work.  
Yet this is just as much 
a performance style as the most 
declamatory reading: all readings 
are performative, whether they appear  
to deny the performative or flaunt 
it (20)   
Bernstein, like Gorgias, aims through the performance of his texts to disillusion the 
audience of the idea of a transparent, sincere voice through which to deliver ideas. 
This essay builds on a number of ideas from Bernstein’s earlier essay collection, 
Content’s Dream, and in particular the conversational essay ‘On Theatricality’. In this 
essay, Bernstein sketches a number of ways in which he feels the reader of poetry can 
offer a performance of the work that is neither wholly dependent on a sense of the 
poet’s personality “as a projected cohering force” nor what he calls the “shamanistic 
incantation of neoritualistic sound poetry” (200). One idea he suggests is that a 
poem’s performance could be achieved through regarding the poem more as “scored 
speech” in which the poet attempts to “create rhythms in reading that are based on the 
compositional possibilities of the text and are not simply appropriated from speech” 
(201). As the critic Gerald Bruns has remarked:  
Bernstein’s work is, whatever else it is, a persistently comic investigation of 
the idea that there are more ways of putting words together than can be 
contained within the standard received model of a (unitary) speaking voice… 
what characterizes his poetry is not the disappearance of voice… but its wild, 
heterogeneous proliferation in forms of pastiche, parody and manic 
impersonation (21).   
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By detaching the performance of poetry from a notion of unified voice, Bernstein 
presents his work in a manner that acknowledges and foregrounds the performative 
decisions that are made in delivering poems. Just as Consigny reads similar concerns 
as being grounded in politics for Gorgias, so too does the “acknowledgment of the 
performative dimension/ of poems” amount to a “recognition of their political bearing 
in the world” (23) for Bernstein. This is because it is necessary to understand how our 
language uses and modes of utterance are socially conditioned before “ingrained 
habits might be changed or reshaped” (23).  
Many of Bernstein’s poems enact the politics of poetic performance. The 
poem ‘Outrigger’, for example, begins in the arena of performance and theatricality: 
“There is some goggling and conversation coming from the box” (The Sophist, 29). 
Discourse in this line is not just linked explicitly to performance (“the box” is as 
much a stage as the stage itself), but also to privilege and economic circumstance.  
This is also the case in the short poem ‘Romance’, from The Sophist: 
“I always assume performers are trying to make a cheap buck.” 
Fra Angelico spoke in a subdued tone, so as not be heard by Savonarola. A 
troupe of acrobats was attempting to gather a crowd in the courtyard in front 
of the monastery and the saintly fresco maker was dispirited. “Just a few more 
days and I will be on holiday in Tuscany.” The holy man particularly looked 
forward to the goose, a specialty of the kitchens of the Baron de R with whom 
he spent each August (58).   
This comic, anachronistic and impossible (if all too familiar) scene details an 
imaginary non-encounter between the painter Fra Angelico (1395- 1452) and the 
radical preacher Girolamo Savonarola (1452 - 1498) ahead of the painter’s visit to 
(presumably) the Baron de Rothschild, the first of which dynasty was not made Baron 
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by the Austrian Emporer until 1816.  Sovonarola was a preacher who attempted to rid 
Florence of corruption and provide fairness for the poor, while Fra Angelico was a 
hugely successful painter responsible for Renaissance masterpieces such as the 
Altarpiece for San Marco’s under the patronage of Cosimo Di Medici. What is it 
about ‘performance’ that so dispirits the hypocritical Fra Angelico? What is it about 
art as performance and art as conditioned by economics and embroiled in the greasy 
world of business that upsets him? On the one hand Bernstein suggests it is simply 
snobbery, but on the other, Fra Angelico functions in the poem as a parody of the sort 
of artist who believes that art is sacred, refined and elevated and doesn’t belong in the 
public square. As art historian Michael Baxandall has demonstrated in his study of the 
social history of fifteenth century Italian painting, Fra Angelico’s art was just as 
compromised by its place within the performance of economic transactions as the 
acrobats he maligns. The only difference being the transaction of patronage that funds 
Fra Angelico’s lifestyle takes place behind closed doors in Tuscan summer villas. The 
potency of the acrobatic troupe to irritate, therefore, lies precisely in their situation 
with “the courtyard”, their openness about the transaction and their openness that they 
are acting performative roles conditioned by social circumstance. 
Alongside debates surrounding the performance and sounding of poetry in 
public readings, Bernstein’s work is also concerned with theatricality and 
performance more generally. This is particularly the case in regard to With Strings, a 
book whose title refers to at least three forms of performance: the strings of a musical 
instrument, the strings of a puppet or acrobat, and a histrionic imperative to sound the 
violins. However, this title also ironically refers to the act of “selling out”, or of 
having one’s art altered as it gains increasing popularity. The reference is to legendary 
jazz musician Charlie Parker’s 1950 album Charlie Parker with Strings, released by 
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Mercury Records. The album was Parker’s most commercially successful by far. 
However, as Jazz critic Carl Woideck has noted, it was controversial among some 
existing fans, who saw Parker as “selling out”. Parker, however, saw things 
differently: “Parker loved American popular song and was proud of his recordings 
‘with strings’: ‘When I recorded with strings, some of my friends said, ‘oh, Bird is 
getting commercial.’ That wasn’t it at all. I was looking for new ways of saying things 
musically. New sound combinations” (189). However, since Parker’s release of ‘with 
strings’, that phrase has become shorthand for a more commercial record by an 
outsider musician. Given that With Strings was Bernstein’s first book of poems from 
the mainstream University of Chicago Press, he is clearly preparing himself and 
ironically pre-empting the suggestion of commercialization. A key element of 
Parker’s strings sessions was performance, as Dizzy Gillespie remarked: “we’d stress 
entertainment. Every time we went on a stage, it would be just like a show. We’d 
make people think that we like what we are doing.” (Woideck, 190). Dizzy and Bird’s 
legendary performances were acrobatic, dramatic and exhilarating; experimental, 
accessible and difficult all at once. By titling his book With Strings, Bernstein is 
envisaging a commitment to experimental language use that does create “new sound 
combinations.” Bee’s cover, entitled ‘Penny Serenade’ (1985), shows a man and a 
woman sitting on opposing high-rise window sills, reaching dangerously out towards 
each other over a chasm. Between them, a line of laundry that might at a pinch look 
like acrobats dancing from a tight rope, the t-shirts flopping elegantly over the line. In 
the next section, I consider the ways in which Bernstein conceives of the poem (and 
the poetry book) as an arena for linguistic acrobatics and sophistic gymnastics of the 
sort Consigny describes in reference to Gorgias as “artificial figuration” (167).  
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5. III. Linguistic Acrobatics 
 
In The Marginalization of Poetry, language poet and critic Bob Perelman analyses the 
title of Bernstein’s 1992 volume of essays and criticism A Poetics. He notes how in a 
frontispiece to the book the title is rendered equally spaced and uncapitalised as 
“apoetics”. He goes on to read this as an instance of “nonhierarchical typography (no 
capitals, no word boundaries)” which constitutes “a small sample of the radically 
democratic poetry Bernstein is arguing for, a poetry not governable by a normative 
poetics, a poetry that would itself constitute an apoetics” (80). There’s a further 
resonance to that rendering of Bernstein’s title, though: the phonetic similarity to the 
word “acrobatics” which is a productive analogue for how a poem is conceived in 
Bernstein’s work. In the final section of this chapter, I intend to look closely at how 
various notions concerning acrobatics perform within Bernstein’s poetry and prose.  
In sophistic rhetoric, apostaseis and prosbolai are words referring to the 
rhetorical devices of sudden breaks and transitionary moves (Dillon, 45). In 
Bernstein’s poetry and critical writings, these concepts are useful ones to bear in mind 
when addressing the rhetorical rhythms of his poems, which frequently progress using 
precisely this method of chasms and leaps.  In ‘Revenge of the Poet-Critic’, Bernstein 
suggests this device when he conceives of a “modular essay” form:  
One thing I am proposing is a modular essay form that allows for big jumps 
from paragraph to paragraph and section to section. In such essays, it becomes 
possible to recombine the paragraphs to get another version of the essay- since 
the “argument” is not dependent on the linear sequence” (1999, 7).  
In a number of essays, not least ‘Revenge of the Poet Critic’ itself, Bernstein has 
produced exactly this sort of modular form of essay in which the reader is encouraged 
	   212	  
to make leaps and maneuvers in order to read the text across multiple planes and 
trains of thought (trains that cross tracks and change platforms at the very last 
minute.) This modular form can be clearly related to the procedures that Dillon 
characterizes with the sophistic rhetorical terms “apostaseis and prosbolai”. Essays 
such as ‘Revenge of the Poet-Critic’ digress and morph from poem to prose, from 
topic to topic, circling around multiple essay topics and registers, resisting cohering 
into one logical or discursive essay. His opening paragraph engages seemingly 
multiple speakers in a kind of confused and confusing conversational dialogue: 
“Thank-you Senator Exxon the open spaces round here were scaring me, how many 
syllables can you fit on the head of a pin cushion? what’s that spell Mario? who are 
you calling a verse? That’s not what I meant y’all, not what I meant at all” (3). This 
raucous and exuberant, conversational and rapidly shifting, prose is not what one 
would expect from the opening to a critical essay. Eschewing the conventions of 
expository academic prose, Bernstein ignites the essay in the sorts of critical and 
creative uses of language that the essay itself advocates. The phrase “who are you 
calling a verse?” anticipates criticism of Bernstein’s essay that it isn’t a piece of 
criticism but a poem, meanwhile also playing on the sense of “a verse” as “averse”, 
what Stanley Cavell has termed, in reference to Emerson: “aversive thinking” (1990, 
33). Indeed, Emerson and Cavell are perhaps two of the greatest influences in 
American criticism and philosophy for exactly the sort of generic cross-over of 
literary or poetic writing into criticism that Bernstein’s essay characterizes under the 
term “poet-critic”. It’s a term that would certainly fit Emerson and that could also be 
claimed suitable for Cavell. As Cavell remarks, Emerson’s style of philosophizing 
“can sound to philosophical ears” “generally impertinent” (33). This characterization 
could (multiplied many times over) be leveled at Bernstein’s dramatically swaying 
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postures adopted in ‘Revenge of the Poet-Critic’. Indeed, the same suggestion of 
impertinence, of not conducting philosophy in the proper manner, can be identified in 
Plato and Aristotle’s dismissal of the sophists, and in particular their criticisms of 
eristic as an irritatingly argumentative and duplicitous method (Schreiber, 2), and 
more generally of their style as “too poetic” (Consigny, 165). However, as Michael 
Gagarin has pointed out, the stylistic innovations of the sophists went hand in hand 
with their philosophical content: “conscious divergences from traditional prose style 
went hand in hand with the rejection of traditional beliefs. New ideas and new styles 
of writing are related features of the sophists’ achievements” (18). The same can be 
said of Emerson, Bernstein and, indeed, Cavell. About his own literary style and its 
relation to his philosophical ideas, Cavell has remarked:  
It may help to say that while I may leave ideas in what may seem a more 
literary state, sometimes a more psychoanalytic state, than a philosopher might 
wish – that is, that a philosopher might prefer a further philosophical 
derivation of the ideas – I mean to leave everything I say, or have, I guess, 
ever said, as in a sense provisional, the sense that it is to be gone on from (33). 
The hesitative qualifiers with which this sentence abounds, the reluctant 
postponement of completion of the idea being communicated is in itself an example 
of Cavell’s literary style, communicating syntactically through the multiplicity of 
clauses the ‘provisional’ light in which he sees his work. Similarly, the ‘a versive’ 
mode of prose writing in ‘Revenge of the Poet Critic’ also embodies certain values of 
Bernstein’s critical writing, presented through the style and construction of his text as 
much as through a traditional and direct reading of his essay. The rapid cuts between 
prose and verse, the dramatic fluctuations in register and tone, (“apostaseis and 
prosbolai”), all these elements combine to create a sense of multiplicity and 
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polyvocality: communicating multiple ideas at once and resisting a sense of totality or 
universality of meaning and understanding. The title of the essay, ‘Revenge of the 
Poet-Critic’, suggests possible forebears for precisely such a project: the sophists.  
Writing of Gorgias, Consigny goes even further, claiming that for the sophist “it is 
only if we are able to escape the chains of reason, smashing the transparent vial of 
prose, that we will be able to experience life in its truest intensity and “reality”, 
becoming one with the irrational flux of Becoming” (154). In this reckoning, the 
resitance and aversion to the logical and univocal styles of prose is essential to enter a 
wilder and more transgessive sphere where a sense of ‘transition’, “flux” and 
“becoming” is prioritized over ‘certainty’ and ‘truth’. This description of a state of 
“becoming” bears comparison to the concept of ‘natality’ that haunts the writings of 
the political theorist and philosopher Hannah Arendt. As Anne O’Byrne has noted, 
Arendt’s own writing employs the fragment and the lacunae, to be bridged by a 
“tiger’s leap” (78), in which “those tensions are precisely what keep the thought in 
motion, what keep it alive and keep us returning to it, not so much in search of an 
ontology or a political theory, but in order to keep our own thinking on all these 
topics moving and to constantly challenge any view that shows signs of congealing 
into dogma” (78). By doing so, Arendt’s text enacts its own sense of ‘natality’, 
resisting finitude through her embrace of a fragmentary and elusive style. Arendt’s 
concept of natality is one in which “political action, like all strictly political 
phenomena is bound up with human plurality, which is one of the fundamental 
conditions of human life insofar as it rests on the concept of natality, through which 
the human world is constantly invaded by strangers” (Kristeva, 25). This conception 
of a constant “becoming” or “natality” as a trace of “human plurality”, the possibility 
inherent in the constant state of birth in which humans live, translates within Arendt’s 
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prose into the styles that O’Byrne describes. The same sense of strangeness and of 
plurality can be detected in Bernstein’s own essay-style, where the significance of his 
diverse and creatively launched assaults on expository prose styles can be understood 
in relation to his remark that “you can’t fully critique the dominant culture if you are 
confined to the forms through which it reproduces itself” (4). The suggestion is that, 
like Gorgias, writing in non-normative and non-prosaic ways offers a way to step 
outside the conventions through which the “dominant culture” sees itself and 
sanctions, i.e. expository, measured discursive prose. Indeed, the sense of ‘natality’ or 
“becoming” within Bernstein’s own poetry is perhaps most clearly illustrated by his 
comic send-up of that most contemporary irritation, the electronic download: 
Poem loading… 
please wait (2013) 
 A poem is always “loading”, always in the process of becoming and never finished or 
exhausted. A poem is also “loading” in the sense of continually taking on further 
intertextualities and contexts, which are continually being loaded onto and into the 
poem at every instance of its encounter. By using the corporate language of computer 
software (a form of language use that has become so ingrained and familiar it is 
hardly noticed), Bernstein also highlights another aspect of Arendt’s sense of 
‘natality’ that is relevant to his essay style. In Arendt’s writing, being born is equated 
with becoming public, moving into the public sphere, just as “loading” onto the 
internet might stand in for that sphere in today’s culture, where Twitter and other 
social media forums could be seen as arguably the equivalent space of an agora in 
today’s political climate, even if they are only rarely used as such. Bernstein’s 
writings engage a sense of the public sphere frequently, for example, in the way that 
in ‘Revenge of the Poet-Critic’, he addresses “Senator Exxon”, simultaneously 
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situating his essay with matters of global capitalist politics.  By doing so, Bernstein’s 
essay orients itself as more than a piece of writing about poetry, rather it inscribes a 
sense of poetic activity (and linguistic experimentation) as something that can be 
integral to a social and political engagement, a critical or “a verse” relation to political 
structures. This sense of linguistic experimentation as a form of being public and 
oriented towards being part of the public sphere, as a direct point of origin in 
sophistics, in the agora as the arena of innovative linguistic utterance. In this arena, as 
Gagarin had remarked, the most “extreme style” of linguistic experimentation 
belonged to Gorgias. 
In his description of Gorgias’s use of paratropes in his language performances, 
Consigny writes vividly about Gorgias’s writing style in terms that foreground his 
value as an experimental writer of language-centered text: 
Several of Gorgias’s tropes are paratropic in respect to sound, such as 
alliteration, assonance, rhyme and repeated clauses in order to create echoes 
both in his own text and in other texts. Through the use of these figures, 
Gorgias constructs an elaborate system of sounds, syllables, words and clauses 
that echo among themselves; and in so doing, he shows how he is able to 
create new meanings from words themselves, whereby the figures generate a 
web of allusions and interactions between the words and sounds. In this 
manner, Gorgias creates new meanings by repetition, draws connections 
between words and ideas not previously noticed and shows that readers may 
create new meanings with every new reading (177). 
While there is much in this description of Gorgias’s writing practice that sets him up 
as a useful progenitor for language-centered writing, the focus of this section of my 
argument is going to be on what Consigny refers to as “words and clauses that echo 
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among themselves”, i.e. the ability of Bernstein’s text to use a charged surface of 
tropes and paratropes in a form that allows for the echoing acrobatics of play. 
Similarly Consigny’s phrase “a web of allusions and interactions between the words 
and sounds” also stresses the importance within his work (and I argue Bernstein’s) of 
both sonic and semantic interpretative procedures when reading the work. Consigny 
further suggests that Gorgias’s employment of just these kinds of devices allows his 
texts/ performances to admit of multi-vocal and pluralistic possibilities. Rather than a 
single strand of argument or logic, Gorgias’s acrobatic textual procedures manifest 
multiple strands of interpretation, meaning and relative rather than verifiable truth: 
Gorgias not only embraces the irrationalist, mythic worldview of the poets, but 
he iterates their antithetical speech, repudiating the notion that literal, 
unequivocal discourse affords an avenue to truth (156).  
The figure of the acrobat is an important one in Bernstein’s poetry. It seems to 
stand for the elements of “risk” and “performance” that are critical to Bernstein’s 
aesthetics. One of the main criticisms of language poetry has been that it dissolves 
into a conservative and ethics-less fragmentation. Detractors of language writing, 
such as the critic Frederic Jameson, have criticized them in just these terms. As 
Jeffrey T. Nealon writes, “For Jameson, language poetry’s paratactic aesthetic of 
fragmentation cannot help but be reactionary because it simply mimics and thereby 
upholds the fragmentation and apathetic endlessness promoted by the bourgeois 
ideology of late capitalism” (147). However, the figure of the acrobat transcends the 
notion of mere “free play”. An acrobat has to be precise, exact and responsible at all 
times, even if the end result looks like “play”. In his study of language poetry, the 
critic David Arnold traces a line of origin to surrealist writing. Studying a passage 
from Breton, he alights on a sense of language as involving “acrobatic display, 
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language appears to be departing its subject and giving way to deferred action” (28). 
This phrasing suggests what it is about the agility and acrobatic that can be considered 
to form an analogy for writing that is at the experimental cutting edge. Arnold’s 
suggestion is that the acrobatic effaces “subject”, i.e. identity for a representation and 
exploration of what can physically be achieved in “action”.   The image of the acrobat 
that is being suggested here by Arnold’s use of the word “action” is an acrobat of 
practice, in the sense that Peter Sloterdijk writes of “the practicing aspect of human 
existence” (2013, 16). In The Art of Philosophy, Sloterdijk advances a sense of the 
acrobat as an analogy for human existence where our actions on a daily basis are 
informed by “training” and “practice”: “in every performance of practicing, an action 
is carried out in such a way that its present execution co-conditions its later 
execution” (16). This is to state that a fundamental aspect of human existence is 
repetition and learnt actions through training that we are barely aware of. If this is so, 
then it is a linguistic process, as the basis through which our consciousness 
experiences the conditions of existence. As Sloterdijk remarks:  
We could say that all life is acrobatics, though we perceive only the smallest 
part of our vital expressions as what they really are: the results of practice and 
elements of a modus vivendi that happens on the high wire of improbability 
(16).  
Sloterdijk’s characterization is significant. If all life is “acrobatics”, then we achieve 
seemingly impossible and baffling feats, we advance our conceptions through 
“practice” and “training”. However, this training also becomes ‘routine’. The acrobat 
performs the same activity each evening until it becomes ‘natural’ and in a sense no 
longer, for the acrobat, “acrobatic”, though it retains this sense for the audience. This 
could be taken to be the situation vis-à-vis language use (and correlating in 
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democratic politics) in contemporary societies. Language use has become so practiced 
and so routine that it is no longer recognized as the acrobatic activity that it is: 
creating meaning and communicating with each other. Similarly, the acrobatic 
process of engaging with a democratic political system. Once that becomes routine 
and overly well-practiced, it becomes entrenched and complacent as a value system 
that potentially no longer represents the values of the society that sanctions it. 
Naturally, when an acrobat becomes complacent, they put themselves in danger and 
for an acrobat to be at his best they are required to be both well-practiced and alert. In 
‘5 for MP’, Bernstein writes “myriad acrobatic rusts”, the word “rusts” suggesting 
just this tendency for acrobatics by rote becoming stale and falling apart. Poetry and 
poet-criticism of the sort that Bernstein advocates in ‘Revenge of the Poet-Critic’ 
therefore introduces alternate modes of language use and linguistic acrobatics to 
remind the reader that language and communication are acrobat’s maneuvers that 
require attentiveness, not complacency. Thus, Bernstein’s poetry manifests a multi-
faceted and multi-perspectival surface over which the reader is asked to swing 
acrobatically, resisting what John Dewey called “habits” that “reduce themselves to 
routine ways of acting, or degenerate into ways of acting which are enslaved just in 
the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them” (1976, 9:54) 
One example of a textual surface that demands an acrobatic reading 
performance is Bernstein’s poem ‘with strings’, produced for a collaboration with the 
post-minimalist artist Richard Tuttle for the exhibition Poetry Plastique, curated by 
Bernstein and Jay Sanders for Marianne Boesky Gallery in New York in 2001. The 
full text of the poem is quoted below:  
with strings 
                                         asmall(orlarge)machinemadeofwords-wcw 














      
This poem was presented in 3 dimensional form as a twisting copper tubing spiral 
sculpture rising from a terracotta pot base. The foam letters of the first line of the 
poem were threaded on to the copper tubing, and around each letter the entirety of the 
poem was also pasted. The terracotta pot that is the base of the poem/sculpture 
contained strips of paper with the lines of the poem on them. The piece enacts a 
dynamic of its component parts: each individual letter of the poem also contains the 
entire poem. As such, the poem performs the relation of the individual to community 
discussed in chapter 3, while also pointing towards a reading method that is at once 
caught between isolated details and abstracted totality. This presentation of the poem 
demands a reading that overtly criss-cosses the text, reading the poem “in the round”, 
by circumnavigating the sculpture and attempting to read the strips of paper within the 
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base. With the letters arranged in this physical and material presence, they invite a 
reading across all planes. While observing the physical sculpture, the letters intersect 
each other both vertically and horizontally. For example: the letter “I” is diagonally 
adjacent to the letter “s”, creating the word “is” and the later “m” is above the letters 
“as” to create the Spanish word “mas”, meaning “more”. A further interplay of the 
letters is in the shadows they cast on the gallery floor, which creates its own, secret 
poem made of words that are difficult to figure out. While heightened in the sculptural 
realization of the poem, this manner of active reading is manifest within the textual 
version of the poem itself. By running the words of the poem into each other without 
spaces, Bernstein asks for an active reading approach in the relatively easy task of 
deciphering the words within the long strings of the poem’s lines. However, this 
initial active engagement awakens curiousity and attentiveness, and once this is 
ignited, there are multiple mini-discoveries for the reader to make: for example, the 
word “uspo” (a contraction perhaps of a communal poetics) can be read from inside 
the phrase “cuspofwisp”. This creative, dexterous method of reading is self-
generating, with each discovery echoing of the other letters and words within the text 
to create still others. For example, by reading the word “uspo” in “cuspofwisp”, the 
reader in turn releases the onomatopoeic neologism “fwisp” from the word that would 
logically follow “uspo”. The phrase “I’manangle” from the seventh line of the poem 
gestures towards the word “mangle”, especially in light of the creative reading 
methods established by the poem. However, an attentiveness to the image also 
suggests a human figure as an “angle”- a trapeze artist wobbling delicately at a 
seemingly impossible angle from the rope. Is this to be read as a metaphor for the 
poet’s tangential relation to the poem, a description of the acrobats’ literal acuteness 
to a high wire or a more general description for aversive strategies altogether?  Or is it 
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a mistake- a clown’s comedy act: should that be a desperate plea or crazed assertion- 
“I’m an angel”?     
‘with strings’ foregrounds the act of reading itself, of having a physical 
encounter with the text. It dramatizes the all-roundedness of texts and their resistance 
to totalized intelligibility. It demands heightened attention to all the ways in which 
texts make meaning and meaning can be made from texts. The critic Craig Dworkin 
has interpreted Bernstein’s early sequence Veil (1987) in a similar way, stressing the 
demands the texts put on the reader for “physical decipherment” (54). This early 
sequence consists of overtyped poems, where the words obscure and intermingle with 
each other in numerous layers to form a wire mesh and weave of language. Dworkin 
characterizes these as having “an astonishing depth of texture and three 
dimensionality”: 
Indeed, the experience of reading is worth insisting on; whatever their initial 
impressions, the poems in Veil are surprising less for their illegibility than for 
their ultimate intelligibility. With patience and concentration, almost all the 
text can be deciphered, if only bit by bit, so that Bernstein’s palimpsests do 
not so much prevent reading as redirect and discipline usual reading habits. 
(53) 
‘with strings’ puts similar demands on the reader, both when presented as a three 
dimensional sculpture and as a text on the page. In either case, the reader becomes 
embroiled in a circus of acrobatic procedures in order to produce a meaningful 
reading from the text. As Dworkin notes, both Veils and ‘with strings’ “redirect and 
discipline usual reading habits”. As texts, they require an unusual approach on the 
part of the reader, they refocus attention and demand concentration in ways that are 
different to those normally brought to the reading process. As such, they are examples 
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of “practice” of the sort that Sloterdijk suggests we continually engage in in our lives. 
By awakening this renewed focus onto the way reading is conducted, Bernstein’s 
texts break the spell of dangerous complacency and instead encourage the reader to be 
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5. IV. “Canned laughter/ is white noise”3– Kairos and Kynicism in Bernstein’s 
poetry and poetics  
 
Bernstein is often referred to as a comedic poet. The New Anthology of American 
Poetry has described his texts as “frequently hilarious” (401). Brian Reed has noted 
Bernstein’s “debts to Groucho Marx, Allan Sherman and Lenny Bruce”. Jerome 
McGann has remarked that “Bernstein’s poetry turns out, as a result, a kind of 
comedy of errors, with the reader (we are many) playing the principal role(s). 
American traditions of screwball comedy – the Marx brothers, Laurel and Hardy – 
have had a deep influence on his work.” (111) The novelist Paul Auster has even gone 
so far as to remark that “at times, Charles Bernstein reminds me of a stand-up comic 
performing for the late night crowd at a Borscht Belt hotel, booked in for a two week 
run and never performing the same material twice” (34). These assessments are borne 
out in relation to Bernstein’s own critical writings and interviews, in which he has 
frequently cited influence from comedians, including those mentioned above, and the 
rhythms and poetics of comedy in general on his work. For example, as he puts it, his 
writing has its origins in “a synthesis of the three Marxes (Chico, Karl and Groucho) 
and the four Williamses (Raymond, William Carlos and Esther)” (228). The elision of 
comedy, politics, performance and poetics represented by these self-acclaimed 
forbears is useful in considering the different strands of Bernstein’s poetics of comedy 
and how they come together (and fall apart laughing).  That Bernstein’s work has 
frequently been cited as such suggests that it is, in fact, comic. However, there are 
different kinds of laughter and it’s important to diagnose the ways in which 
Bernstein’s poetry does and doesn’t constitute comedy. By doing so the aim is to 
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assert the centrality of comedy to Bernstein’s poetics, even when they aren’t 
necessarily laugh-out-loud, to consider that the comic is as vital to Bernstein’s 
thinking both when he is and when he isn’t “hilarious”. The critic Giles Gunn has 
remarked of Kenneth Burke (a writer whose own pragmatism bears an extensive debt 
to the sophists) that:  
To deprieve Burke of his jokes, his puns, his sly winks, to say nothing of his 
burlesques of the serious and his parodies of the banal, is to deprieve him of 
much of the machinery that makes his thinking radically critical and his 
criticism radically social and political (1987, 80).  
This section suggests that the same claim might equally be made for the poetry and 
poetics of Charles Bernstein.   
Bernstein’s writing isn’t, generally, ‘amusing’, ‘amuse’ seeming at once both 
too restricted and too banal a word. After all, at times, Bernstein’s poetry is not 
humorous at all; it is too baffling, frustrating and difficult to illicit a laugh, the 
onslaught of different registers and voices too much to digest or deal with. However, 
not to disagree with the New Anthology of American Poetry, his poems are 
“frequently hilarious” (401). The distinction between “hilarious” and “amusing” is 
analogous to that made by the critic Debra Diane Davis when she draws on a remark 
by Milan Kundera to assert that “a face [but also a text and/or a techne] contorted in 
laughter has never been considered beautiful or sublime… What we find appreciable 
is the stability of the knowing smile and/or the controlled chuckle” (2). There is a 
form of laughter that is allied to “stability” and there is a form of laughter that is a 
destabilizing force. ‘Amusing’ is the “controlled chuckle” and the “knowing smile” 
that re-inforce stability. ‘Hilarious’ is the out of control and excessive belly laugh- the 
laugh that upsets and that might even lead to tears. There is nothing “controlled” 
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about the humour in Bernstein’s “hilarious” and “histrionic” texts. The laughter of 
Bernstein’s poetry is generated precisely from the unexpected veers and directions 
that he is prepared to allow the poem to go in. The laughter can stem from discomfort 
and uncertainty and can certainly provoke the same reactions. Bernstein’s humour is 
in the excesses he admits to the poem, which results not so much in an expansion of 
the poetic field but a hacking up and hacking over of the surface.  For example, in the 




I sa%w yo%r pixture on 
wehb si;t; no.t su%re 
whhc one & w-ant to 
tal^k or mee.t ver-y so.on 
I am old ma%n 57 year$ 
ba%d tooth and sme.ll 
ma.ke vr,ry hr.d t mee%t 
people. I a,m wr$iter 
wr$ite po%re%y  
The rough, contorted surface of the poem, as though it has been jumbled in 
transmission enacts a dynamic of having to decipher or translate the poem. It isn’t 
difficult to do and yet the increased awareness to the text is itself something of a joke, 
mimicking and parodying the sort of language that wouldn’t even be received in the 
inbox, would go straight to the spam folder with any half decent filter program. 
However, Bernstein’s poetics doesn’t have a spam filter, it admits all language uses, 
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the more bizarre and jumbled the better, the more interesting. Bernstein’s humour is 
clearly at work in his insertion of a dollar sign in the word “wr$iter” (!) and in his 
rendering of poetry as “po%re%y”, suggesting poetry as a percentage game (never 
complete and always “porey”, or in its more conventional version, porous). His poem 
also suggests that the room for effective communication is not controlled or governed 
by normative procedures of grammar and spelling. This e-poem barely follows any of 
the normative procedures of spelling, and yet it is fairly easy to create meanings from 
it, meanings which the interjections of inappropriate symbols and punctuation merely 
accentuate rather than destroy. The strangeness of the poem’s surface in effect 
provides that slight alteration that encourage the reader to perform their acrobatics, 
the percentage signs perhaps mimicking gymnasts’ hoops.  
In the introduction to her book Breaking up (at) Totality: A Rhetoric of 
Laughter Davis describes a bizarre catalogue of object classifications from Borges 
and remarks “the “shattering laughter” sparked in this “wonder filled” instant is not 
(only) the laughter that Aristotle attributes to Gorgias, the laughter that opposes 
meaninglessness to meaning (On Rhetoric 3.18). It’s a laughter that shatters what 
Jacques Derrida calls the very “fabric of meaning” (From Restricted 259) through 
which the notion of meaninglessness becomes meaningful, through which 
meaninglessness comes to operate as the dirty underside (the negated) of meaning (or, 
in Gorgias’s case, vice versa)” (2). This sort of laughter, part amazement and wonder, 
part absurdity and resistance, “exposes an/other way of seeing” and “exposes the 
excess flying around, that overflow for which any one system of thought will have 
been unable to account” (2). This potential of laughter to “expose an/other way of 
seeing”, i.e. to open up another perspective or way of being in the world is critical to 
the way that comedy operates within Bernstein’s poetics. A laugh in Bernstein’s 
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poetry is frequently as a result of a bizarre and unexpected turn of phrase. For 
example:   
The Laughter-in-language proliferates meaning rather than fixating it; it has 
the tendency to disrupt any techne and to seduce us as it tropes. To be spoken 
by a language contorted in laughter is to be spoken by a language on the loose, 
a schizoid language, capable of hailing into being only sssplintered 
subjectivities (19).  
Davis roots her study of the rhetorical and philosophical role of laughter in the 
writings of Gorgias, and in particular the notion of “kairos”. “Kairos” is a disputed 
term and has been the focus of extensive study in recent years by scholars interested 
in sophistic rhetoric. Thomas Rickert has located the origin of the term in 
Philostratus’ account of Gorgias’s claim that he could speak knowledgeably and 
convincingly on any subject: “Entering a theater of Athenians, he recounts, Gorgias 
had the boldness to say ‘suggest a subject,’ and he was the first to proclaim himself 
willing to take this chance, showing apparently that he knew everything and would 
trust to the moment (toi kairoi) to speak on any subject” (90). According to Rickert, 
Plato’s reading of this is simply as “boastful” (90). However, there are other critics, 
such as Victor Vitanza, Bernard Miller and Mario Untersteiner, who have suggested 
that rather than a display of Gorgias’s control and faculties for impressively 
discoursing on any subject, rather, “kairos” is concerned with being ‘out of control’, 
of subjecting oneself to chance and fortuities within language (to the moment). As 
Rickert puts it, for these critics, Gorgian kairos is a way of “abandoning the 
subject/object dichotomy” (90) and that rather the “kairos of a situation is a moment 
placed not as something between a subject and an exterior situation but as mutually 
involved and evolving vectors of material and discursive force” (90). By this reading, 
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‘kairos’ is the acknowledgement of our lack of control over the words we use, an 
expression of the limits of language as something that can be manipulated by an 
individual and rather a conception of language as something that is shared, 
participatory and always changing dependent on “material and discursive force”. By 
putting himself within a theater and claiming that he will talk on any subject, 
Gorgias’s performance can be seen as an experimental language performance in 
which, his linguistic and logical capacities would be tested to their utmost: a kind of 
proto-version of Just a Minute. And just as the performers on the Radio 4 game find 
out, when your powers of eloquence and invention get tested and the human mind 
finds itself creating nonsense in order to keep talking, the result is very often 
humorous. For Davis, therefore, with its basis in a lack of control of language and 
logic, “kairos” describes a moment of comedy, i.e. a moment when rational discourse 
is interrupted and transgressed by the intrusion of something unexpected, anti-logical 
and absurd: “The kairotic moment names that instant when our meaning-making is, in 
a flash, exposed as an operation inscribed in, rather than opposed to, play” (27). An 
example of this sort of moment is represented within Davis’s discussion of Gorgias 
and his ‘Encomium of Helen’. In this text, Gorgias describes how Helen is faced with 
a breakdown in logic, i.e. an arbitrary decision of either going to Troy or not going to 
Troy and the logic of the situation doesn’t enable her to choose an option that would 
save her. This is a kairotic moment because it is a moment when, as Davis notes, 
Helen loses control and ceases to become “the master of her destiny” and “the author 
of her/story” (27). Instead, an “extralogical force” comes into play. Within Gorgias’s 
text, too, kairos is at work because through his elaborate defence of Helen, he exposes 
the art of persuasively logical discourse to ridicule, overturning the widely held ‘truth’ 
that Helen’s actions in going to Troy are reprehensible. As John Poulokos has written, 
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the Encomium “trusts to make the case for the importance of kairos by reopening a 
seemingly settled account and introducing new ways of reasoning, ways leading to the 
formation of new beliefs” (95). This observation is interesting because it suggests that 
the kairotic moment is borne of a situation of logical or linguistic stalemate, where 
then kairos offers a new way of seeing or formulating something. In the Encomium, 
Gorgias is playing with logic and playing with language, demonstrating their inter-
reliance at the limits where it becomes impossible to distinguish enough between right 
and wrong to make any judgment on Helen’s culpability. It is precisely in this 
moment that Gorgias’s text achieves its comedy, its kairos- the moment when sense 
becomes indistinguishable from nonsense. As Davis makes clear, the distinction 
between logic and kairos is not as simple as it might at first seem, as logic itself is 
born from a kind of play. Kairos reveals itself to be the same as logic, only an inverse 
and mocking version that doesn’t purport to be more than a construction achieved 
through the play of generating meanings. This is what characterizes Gorgian anti-
logic. “Kairotic laughter arises not so much from the (rational) realm of meaning-
making but from the overriding (nonrational) realm of play, of excess, in which the 
phase of meaning-making is also situated.” (28) There is a paradox at the centre of 
this sentence. That the “realm of play” is both opposed to the “(rational) realm of 
meaning-making” and related to it through the interrelation of  “meaning-making” 
and “play” is an example of the ways in which “kairotic laughter” is able to resist the 
norms of conventional exposition and logic. The power of kairos is in its ability to 
expose the “play” and the performances that define even our most logical or stable 
modes of discourse.  
Bernstein has himself conducted a Gorgian Kairotic happening or 
performance, as he describes in a note to the poem ‘Talk to Me’: “On April 18, 1999, 
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I performed this improvised poem as part of Deb Singer’s ‘Impulsive Behaviour’ 
series at the Whitney Museum’s Philip Morris Space. Also on the bill that night were 
Edwin Torres and Bruce Andrews performing with Sally Silvers.” By composing a 
poem ‘live’ in this way, Bernstein treats the poem as something like a jazz 
improvisation, riffing off the people in the room and the other performances of the 
evening. One interesting aspect of the poem is that it involves a kind of kairotic 
breakdown of non-knowledge, in which ordinary chronic time is disrupted or 
suspended: “What time is it now? What time is it NOW? What TIME is it NOW? 
WHAT time IS IT now?” (17) In the course of the poem, Bernstein makes it clear that 
his ordinary mode of writing poetry is not improvisational, that when he writes he is 
attentive to the structures and organisations of words in a way that pure improvisation 
can sometimes hide. However, what is ultimately more striking is that the poem itself 
reveals that that very idea of “improvisation” is an illusion, as whether working on the 
spot or in a much more planned fashion, the mind is constantly planning and 
arranging words. What is revealed in ‘Talk to Me’ is that the idea of “off the cuff” 
inspiration/ improvisation as something generated directly from the poet to the 
audience is a fallacy and that improvised poetry, as with all forms of writing and 
thinking, is a matter of responding, playing and re-arranging language. Therefore, the 
poem itself proceeds in an overtly constructed way using interlinked motifs: Bernstein 
in dialogue with a talking watch; the shuffling and varying repetition of a number of 
lines; a narrative of email-discussions with the Yugoslavian poet Dubravka Djuric; an 
irate instruction to “Go back stay back way back”. These different threads are woven 
together in an overtly constructed and organized way, in spite of the poem’s 
improvised form. For example, there is an anecdote about not being able to get the 
reverse clutch to work in a car that he drove with the poet and editor James Sherry 
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from Vienna to Belgrade: “We were in a parking space and yet couldn’t get out of 
there.” This anecdote clearly resonates with the echoing voice that intones “Go back” 
throughout the poem, as well as the discussion of Dubravka Djuric’s emailed 
questions about some lines of Robert Duncan. The poem is self-reflexive and aware 
of these ordering processes that are occurring even when utilizing the spontaneity of 
improvisation. Rather than approaching a use of “language” without structure, the 
improvised form in fact highlights the formal and structural processes that underpin 
all of our language uses:      
- Now  
those are 
some of the elements 
that might go 
into a poem 
but in a poem I’d 
disperse and  
reorganize them 
in a way 
that would not 
have the same 
kind of, kind 
of rhythmic  
structure 
that I fall into 
when improvising (18) 
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In his study of ‘nonknowledge’ and in particular in the lecture 
‘Nonknowledge, Laughter and Tears’, Georges Bataille writes that:  
The unknown character of the laughable would not be accidental, but 
essential. We would laugh, not for a reason that we would not happen to 
know, for lack of information or for want of sufficient penetration, but 
because the unknown makes us laugh.  
In sum, it makes us laugh to pass very abruptly, all of a sudden, from a 
world in which each thing is well qualified, generally in a stable order, to a 
world in which our assurance is suddenly overthrown, in which we perceive 
that this assurance is deceptive, and where we believed that everything was 
strictly anticipated, an unforeseeable and upsetting element appeared 
unexpectedly from the unforeseeable, that reveals to us in sum a final truth: 
that superficial appearances conceal a perfect lack of response to our 
anticipation (135).  
It seems unlikely that the truly “unknown” would even register enough on our radars 
to “make us laugh”. However, as the art critic Louis Kaplan has written, Bataille’s 
statement “takes us to the point where thinking can no longer venture and where a 
burst of laughter exceeds or ruptures it” (103). Rather than the “unknown”, it is really 
the recognition of what might be termed ‘the unknowability of what we think we 
know’ that triggers a laughter-response. As such, Bataille’s statement enacts its own 
paradox and confusion, leading the reader to just such a moment at the fringes of 
logical thought. For a sophist whose goal (as expressed by Michell Balliff) is to assert 
“that language resists logic” (5), then this sort of comedy that is profoundly the realm 
of “nonknowledge” and which sets itself up precisely as the inverse of Platonic Truth, 
is an extremely powerful mode for Gorgias to adopt. As Kaplan remarks, Bataille puts 
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forward a case for a philosophy of “laughter that exceeds or ruptures any totalizing 
claims” (103). One aspect of ‘Kairos’ that Eric Charles White has drawn attention to 
in his book Kaironomia also makes it particularly suitable as a way of thinking about 
language poetry, suggesting “the flow of ” For these reasons, comedy has been an 
attractive mode for language poets, too, and Bernstein is by no means the only figure 
associated with language poetry to write in a way that might be termed comedic. The 
poet David Melnick’s PCOET is perhaps the purest expression of the poetic laughter 




 canoe  
it spear heieo 
 as Rea,   cinct pp  
pools we sly drosp 
 Geianto 
 (o sordea,   o weedsea!) (33)  
Melnick’s PCOET exists just on the cusp of non-knowledge and unpronounceability. 
Suggestively drawing to mind words and phrases with which we are familiar (“poet” 
in the title for instance, strangely modified by the bizarre insertion of the letter “c”), 
his language resists comprehension and triggers a slightly uneasy though also 
liberated laughter. When first confronted with this sort of text, the mind leaps towards 
those words that most closely resemble correctly spelled and familiar words, such as 
“spear”, “pools”, “sly”, and “canoe”, for example. However, very quickly, the 
proximity of these words and phrases to unfamiliar words such as “puilse”, “cinct pp” 
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liberates the reader from certainties about what even those words we are familiar with 
mean. By focusing attention on the sounds and structures of words and the relation of 
what we see on the page to the vocalization of those symbols, Melnick enacts a drama 
of signification, where the focus is on how words mean, rather than what specific 
words mean. Jerome McGann quotes the Canadian poet Steve McCaffery in a review 
from the London Review of Books as remarking of Melnick’s work that “it seems less 
like writing than incisions into the very surface of signification” (6). By the end of 
PCOET, these short lyric-sized bites have been distilled even further into one-word 
poems akin to those of minimalist poets such as Aram Saroyan and Robert Lax. 
However, Melnick’s one words are one non-words, such as “sofka” (83), “roubmt” 
(82) and “meom-a” (73). In these words, the focus is on the interplay of the letters 
within the words and how they resist or accommodate pronunciation. This interest in 
the sound of words and how we make meaning can also be seen in Melnick’s text 
Men in Aida, a homophonic translation of Homer’s The Odyssey. Melnick uses the 
Greek text to create a like-for-like sound translation of the poem from Greek to 
English. As our understanding of Greek soundings is limited, Melnick’s text is fluid 
and surprising, suggesting radical new possibilities for meaning generation based on 
sound. Untied from “knowledge” and liberated by a creative response to the sounds of 
the language, Melnick’s text veers outrageously towards the comic. The language 
poet Bob Perelman has described the resulting text as “a hyperbolic gay comedy” 
(24): “Horse fat. Eddie send ogre. Ron keep it at a moo, though. Bay dock yond pair a 
thin, a pole, a flow is boy oh the lass is”; “Ballet and a puree, neck you on guy on 
totem, may I?” In a discussion of Susan Howe’s poem ‘Pythagorean Silence’, the 
critic Gregory Dale Adamson has described how her work constitutes “noise” and 
“chatter” (113) against the purely logical and rational ideal of clarity and concision 
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that was practiced by the Pythagoreans.  By this definition, Melnick’s raucous, 
innuendo-laden and luxuriant texts are decidedly ‘noisy’, i.e. poetry with much sound 
going on, soundings that exceed or prioritise themselves above a direct and immediate 
sense of communication. The rhythms of his poetry are that of a heightened and 
intensified “chatter”, such as the excerpts quoted above, and the comedy value comes 
from the proximity of all the “chatter” to “noise”, to unknowability. It is this sense of 
“noise” and “laughter” that are present in Hejinian’s line with which this chapter is 
titled “canned laughter/ is white noise”. Laughter (esp. laughter related to artifice, i.e. 
“canned”) is “noise”, i.e. not easily reducible to a communication to be exchanged.   
The irreducibility of language-oriented texts such as PCOET and Men in Aida makes 
them essentially comic in and of themselves. As Lisa Trahair has noted in The 
Comedy of Philosophy: “Incomprehensibility is an essential feature of much comedy. 
To comprehend the comic, therefore, is to risk overlooking the structure of 
incomprehensibility that is crucial to its operation” (15). Similarly, Lucio Angelo 
Privitello has echoed and extended Bataille in describing “the non-knowledge of 
laughter, its inner experiment” (181). By this definition, linguistic “experiment” has 
itself the potential to provoke laughter because of its nearness to “non-knowledge” 
and pushing the boundaries of what we know as sense/ nonsense. This positioning of 
the poems on the cusp of laughable and infuriating non-knowledge is summed up by 
Melnick in a short note he wrote for the first issue of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E:    
What can such poems do for you? You are a spider strangling in your own 
web, suffocated by meaning. You asked to be freed by these poems from the 
intolerable burden of trying to understand. The world of meaning: is it too 
large for you? Too small? It doesn’t fit. Too bad. It’s no contest. You keep on 
trying. So do I (13). 
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In the essay ‘Comedy and the Politics of Poetic Form’, Bernstein sets out what 
he sees as the political implications of writing in a way that explores what Davis calls 
the “laughter-in-language”: 
Such poetic play does not open into a neat opposition of dry high irony and 
wet lyric expressiveness but, in contrast, collapses into a more destabilizing 
field of pathos, the ludicrous, schtick, sarcasm; a multidimensional textual 
field that is congenitally unable to maintain an evenness of surface tension or a 
flatness of affect, where linguistic shards of histrionic inappropriateness pierce 
the momentary calm of an obscure twist of phrase, before cantoring into the 
next available trope; less a shield than a probe (A Poetics, 220).  
Comedy at the level of language, then, is a disruption to dominant modes of discourse 
and a means of opening up alternatives. Indeed, in his essay on teaching practices 
‘Wreading, Writing, Wresponding’, Bernstein writes “laughter is the necessary yeast 
of good class conversation and opens up the possibility for listening and not just for 
hearing” (2011, 51). The same might be said for the position of laughter within his 
own poetics, it is something that opens up the potential for conversation and 
alternative modes of viewing and experiencing.  It is a means of undermining and 
exposing conventions that we take to be true or that profess themselves to be true. It is 
a means of removing the warrant from a “phallocratic voice of truth and sincerity” by 
revealing its register to be founded on “historical constructions rather than sovereign 
principles” (223). Bernstein’s phrase “histrionic inappropriateness” gives a clear idea 
of how he sees comedy as offering a way of “probing” the dominant modes of 
discourse. Suggesting excess, awkwardness and absurdity, it is through an ungainly, 
inelegant and wavering linguistic surface that the comic is able to reveal the fluidity 
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of all our mechanisms of thought, communication and government. Examples of 
“histrionic inappropriateness” abound in Bernstein’s poetry, in poems such as 
‘Freud’s Butcher’ from the pamphlet ‘The Nude Formalism’, co-produced with Susan 
Bee: 
Many folks are in a snit 
They say the new poetry’s not a kick 
They pout and pester from academic writing posts 
About emotions turned into ghosts of ghosts 
 
Hejinian, Silliman – the tide is over 
Andrews, McCaffery – abandon your mowers 
You’re before your time then out of date 
It’s not market forces nor fate (14) 
This poem, which was first published in American Poetry Review, uses the hackneyed 
rhythms and bad rhymes of doggerel verse combined with the “folksy” colloquialisms 
of strands of American poetry to create comic effect. As with the rhymes of writers 
such as William McGonagall, comic value comes from the inevitability of the 
plodding rhythm with the straining and struggling of the rhymes. Similarly to 
Melnick’s writing in this one respect, the words in ‘Freud’s Butcher’ appear to have 
been selected more on sound (their ability to rhyme and conform to the metre) than 
sense, hence the bizarre word-choice “abandon your mowers”. This is a process that 
Perloff has described as “syntactic slots are filled with words and phrases that fail to 
fit semantically but that are phonemically appropriate” (1990, 14). There is a comic 
element to this formal device in itself, the disjunction between semantic “nonsense” 
and sound-sense. Humour comes from the “mis-seaming” of ‘order’ and nonsense, of 
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following rules to absurd conclusions. However, this poem is also humorously 
“histrionic” and “inappropriate” in its self-reflexivity and conscious group formation 
(the references to language poets Lyn Hejinian, Ron Silliman, Bruce Andrews and 
Steve McCaffery). An irony of the poem is that it takes what might be considered an 
emotional and antagonistic stance towards a differing poetic style, while also 
suggesting that the critics see this sort of poem as emotionless. The concluding two 
stanzas of ‘Freud’s Butcher’ continue to explore rules and order in a discussion of 
Sigmund Freud’s eating habits (which are revealed as being kosher). The final couplet 
reads: “Art and religion don’t always agree/ The one’s by the rule, the other 
sometimes free”. 
Each page of ‘The Nude Formalism’ is designed individually with different 
typefaces and elaborate decorative borders and illustrations (by Bee). This lends the 
book multiple and evolving, ornate and excessive visual styles that marry with the 
similarly elaborate poetic diction of the poems: “Come with me and amble over the 
briars/ into the fog. It rests a flurry by the slide/ to make-b’lieve measure, harmless in 
the way/ a doormat lay, fifty more bestride” (20). This sort of poetic diction 
(fluctuating from mannered to colloquial, elaborately sounded to bathetically 
mundane) creates a highly comic poetic surface at the level of language itself, which 
plays out like a contortionist’s performance. The pamphlet begins with the mock-
manifesto ‘Fragments from the Seventeenth Manifesto of Nude Formalism’, among 
the tenets of which are “Down with all authentic formulations of these theses! Down 
with Adolescent Sublime! Down with Abstract Confessionalism! Down with 
Empathic Symbolism! Down with Symbolic Empathism!” and “Use absolutely no 
word that contributes to the sense of a thing seen.” Parodying the manifesto form, as 
well as the movement in American verse known as The New Formalism (which 
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advocates a return to rhymed and metred verse), Bernstein’s comic non-manifesto 
shares with that other classic of the genre, Frank O’Hara’s ‘Personism’, an 
irreverence and highly individualized sense of poetry’s tendency to take itself 
altogether too seriously at the same moment that it doesn’t take itself seriously 
enough. The poet Christian Bök has written on the Poetry Foundation website of ‘The 
Nude Formalism’ that Bernstein “has lampooned this attitude in his chapbook, which 
presents a suite of formal poetry, written nonsensically, like doggerel misremembered 
in the act of its recitation. Bernstein sets out to “denude” these poems of any content 
in order to showcase the aesthetic potential of such forms, once they have freed 
themselves from any semantic necessity.” Emptying the poems of identifiable 
semantic content (the poems remain semantically charged but in multiple and 
nonsensical ways), Bernstein enacts the “laughter of non-knowledge” by leaving the 
reader with extensively elaborate poetic diction that is ‘saying’, in the sense of 
directly communicating, nothing.  ‘The Nude Formalism’ is a language-experiment 
akin to Gorgias’s language performance where he states he can improvise speaking 
knowledgeably on any subject – language unleashed from normalized logic and 
coherence of content. The poet Caroline Bergvall has written that “at its very heart, 
Bernstein’s poetry signals the idea of performance, in the sense of its constructedness, 
explicit artefactuality, and distantiation” (7). Her choice (and quite possibly coinage) 
of the word “distantiation” conveys this sense of language detached from coherence 
and clarity and instead to be regarded as a performance to be taken not at face value 
but with a level of distance through which it can be analyzed and interpreted actively.  
The critic Irving Massey has also stressed the importance of comic 
performance in his reading of Bernstein’s essay: 
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Bernstein is committed to poetry as performance: that is, as a form of theater. 
In his insistence on the political nature of poetry, performance poetry 
becomes, for him, political theater. Finally, if the most revolutionary poetry is 
a bathetic, comic or self-mocking poetry, for Bernstein, the crucial poetry of 
our time is comic political theater (146). 
The form of “comic political theater” that Bernstein’s poetry might be considered to 
constitute is that of a Brechtian verfremdungseffekt, in which the reader is ‘brought to’ 
with a jolt and forced by the strangenesses of his syntax and grammar to pay attention 
to the ordering principles at work. The connections between Bernstein’s writing and 
the concept of “alienation” that is a cornerstone of Brecht’s ‘epic theatre’ have been 
noted by critics such as Tim Peterson and Jerome McGann. Peterson relates 
Bernstein’s “anti-absorptive strategy… through which the reader is alternately drawn 
into and bounced out of the text being read” (21) to that of Brecht in his essay ‘Either 
you’re with us and against us’ and McGann has described the way in which 
Bernstein’s Brechtian critical writing style “breaks the spell of expository prose 
typography” (2006, 154). Reading a text such as ‘Freud’s Butcher’, Brechtian 
verfremdungseffekt can be recognized within the bizarre mock-doggerel language that 
Bernstein employs, language that distances itself from the sort of speech we use to 
communicate. Bernstein’s formal contortions are alienating, involving a refocused 
attention in order stay alert to possibilities for meaning. A crucial component of 
verfremdungseffekt is the establishment of a sense of familiarity and convention 
which is then disrupted. For example, in many of Brecht’s epic plays, such as The 
Threepenny Opera, where elements of the theatre that one might expect in a play, 
such as familial relationships, operatic conventions etc, are present but disrupted and 
made strange to encourage the audience to look again and reconsider what they think 
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they know about what at first seems familiar or conventional. In Bernstein’s poetry 
(and in Gorgias’s performances), the same process occurs. For example, in ‘Freud’s 
Butcher’, the heightened language and slavishly attuned to rhyming scheme might 
appear the familiar stuff of poetry, and yet in Bernstein’s hands they are so radically 
strange as to call into question the very tenets of not only the genre of poetry but 
language use itself. Drama scholar W. B. Worthen has written of language poets and 
Bernstein in particular in relation to the performance of poetry and the poetics of 
performance. Following a discussion of Bernstein’s engagement with Brecht, he 
draws attention to the ways in which:  
The poem’s alienated embodiment on the page foregrounds the objectivity of 
language, its disassociation from a merely individual experience. This mise-
en-page enforces the reader’s alienated embodiment in the act of reading, a 
performance that similarly dislocates the comfortable assimilation of the poem 
into the lyric practice of subjection, the emotive or “melodramatic” 
identification with lyric “speech” (2005, 129).  
This dislocation of Bernstein’s poetry from what we expect from a poem is one of its 
most striking facets and arguably his poems still retain their capacity for alienation 
and surprise, even in the widened poetic sphere of today, where language poetry is 
increasingly at the heart of academic conceptions of contemporary poetry. Bernstein’s 
poetry retains its ability to alienate because it does not easily assimilate itself even 
into a conventionally or simplistic understanding of what language poetry is. 
Similarly, in Gorgias’s performances he uses the language and process of logic that 
other philosophers and sophists of the time used but he uses them in a nihilistic and 
extreme way in order to bend and stretch the limits of what logic is perceived as 
capable of.  
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Fundamental to this effect is the denial, as Worthen suggests, of “lyric 
speech”, while also parodying multiple speech-styles within the work. This 
ventriloquism is central not only to Bernstein’s verfremdungseffekt but to his comedic 
poetics as a whole:  
For I am a ventriloquist, happy as a raven to preach with blinding fervor of the 
corruptions of public life in a voice of pained honesty that is as much a conceit 
as the most formal legal brief for which my early education would seem to 
have prepared me. If my loops and short circuits, my love of elision, my 
Groucho Marxian refusal of irony, are an effort to explode the authority of 
those conventions I wish to discredit (disinherit), this constantly offers the 
consoling self-justification of being Art, as if I could escape the partiality of 
my condition by my investigation of it. But my art is just empty words if it 
does not, indeed, persuade, if it enters into the world as self-justification or 
self-flagellation or aesthetic ornamentation rather than as interaction, 
conversation, provocation (for myself and others) (224).  
Bernstein’s comic ventriloquist poetic performances are therefore able not only to 
dismantle or “disinherit” the logic of the self but to promote and encourage 
“provocation (for myself and others)”. The displacement of the self therefore is the 
provocation that unites in conversation and interaction the mutual producers of the 
work: the readers. Silliman has written of precisely this process in his afterword to the 
Bernstein-edited collection Close Listening. Silliman’s essay, entitled ‘Who speaks? 
The Self and Ventriloquism in the Poetry Reading’, explores ventriloquism as a 
condition of everyday language uses. His essay begins by focusing on “the trash 
containers in the cafeteria of a firm for which I used to work”, on which “appeared the 
words THANK YOU” (1998, 360). Silliman analyses the words, based around the 
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question posed by his title, which he appropriates from Roland Barthes: “Who 
speaks?” He comes to a number of different interpretations: that the words in fact 
mean “put garbage in here” rather than “thank you” and that therefore there it 
“extends a parallel logic” (360); secondly, Silliman contends that the words could be 
interpreted as “an anonymous architect expressing relief or even gratitude” (360); 
thirdly, he suggests they suppose a whole conversation “put garbage here”, “okay”, 
“thank you” of which only the final trace remains. In all of these interpretations of the 
words on the bin, Silliman still foregrounds the question of “who speaks” because it is 
something that we would never normally consider, being so accustomed to this kind 
of “absent but neutral subject” (361) in the language of commerce that we encounter 
on a daily basis. The words “thank you” in this context would involve the 
discrimination on the part of the perceiver to eliminate what they don’t mean (namely 
“thank you”- no-one is really being thanked only instructed where to put rubbish 
euphemistically), if we weren’t so accustomed and familiarized to the sign. However, 
as Silliman remarks paraphrasing Lacan “reference entails displacement” (360), even 
in an example such as this, where there is a certain incongruity and distance between 
what is being said and what is being indicated, i.e. the substitution of a phrase “thank-
you” for the more unpleasant or off-putting “put garbage here”. Whatever social 
codes are written into this use of language, the thing that isn’t usually attended to is 
“who speaks?”, so normalized is the detached and passive ventriloquism of the 
utterance, standing in for the management or even wider for the code of common 
decency governing workplaces in capitalist democracies.  
By utilizing a similar kind of ventriloquized utterance in his poetics, Bernstein 
makes both the alienating displacement and the question “who speaks?” central to the 
impact of his poems. A relevant example within the context of Silliman’s discussion 
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of the coded “trash can” is Bernstein’s poem from Girly Man, ‘Thank You for Saying 
Thank You’.   The title encapsulates the sense of a monotonous language game of 
which the rules are excessive, self-defeating politeness. Another interpretation would 
be that it's a sarcastic aside targeted at someone impolite who didn’t say “thank-you”. 
In any case, the poem initiates itself in the transactional language of polite 
communication. The poem begins:  
This is a totally 
accessible poem. 
There is nothing  
in this poem 
that is in any  
way difficult  
to understand. 
All the words 
are simple & 
to the point. 
There are no new 
concepts, no  
theories, no 
ideas to confuse 
you. (2008, 7)  
Bernstein ventriloquises the voice of “the poet” reassuring the reader about the 
straightforward content of his poem. However, his reassurances are far from 
convincing or reassuring, even as they appear to be borne out. Indeed, “all the words/ 
are simple &/ to the point”. However, there is a distinct question overhanging “who 
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speaks?” in the poem and why they would be so adamant to convince the reader that 
the poem is “totally accessible”.  The poem is in fact highly resistant, only in 
unexpected ways. The language in the poem is not resistant to communication, as is 
the case with some language poems; as the last line of the poem puts it, it “says what 
it says” (9). What the poem is resistant to is not communication but to interpretation. 
It takes considerable effort to interpret almost anything about the language in a poem 
that is so flat and lacking in textual effects, ambiguity and other aspects of textual 
enigma that are familiar from modernist and postmodernist poetry. Bernstein’s poem 
offers the same resistance to interpretation as works of conceptual and “uncreative 
writing” do, placing the fact of the poem above any impulse to read or even interpret 
it. However, what this resistance to interpretation parodies is the assumptions that 
underlie all ‘communication’ no matter how “direct” and “accessible” it may seem. 
Without Silliman’s interpretative analysis of the “trash can”, it is unlikely any heed 
would be paid to such a seemingly obvious and direct sign indicating where the bin is 
in the cafeteria. Similarly, the tone and vocabulary of Bernstein’s poem ventriloquizes 
the sort of positive and reassuring speech of so many public or institutional 
utterances: “It’s all about/ communication” (7), “This poem appreciates/ &values you/ 
as a reader” (8). However, its directness is undercut by the linebreaks of the poem, 
constantly reminding one that the poem is an artifice and the voice (however natural) 
is too. In the course of the poem, its monotone delivers the critical blow against those 
who would advocate just such a “totally accessible” poetry: “a hundred/ readers 
would each/ read the poem/ in an identical/ manner & derive/ the same message/ from 
it” (8). Poetry that advocates direct communication and total accessibility of this sort, 
suggests Bernstein’s poem, is about control, is about homogeneity, predicting and 
manipulating the responses of individuals within a society to interpret things in the 
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same way and to behave in the same way. By ventriloquizing exactly this kind of 
“direct speech” Bernstein performs a Brechtian verfremdungseffekt that encourages 
the reader to question the assumptions that underlie questions of “naturalness” and 
“accessibility” when it comes to language.  He does so, “in an effort to explode the 
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Conclusion: Contemporary Poetics and Sophistics  
 
By tracing some of the confluences and influences of sophistic thought in the poetry 
and poetics of Charles Bernstein, this thesis has attempted to suggest one reading of 
his practice as a continuation and rejuvenation of sophistic ideas in the context of 
contemporary poetic culture. Within Bernstein’s work, the key confluences with 
sophistics are: an interest in linguistic experimentation; a sense of language as the 
primary means through which societies are ordered and structured; an antipathy to 
uses of language that purport to be “natural”; an interest in pedagogy and its potential 
impact in creating empowered democratic individuals aware of their position as part 
of a society.  Part of what I have also intended to suggest in this thesis, though, is that 
a sense of sophistics is a useful way to consider the emergence of language poetry and 
other language-oriented and politically-engaged poetries that are currently being 
written. By this understanding, Charles Bernstein and some other language poets 
become part of a sophistic lineage or trajectory that includes many other figures who 
have bled literary experimentation into philosophy and challenged the dominant mode 
of discursive logic that has dominated since Plato. The line would include disparate 
thinkers and writers as Nietzsche, Thoreau, Emerson, William James, Derrida, Cavell, 
Stanley Fish and many other writers for whom a sophistical approach to writing 
philosophy, one that prioritises linguistic experimentation, has been key. It’s a list that 
would recalculate and formulate itself as the character of “sophist” retains its capacity 
to challenge and shock: for all the increased academic interest in sophistry, it remains 
a category to be avoided. And yet, even if a lineage of contemporary and historical 
sophists would dissemble and evade being categorized, nevertheless, the sense of 
sophistics offers a way of understanding the convergence of poetics, politics and 
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philosophy, as it emerges in the work of both theorists and poets. As Barbara Cassin 
has written, sophistics is an alternative tradition that has never been lost:  
What sophistic may, in its own way, help to bring to light in philosophy, 
politics, and literature is the loss and gain constituting such a discursive 
autonomy, in other words, constituting a logos that is an alternative to the 
Plato-Aristotelian logic that has always been ours (2003, 452).  
The widening in scope of this project then would take in other contemporary sophists 
in poetics, both those writers associated with language poetry and outside it. A 
number of the writers discussed in passing in this thesis would be relevant to such a 
project.  However, it would perhaps stop first to consider the ways in which Kenneth 
Goldsmith’s conceptual poetry and uncreative writing projects engage radical 
language performance with the cultural logics of contemporary art and literature. It 
would see his performance series “Kenneth Goldsmith Sings…”, in which he sings 
the works of twentieth century thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Adorno and Benjamin, 
as a sophistic enshrinement of artifice and art into theoretical works. These 
performances throw together the logic of contemporary pop performance and the 
logic of Twentieth Century theoretical discourse in a way that foregrounds language 
and artifice. A sophistic encounter with Goldsmith would perhaps also regard his 
rejection of originality as a valid aesthetic value (for example his statement that “My 
books are better thought about than read. They’re insanely dull and unreadable; I 
mean, do you really want to sit down and read a year’s worth of weather reports”) as 
itself a characteristic sophistic maneuver akin to Gorgias’s remark at the end of his 
‘Encomium for Helen’ that his arguments have been a “paignon”, a joke. Goldsmith’s 
text is performatively alienating in the same way as Gorgias’s performance. Simon 
Goldhill has written of Gorgias’s celebrated speech that “whether you have been 
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persuaded by the argument that logos is an irresistible master or not, the twist at the 
end cocks a snoot at your response” (21). The reader who aims at appraising 
Goldsmith’s works is similarly tongue-tied. If you engage with them at a linguistic 
level, reading them as literary texts, then you are failing to break out of the traditional 
assumptions regarding how you interpret literary texts that Goldsmith is breaking out 
of. However, if you dismiss them as “unreadable” in the way that Goldsmith 
encourages you to, you are left with nothing much apart from a fact of a text having 
been written, and not very much to “think about”. Furthermore, Goldsmith’s texts are 
actually remarkably readable and employ (however haphazardly) literary and 
rhetorical techniques such as repetition and juxtaposition as well as all of those he 
borrows from his source texts such as television, radio and The New York Times. In 
the same way that Bernstein’s and Gorgias’s poetics point towards the rhetorical 
underpinnings of all institutions and media in society, Goldsmith’s work could be 
seen as a conceptual re-presentation of this very fact. He is the poet who most 
succinctly and conceptually interrogates dominant media through which we live our 
lives, as a recent project of “printing out the entire internet” testifies. 
A sense of the sophistic could also be seen in poet Eileen Myles’s blending of 
poetics and politics when she ran as a write-in candidate for US President in 1992. As 
an encapsulation of the bringing together of poetics and public policy this symbolic 
act can be seen as a sophistic gesture. In spite of the smallness of the chance that 
Myles would have won the vote (a virtual impossibility), the fact of Myles standing 
opens up a possibility for poets to imagine their work as bound up with social and 
political facts. This act (and the texts Myles has written about it, such as How to Run 
for President of the United States of America) encourage poets to consider their role 
as a public one. Indeed, her own decision to run for president emerged from what 
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might be considered a sophistic backdrop. She has said that “in 1992, I was moved by 
the realization that candidates were not writing their own speeches and I knew I 
would want to do that” (e-flux.com). Her decision, then, is sophistic in that it comes 
from the awareness that politics is rhetoric, is ‘speech-writing’. The distance she 
senses between politicians and their language is a sense that if politics is primarily a 
language game, then those engaged in it should be those most adept at exploring 
language, most aware of its constructive powers. The sophists’ could be seen to be 
issuing the same suggestion throughout their politically-engaged speeches and 
language performances. Myles’s and Goldsmith’s gestures suggest a possibility of 
why the renewal of a sense of sophistic might be regarded as critical at this juncture: 
the perceived crisis in Western democratic processes. John Stuhr has summed up the 
democratic crisis as follows:  
These deepening problems include terrorism, fanaticism, and absolutism; 
hunger and homelessness; debts and deficits; illiteracy and illness; intolerance, 
illegality and illiberalism; physical and psychic violence and scandal at both 
individual and institutional levels; environmental degradation and 
international conflict; apathy, resignation, contempt, and selfishness (45).  
Stuhr’s point is that democracy is facing a barrage of ever-increasing problems and 
that it is proving itself in its current liberal form, not necessarily fully equipped to 
deal with them. Stuhr’s argument isn’t that this fact justifies throwing democracy out. 
On the contrary, he is fully behind it. However, his interpretation of the word 
democratic is drawn from Dewey and suggests that “the very idea of democracy, the 
meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh” (45). In a world-
situation where democracy is widely held up as a scared and untouchable given, 
Stuhr, as Dewey before him, demands that democracy be less hallowed and more 
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discovered, less taken for granted and more engaged with by all citizens in a 
thoughtful and intelligent way. For Stuhr, “these current problems are horrible 
reminders of the public and personal consequences of letting democracy “stand still”’ 
(46). In so doing, Stuhr is not only echoing Dewey. He is also enshrining the idea of 
an ever changing society that was memorably asserted by the pre-socratic philosopher 
Heraclitus, who asserted that ‘everything is in flux’ through the memorable metaphor 
of a river. According to Stuhr and continuing this Heraclitean metaphor, democracy in 
its current form would be a pond full of stagnating water in desperate need of flow. 
The sophists introduced the “flux” into Athenian democracy, recognizing that 
language and the process of the agora were fundamental to the democratic political 
life of the system, they took this as their medium and developed radical and 
unpredictable ways of exploring its implications. Their work was not so much a 
challenge to or critique of democracy but a constant critical incursion into its 
processes and presenting both novel stylistic forms and innovative logical arguments 
that ensured that Athenian democracy was “continually explored afresh”. However, 
we currently reside in a political climate where politicians are so detached from a 
sophistic awareness of language’s role in constituting society that they routinely farm 
out the writing of their speeches. Language poetry (which grew up in perhaps 
American democracy’s most desperate hour- the Watergate scandal), and in particular 
the work of Bernstein, is the literary movement that most fully performs the sophistic 
function. Language poets, like sophists, take language as the fundamental method and 
medium of political organization and therefore explore new linguistic structures in 
order to challenge and critique the dominant structures of contemporary society. 
Finally, it is in this sense that this thesis argues that Bernstein goes beyond those 
contemporaneous reappraisals of the sophists in his book The Sophist. The wealth of 
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publications within schools of thought such as philosophy and rhetoric have re-framed 
the sophists as having made an important contribution to contemporary Western 
philosophy. However, while those books attempt to reconstruct the ideas of the 
sophists, they fail to re-imagine and re-invent the linguistic innovation and 
experimentation that was at the heart of their project as a means of exploring the 
radical capacities of language as the medium of thought and communication. This 
task, however, is the domain of Bernstein and other poets. As he puts it, literary 
writing allows the “right to reconvene” on contemporary structures of society, such as 
the stagnant pond of democracy by placing the question of structure and artifice at its 
centre. It is in this sense that Bernstein’s sophistics presents a Heraclitean vision of 
contemporary social and political culture, or as he himself puts it, an exploration of 
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